Bijeol v. Benson, 75-1024
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
| Writing for the Court | Before SWYGERT, SPRECHER and TONE; TONE |
| Citation | 513 F.2d 965 |
| Parties | Paul BIJEOL et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. Charles L. BENSON et al., Respondents-Appellants. |
| Docket Number | No. 75-1024,75-1024 |
| Decision Date | 15 April 1975 |
Page 965
v.
Charles L. BENSON et al., Respondents-Appellants.
Seventh Circuit.
Decided April 15, 1975.
Page 966
S. Cass Weiland, Atty., Crim. Div., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Stanley B. Miller, U. S. Atty., Indianapolis, Ind., for respondents-appellants.
Michael B. Nash, Chicago, Ill., for petitioners-appellees.
Before SWYGERT, SPRECHER and TONE, Circuit Judges.
TONE, Circuit Judge.
This is a sequel to Garafola v. Benson, 505 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1974), in which we held that prisoners sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) were entitled to a meaningful hearing before the Board of Parole at some point prior to the expiration of one-third of their sentences. The question here is whether the Garafola rule can be applied to other similarly situated federal prisoners by means of a class action or a proceeding analogous to a class action, and, if so, whether it should be so applied nationally, only within this circuit, or only within the district in which the case was filed.
Petitioners are five prisoners convicted of bank robbery who are serving sentences of various lengths under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) in the United States Penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana. In their pro se complaint, they sought declaratory, injunctive, and habeas corpus
Page 967
relief 1 based on the failure of the United States Board of Parole in each of their cases to hold a meaningful parole hearing before the expiration of one-third of the sentence. They sought to represent not only themselves but all prisoners at Terre Haute who were sentenced under § 4208(a)(2) for bank robbery.The complaint, filed before the entry of the District Court order affirmed in Garafola, relied upon Grasso v. Norton, 376 F.Supp. 116 (D.Conn.1974), which was then and is now pending on appeal. Respondents promptly moved to stay this case pending review of Grasso by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit but filed no other motion and no answer. Nothing further transpired in this case until nine days after our affirmance in Garafola, when the District Court entered an order holding that respondents, by moving for a stay without filing an answer, had admitted the facts pleaded; that the action should proceed as a class action under Rule 23(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.; that the class should be defined as all federal prisoners sentenced under § 4208(a)(2); and that relief based on Garafola should be granted to the entire class. Shortly thereafter the court stayed its order until January 9, 1975, except as to prisoners in Terre Haute, and thereafter we entered a like stay pending appeal.
Respondents ask us to reconsider our holding in Garafola, which we decline to do, but they concede that, assuming Garafola is to stand, the District Court properly granted relief to the named petitioners. We therefore are not required to consider the correctness of the District Court order as to them.
Turning to the class allegations, we conclude that while Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P., does not apply, a representative action may be maintained in the unusual circumstances of this case, limited to federal prisoners in custody in the district in which the district court sits who are serving sentences imposed under § 4208(a)(2) and have not yet been given a parole hearing other than the initial hearing customarily given shortly after custody begins. Terre Haute is the only federal penitentiary in the district.
Respondents do not directly question the appropriateness of a representative proceeding in habeas corpus actions. Nor do they directly question the appropriateness of a class limited to prisoners within the district. Instead they argue that the District Court did not comply with the procedural requirements they assert are necessary under Rule 23. They also challenge the authority of the District Court to extend the effect of the order outside the district. Thus, if an order based on Garafola met the technical objections and granted relief only within the district, respondents' only serious challenges to the validity of the District Court's order would be resolved. We need not decide, therefore, whether the District Court could properly go beyond the pleadings in defining the appropriate class, insofar as the designated class is entirely within the district.
The gist of petitioners' allegations is that they are being unlawfully subjected to physical restraint by reason of the Parole Board's failure to comply with the statute. Their remedy, therefore, is habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485-489, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). Although the Preiser case dealt with a state...
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Mays v. Dart, Case No. 20 C 2134
...the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that governs class actions, Rule 23, does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings. Bijeol v. Benson , 513 F.2d 965, 967–68 (7th Cir. 1975) ; cf. Rodriguez v. Hayes , 591 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2010). But representative actions—which are analogous to cla......
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...[Schrader v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 76, 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.1972) ] awaits occasion for reappraisal [Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 968 n. 3 (7th Cir.1975) The increased prominence of the representative action as an adjudicative device against a defendant class prompts c......
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...1975), and the Seventh Circuit has indicated that its Schrader opinion will have to be reexamined in light of Eisen, Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 968 n.3 (7th Cir. Our own resolution of the due process claim in a Rule 23(b)(1) action must also Page 1186 take into account the recent decis......
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Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Com'n, No. 82-3593
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