Biggins v. Hernando, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:94CV263-D-O (N.D. Miss. 12/__/1995)
| Decision Date | 01 December 1995 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:94CV263-D-O. |
| Parties | CHARLES BIGGINS, PLAINTIFF, v. CITY OF HERNANDO, MISSISSIPPI, ET AL. DEFENDANTS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
This cause comes before the court upon the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. The issues which the defendants address include claims for deprivation of property and liberty without due process and a First Amendment claim. After a thorough review of the record in this cause, the undersigned finds the motion partially well taken and the same shall be granted in part and denied in part.
The plaintiff, Charles Biggins, began work as a patrolman for the Hernando Police Department on July 1, 1991. He was terminated from his employment on August 2, 1994 by the City of Hernando Board of Aldermen for alleged misconduct and improper use of his authority.
The acts that eventually escalated into the relevant situation began on July 17, 1994, when the plaintiff arrested an individual by the name of John Jackson. Jackson immediately complained to the police department that plaintiff had used excessive force in the arrest and had been constantly harassing him. Defendant Gale Shackleford, the police chief, assigned two (2) officers to investigate the complaint. Meanwhile, Jackson's sister, Diane Jackson, circulated a petition throughout the city to have plaintiff removed from employment as a police officer. Several other citizens also filed complaints against plaintiff during this same time.
Upon completion of the investigation of Jackson's complaint and receipt of the petition and written complaints, Shackleford and defendant Edward Gale, Mayor of Hernando, turned the matter over to the Police Advisory Committee1 ("Committee"). The Committee held a meeting to discuss the various complaints against plaintiff on July 28, 1994. Jackson and several other citizens were heard along with plaintiff. The Committee recommended to the Board of Aldermen that plaintiff be dismissed.
On August 2, 1994, the Hernando Board of Aldermen heard the Committee's recommendation with plaintiff present at the meeting and represented by counsel. With a four (4) to one (1) vote, the Board dismissed plaintiff from the police force. Subsequently, plaintiff filed the present suit.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." F.R.C.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment carries the burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is presented, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1994). "Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. v. Krajl, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1992). The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Matagorda County v. Russel Law, 19 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated a constitutional right by not affording him procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Moore v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 871 F.2d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 1989). In the case sub judice, plaintiff has alleged that his due process claim stems from both a property and liberty interest in continued employment with the Hernando Police Department.
A property interest in continued employment with the Hernando Police Department could only arise if plaintiff had a legitimate claim of entitlement to it, a claim which would limit the employer's ability to terminate the employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Schultea v. Wood, 27 F.3d 1112, 1116 (5th Cir. 1994). State law determines whether such a property interest exists. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1491-92, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); Williams v. Texas Tech. Univ. Health Sciences Ctr., 6 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, Williams v. Saltzstein, 114 S. Ct. 1301, 127 L.Ed.2d 652 (1994).
Under Mississippi law, unless otherwise specifically contracted for or implied through personnel polices or procedures, employment is terminable at the will of either the employer or employee. Harrison County Sch. Bd. v. Morreale, 538 So. 2d 1196, 1200 (Miss. 1989). Plaintiff produced no evidence of a contract with the City of Hernando and conceded that the police department's personnel manual did not create a property interest.2 See Plaintiff's Motion in Response to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ¶ 2. There being no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the City's policies and procedures creating any property interest, dismissal is warranted as concerns the plaintiff's property claim. See Hartle v. Packard Elec., 626 So. 2d 106, 109 (Miss. 1993) ().
The plaintiff also claims that he has been deprived of a liberty interest which triggers his due process rights. Only if such a deprivation occurred would plaintiff have a right to a hearing. In order to maintain such a cause of action, the plaintiff must prove
(1) that he was a public employee; (2) that he was discharged; (3) that stigmatizing charges were made against him in connection with his discharge; (4) that the charges were false; (5) that the charges were made public; (6) that he requested a name-clearing hearing; and (7) that the hearing was denied.
Arrington v. County of Dallas, 970 F.2d 1441, 1447 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-74; 92 S. Ct. at 2707. The defendants argue that to demonstrate stigmatization, plaintiff must further show that the charges damaged his reputation so as to essentially foreclose his "freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities." Roth, 408 U.S. at 573, 92 S. Ct. at 2707; Ishee v. Moss, 668 F. Supp. 554, 558 (N.D. Miss. 1987). Injury to reputation alone cannot constitute injury to liberty. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1164, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976); Ishee, 668 F. Supp. at 558. The defendants do not dispute that plaintiff was a public employee, that he was discharged, or that some charges were made public. However, they do dispute the remaining elements.
For example, the defendants attest that plaintiff has failed to present any proof that the charges levied against him were stigmatizing. Instead, the proof shows that plaintiff was hired by the Coldwater Police Department in June 1995.3 No affidavits, depositions, or other admissible evidence is present in the record which would tend to show that the plaintiff was denied employment, much less that any denials were based on the charges relevant to the instant case.
However, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that a discharged employee's liberty interest is infringed when he is denied the opportunity to clear his name of "charges that blacken his reputation, in addition to charges that foreclose future employment opportunities." Rosenstein v. City of Dallas, 876 F.2d 392, 398 n.10 (5th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). Charges, made in the course of termination from public employment, which blacken one's name, "but do not necessarily cause the loss of employment opportunities, can constitute part of a claim for a name-clearing hearing." Id. n.9. Furthermore, the charges need not actually cause the discharge, but must only be "connected with the discharge." Id. n.3 (citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 633 n.13, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 14406 n.13, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980)).
In the case sub judice, it appears that the charges made actually caused plaintiff's discharge. In any event, there is sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to determine that they were "connected" with his termination of employment. And the undersigned is of the opinion that charges or conduct such as sexual harassment, harassment of citizens, and use of excessive force are of a type which could be said to blacken one's name. Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment on the issue of whether or not the charges against him were stigmatizing.
The defendants next argue that plaintiff has failed to distinguish between statements made by the citizens of the City of Hernando and those made by the defendants. The defendants cite Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 936 n.10 (5th Cir. 1995), for the proposition that statements made by private citizens cannot form the basis of a liberty claim. The court does not give such a broad reading of Blackburn. Instead, it appears that Blackburn holds that the stigmatizing charges must be made public by the defendant in...
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