Biles v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv.

• Decision Date: 25 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 95-CA-25,95-CA-25
• Citation: 107 Ohio App.3d 114,667 N.E.2d 1244
• Parties: , 69 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 530 BILES, Appellant, v. OHIO BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 114

107 Ohio App.3d 114

667 N.E.2d 1244, 69 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 530

BILES, Appellant, v. OHIO BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES et al., Appellees.

No. 95-CA-25.

Court of Appeals of Ohio,

Second District, Clark County.

Decided Oct. 25, 1995.

Martin, Browne, Hull & Harper, Steven J. McCready and Michael C. Weaver, Springfield, for appellee.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General and Joseph J. Zaccaria, Assistant Attorney General, Columbus, for appellees.

FREDERICK N. YOUNG, Judge.

Carolyn L. Biles (appellant) is appealing from the decision of the Common Pleas Court of Clark County, Ohio, which affirmed the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review denying her unemployment compensation benefits after she left the employment of Monte Zinn Chevrolet in Springfield, Ohio.

The appellant's initial application for benefits was denied by the bureau with the following statement:

"Claimant quit Monte Zinn Chevrolet Co., Inc. when she thought her position was eliminated and then packed her possessions and left the building without discussing the situation with her employer. This is a quit without just cause as claimant created her own unemployment. Claimant is ineligible for benefits for the duration of unemployment caused by this quit."

Appellant, by then represented by counsel, filed an application for reconsideration, which was denied on November 18, 1992. She filed an appeal to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, which held a hearing on March 26, 1993, where both the appellant and Monte Zinn, owner of Monte Zinn Chevrolet, appeared with counsel and testified. The facts of the matter were found and set forth by the hearing officer in his decision as follows:

"FINDINGS OF FACT

"Claimant worked for Monte Zinn Chevrolet Company, Inc. from September 8, 1990, through September 28, 1992. Claimant's title was Customer Relations Manager.

"In late May and June, 1992, claimant was off work six weeks due to breast cancer surgery. Shortly before she was to return to work, claimant noticed an ad in a local Springfield newspaper for a customer relations manager position for Monte Zinn Chevrolet Company, Inc.. The ad described claimant's duties. In addition, the ad made reference to also working for a Toyota dealership owned by Monte Zinn.

"When claimant returned to work she questioned Mr. Zinn concerning the ad. Mr. Zinn informed claimant that he was thinking about making changes and he believed a man might be better suited for the position of customer relations manager. Mr. Zinn expected the individual to have more contact with body shop personnel and mechanics than claimant had been doing. While claimant had contact with those two areas, Mr. Zinn believed additional contact was necessary. Claimant was not informed that she would not have a job with Monte Zinn Chevrolet Company, Inc.

"In mid-September, 1992, claimant took a one week vacation. When claimant returned from vacation on Monday, September 2, 199, claimant found that another individual was in her office at her desk. The other individual, Rob Koons, informed claimant that he had been promoted to the position of customer relations manager. Claimant believed that she had been replaced by Mr. Zinn. Claimant spoke with the general manager, Steve Lowery. Claimant was instructed to see Mr. Zinn at approximately 9:00 a.m. Claimant spoke with Mr. Zinn in his office. Claimant was told by Mr. Zinn that she should return in the afternoon to discuss her status with the company. Claimant was not informed that she was discharged by Mr. Zinn.

"Claimant did not return to see Mr. Zinn in the afternoon. Claimant made no contact with the company after September 28, 199. Claimant believed she had been replaced by a less qualified male and that she had been discharged by the employer.

"Mr. Zinn has testified that he had planned to move claimant to another position with no change in her rate of pay or hours. When claimant failed to return, the employer considered she had quit her employment.

"Claimant has argued that she was constructively discharged by Monte Zinn Chevrolet Company, Inc. when her position was given to a less qualified male. Claimant has argued that she was discriminated against by Monte Zinn Chevrolet Company, Inc. based on her gender. Claimant quit employment with Monte Zinn Chevrolet Company, Inc. before the employer was given the opportunity to describe to claimant her new position. Claimant's actions in leaving the dealership and not returning after she was aware that Mr. Zinn wished to speak with her about her new duties were not the actions of a reasonably [sic] individual."

