Bill's Distributing, Ltd. v. Cormican, 01-2567.
Decision Date | 07 May 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 01-2567.,01-2567. |
Citation | 256 Wis.2d 142,2002 WI App 156,647 N.W.2d 908 |
Parties | BILL'S DISTRIBUTING, LTD., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gerald CORMICAN, Susan Cormican, Gerald Cormican and Susan Cormican d/b/a Cormican Trucking, Cormican Logging/Trucking, LLP, Defendants-Respondents, John JOURDAN and Judith Jourdan, Defendants-Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. KINCAID & RUETZ FORESTRY CONSULTANTS, INC., Third-Party Defendant. |
Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Peter M. Reinhardt and Bakke Norman S.C. of Menomonie.
On behalf of the defendants-respondents, the cause was submitted on the brief of Richard J. Kelly, Michael J. Happe, and Kelly & Ryberg, S.C. of Eau Claire.
Before Cane, C.J., Hoover, P.J., and Peterson, J.
¶ 1.
Bill's Distributing, Ltd., appeals an order in its action to recover damages for trees erroneously removed from its land. The trial court ordered that WIS. STAT. § 26.09 (1999-2000) could not apply retroactively and that Bill's was not entitled to the restoration damages for its trees.1 Bill's argues that the recently amended version of WIS. STAT. § 26.09 (1997-1998), the timber trespass statute, should apply retroactively to its claim. We disagree and affirm that portion of the order because the changes to the statute are substantive rather than procedural. Bill's also contends that it is entitled to restoration damages for its trees. We agree and reverse that part of the order because § 26.09 (1997-1998) is not an exclusive remedy.
¶ 2. Bill's owns wooded hunting and recreational land. John and Judith Jourdan own adjoining property. Kincaid & Ruetz Forestry Consultants, Inc., contracted with John Jourdan to arrange the sale of timber from the Jourdans' land.
¶ 3. Gerald and Susan Cormican, doing business as Cormican Logging/Trucking, LLP, harvest timber. In 1999, Jourdan and Cormican entered into a contract permitting Cormican to remove designated timber from the Jourdans' land. The Cormicans, however, removed approximately four acres of timber from Bill's property without its consent, and the Jourdans received compensation for that timber.
¶ 4. Bill's commenced this action against the Cormicans and the Jourdans, alleging timber trespass and unjust enrichment. Bill's later amended its complaint to add allegations of negligence and private nuisance and to add Kincaid & Ruetz as a defendant.
¶ 5. The trial court issued an order concluding that Bill's damage remedy for the timber wrongfully removed from its property was limited to "stumpage value," rather than restoration damages. The court also decided that the amended WIS. STAT. § 26.09 (1999-2000) could not apply retroactively to Bill's action. We granted Bill's leave to appeal.
[1-5]
¶ 6. The interpretation of a statute and its application to a set of facts are questions of law we review de novo. Reyes v. Greatway Ins. Co., 227 Wis.2d 357, 364-65, 597 N.W.2d 687 (1999). The purpose of statutory interpretation is to discern the intent of the legislature. Id. at 365. To determine intent, we look to the plain language of the statute. Id. "A statute is ambiguous if it capable of being understood by a reasonably well-informed person in either of two senses." Id. If the language of the statute renders legislative intent ambiguous, we resort to judicial construction. Id.
¶ 7. WISCONSIN STAT. § 26.09 (1997-1998) created a civil claim for recovery of damages resulting from timber trespass.2 The legislature amended the statute by 1999 Wis. Act 190, § 15, effective June 2, 2000. Section 26.09 (1999-2000) provides in pertinent part:
[6]
¶ 8. Bill's argues that the amended WIS. STAT. § 26.09 (1999-2000) can apply to its action because the statute is remedial in nature. We disagree. We conclude that the amendment constitutes a substantive change to § 26.09 (1997-1998), and therefore the amended statute cannot apply retroactively.
[7, 8]
¶ 9. Here, the injury occurred and Bill's initiated its claims before the amended statute became effective. Generally, statutes are applied prospectively. Snopek v. Lakeland Med. Ctr., 223 Wis. 2d 288, 293, 588 N.W.2d 19 (1999). However, there are two well-defined exceptions to this rule. A statute may be applied retroactively if, by the express language or by necessary implication, the statutory language reveals the legislative intent that it apply retroactively. Schulz v. Ystad, 155 Wis. 2d 574, 597, 456 N.W.2d 312 (1990). Nothing in WIS. STAT. § 26.09 (1999-2000), however, expresses or implies a legislative intent for it to apply retroactively.
[9, 10]
¶ 10. We also give retroactive application to statutes that are procedural or remedial in nature, rather than substantive. Modica v. Verhulist, 195 Wis. 2d 633, 643, 536 N.W.2d 466 (Ct. App. 1995).4 City of Madison v. Town of Madison, 127 Wis. 2d 96, 102, 377 N.W.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1985) (citation omitted).
¶ 11. Contrary to Bill's assertion that WIS. STAT. § 26.09 (1999-2000) is a remedial statute, we agree with the trial court that the changes are substantive. WISCONSIN STAT. § 26.09(2) (1999-2000) reiterates the universal right to sue for timber trespass available in the former statute. However, WIS. STAT. § 26.09(3) (1999-2000) provides a new range of damages available with a new element of fault accompanying each level of damages. This escalating liability for greater culpability builds on the general right to sue for timber trespass and defines new rights, defenses and obligations under the statute. We therefore conclude that the amended statute is substantively different. See City of Madison, 127 Wis. 2d at 101-02.
[11, 12]
¶ 12. As alluded to, a comparison of the former and current WIS. STAT. § 26.09 reveals that, among other things, the amended statute provides for new damages. WISCONSIN STAT. § 26.09 (1999-2000) provides not only for double damages, as the old statute did, but in certain circumstances also provides for triple and quadruple damages. The amended statute carefully details various penalties and damage amounts that may be recovered depending on the actions of the parties. WIS. STAT. § 26.09(3) (1999-2000). An alteration in damages available is a change in substantive rights....
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