The hearing officer affirmed the decision of the bureau denying appellant unemployment compensation pursuant to R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a), which provides that no individual may be paid benefits if the Administrator finds that the applicant quit his or her work "without just cause." The hearing officer stated his reasons as follows:

"Claimant quit employment with Monte Zinn Chevrolet Company, Inc. when she believed she had been replaced unfairly by a less qualified male. Claimant's actions in quitting her employment before finding out what her new assignment with the employer might be were not the actions of a reasonable individual. Claimant quit employment with Monte Zinn Chevrolet Company, Inc. without just cause."

After her application for a further appeal was denied, Biles timely filed an appeal to the common pleas court pursuant to R.C. 4141.28(O). That section sets forth the standard of review by the common pleas court as follows:

"If the court finds that the decision was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, it shall reverse and vacate such decision or it may modify such decision and enter final judgment in accordance with such modification; otherwise such court shall affirm such decision. Any interested party shall have the right to appeal from the decision of the court as in civil cases."

The Clark County Common Pleas Court heard oral arguments on the matter on September 8, 1994, received briefs of counsel representing both parties, and on January 25, 1995, affirmed the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review with the following entry:

"This cause is before the Court on Plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the State of Ohio Unemployment Compensation Board of Review mailed October 7, 1993, disallowing Claimant-Appellant's application for unemployment benefits.

"Upon review of the record, including the records of Appellee-Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, and arguments of counsel, the Court does not find that the decision was unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence."

It is from that decision that appellant's timely appeal is before us.

Initially, we must determine our proper standard of review of the decision of the common pleas court in an unemployment compensation case. Until very recently, it seemed to be settled law in Ohio that the standard of review was abuse of discretion. In other words, an appellate court could not overturn a decision of the common pleas court upholding, or overruling, a decision of the board of review, unless it found that the court had abused its discretion in finding that the board's decision itself was either unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, or not so, pursuant to the standard of review set forth in the Revised Code, as quoted above. The seminal case on this issue is Angelkovski v. Buckeye Potato Chips Co. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 159, 11 OBR 242, 463 N.E.2d 1280. In Angelkovski the Court of Appeals for Franklin County carefully explained the role of both the common pleas court and a reviewing court in judging actions of the board of review as follows:

"The resolution of purely factual questions is for the board of review and its referees as triers of the facts. Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Roach (1947), 148 Ohio St. 511, 518 [36 O.O. 167, 170, 76 N.E.2d 79, 83-84]. The role of the court of common pleas, upon an appeal based on factual grounds, is limited to determining whether the board's decision is supported by evidence in the record. Kilgore v. Bd. of Review (1965), 2 Ohio App.2d 69, 71 [31 O.O.2d 108, 109, 206 N.E.2d 423, 424]. The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the board; it may not reverse simply because it interprets the evidence differently than did the board. Fahl v. Bd. of Review (1965), 2 Ohio App.2d 286 [31 O.O.2d 426, 207 N.E.2d 774]; Kilgore v. Bd. of Review, supra. Because the statutory standard of review is couched in terms of manifest weight of the evidence, a decision of the board supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the controversy will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. See C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279 [8 O.O.3d 261, 376 N.E.2d 578]. Stated another way, a reviewing court will not reverse on the manifest weight of the evidence where reasonable minds could weigh the evidence and arrive at contrary conclusions. In re Parker v. Anheuser-Busch (Jan. 28, 1983 [sic, 1982] ), Franklin App. No. 81AP-718, unreported "The role of an appellate court, in reviewing a determination of a court of common pleas on manifest weight of the evidence on appeal from the board, is different. The function of the court of common pleas, in determining whether the board's decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, necessarily involves the exercise of sound discretion. Accordingly, an order of the court of common pleas based upon a determination of the manifest weight of the evidence, may be reversed only upon a showing that the court abused its discretion. See Rohde v. Farmer (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 82 [52 O.O.2d 376, 262 N.E.2d 685]. In this context, the meaning of the term 'abuse of discretion' connotes more than an...