Billings v. Billings

• Decision Date: 06 July 1999
• Docket Number: (AC 18187)
• Citation: 54 Conn. App. 142,732 A.2d 814
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: SANDRA B. BILLINGS v. GEORGE W. BILLINGS III

54 Conn. App. 142

732 A.2d 814

SANDRA B. BILLINGS v. GEORGE W. BILLINGS III

(AC 18187)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 20, 1999.

Officially Released July 6, 1999.

O'Connell, C. J., and Foti and Spear, JS.

Brock T. Dubin, for the appellant (defendant).

Alice C. Mack, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

FOTI, J.

The defendant, George W. Billings III, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motions for contempt and modification and granting the plaintiffs motion for contempt. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) calculated the value of his interest in the marital home, (2) determined that his obligation to maintain life insurance was a property settlement and not alimony, (3) denied his motion for modification and (4) found him in wilful contempt. We reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant were married in 1967 and have two children. The defendant was an attorney in Norwalk and a partner in the law firm of Billings & Reid until 1985, when he suffered a stroke severely limiting his earning capacity.

On November 7, 1986, the trial court rendered a judgment of legal separation. The judgment awarded both parties $1 per year as alimony. The judgment further specified that the marital home was to be sold and the proceeds divided as follows: "The plaintiff may continue to occupy the marital home until June 1, 1992, at which time the real estate shall be placed on the market for sale.... The price shall be by agreement and failing agreement, a court of competent jurisdiction shall fix the price and other terms of sale. Upon sale, after payment of the mortgage, broker's fees and closing costs, the net proceeds shall be divided seventy-five percent (75%) to Plaintiff and twenty-five percent (25%) to Defendant."

The judgment also provided: "The defendant shall keep three life insurance policies in force naming Plaintiff as primary beneficiary of $100,000.00 and naming the two children as primary beneficiaries of the remaining $150,000.00. He shall furnish proof to Plaintiff that the policies are in force with the beneficiaries maintained, as to Plaintiff unless she dies remarries or cohabits and as to the minors until they are both eighteen (18) years of age."

A stipulation to modify the judgment entered into on February 12, 1988, provides: "From the first date of the payment on the mortgages, after the Judgment rendered in the above-entitled matter, the plaintiff shall be entitled to a credit for the principal reduction on said mortgages at the time the property is to be sold and the net proceeds divided." The stipulation also extended the date by which the marital home must be sold until September 1, 1996. The stipulation also provided that the defendant name the children as beneficiaries on the life insurance only "until the last child completes his or her post high school education." Additional facts will be set forth where necessary.

I

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly calculated the value of his interest in the marital home. We agree.

"Before turning to the merits of the parties' arguments, we first set forth principles that will assist us in resolving this issue. To begin, it is well settled that judicial review of a trial court's exercise of its broad discretion in domestic relations cases is limited to the questions of whether the court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have concluded as it did.... It is the sole province of the trial court to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) W. v. W., 248 Conn. 487, 495, 728 A.2d 1076 (1999).

The trial court found the following facts. "In January, 1994, the parties agreed to refinance the marital home. On January 14, 1994, the [defendant] quitclaimed his interest in the home to the [plaintiff] and the [plaintiff] paid the [defendant] $15,000 as an advance on his 25 percent interest. By letter dated August 25, 1996, the [defendant] advised the [plaintiff] she owed him $28,833.80 for his 25 percent interest. The [plaintiff] replied, in a letter to him dated September 6, 1996, that she was owed $4664.79, according to her mathematical calculations."¹ In 1996, at the time the plaintiff was to sell the marital home, it had a stipulated value of $220,000. The house was encumbered by two mortgages.

While both parties utilized different methods to compute the value of the interest in the property, the court utilized yet a third method holding: "The plain language in the judgment requires payment of the mortgages, which totaled $44,644.79, before the 75 percent-25 percent split in the net proceeds is computed. This amount must first be deducted from the agreed market value of $220,000, which leaves a net balance of $175,335.21. The [plaintiff's] 75 percent net share amounts to $131,501.41, and the [defendant's] 25 percent net share amounts to $43,833.80, after payment of the mortgages." We agree with the trial court's calculations up to this point in its analysis. We conclude, however, that the trial court miscalculated the value of the parties' interests and misinterpreted the judgment and stipulation.

The stipulation states: "From the first date of the payment on the mortgages, after the Judgment rendered in the above-entitled matter, the plaintiff shall be entitled to a credit for the [principal] reduction on said mortgages at the time the property is to be sold and the net proceeds divided." (Emphasis added.) We must determine if the trial court properly interpreted the language of the stipulation. The stipulation is essentially a contract between the defendant and the plaintiff. It is axiomatic that where the parties do not define a term, we look to the plain meaning of the words. "Credit" is defined as "the acknowledgement of payment on a debt by entry of the amount in an account"; Webster's New World Dictionary (2d Ed.); or "a sum deducted (from an account owed) or added (as to a bank account) in making an adjustment." Id. "Credit" also has been defined as "a component of a journal entry which increases revenues, liabilities, and equity; and decreases assets and expenses." Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). The term "credit" clearly refers to mortgage payments made by the plaintiff. It does not connote that the plaintiff can receive a bonus or other remuneration for amounts she has not paid.

The trial court held that the plaintiff was entitled to an additional credit of $24,039.21, the amount that she testified as having paid on the mortgage from December, 1986, through January, 1994. The trial court deducted the $24,039.21 from the $28,833.80 that the defendant claims is his proper share of the marital home. Thereby, the trial court awarded the defendant $4794.59. We fail to see the logic in the trial court's calculations. The trial court, in essence, gave the plaintiff credit for the payment of the two mortgages totaling $44,664.79, to which she is clearly entitled. The trial court also gave the plaintiff credit for an additional $24,039.21, which has already been included in the original deduction of $44,664.79. Both parties' calculations take into account the mortgage payments of $44,664.79, which are the total payments on the mortgages from 1986 to 1996. Neither party's original calculations considered reducing the defendant's share by an additional $24,039.21. In fact, at oral argument, the plaintiff admitted that she was, in essence, receiving a "double credit" in the form of the additional $24,039.21. We conclude that the trial court's interpretation of the stipulation was incorrect.

The plaintiffs calculation is incorrect because it calculates the defendant's share of the property before deducting the mortgage payments as required in paragraph six of the judgment. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant's calculation is correct and reject the trial court's calculation, as it is unsupported by the language of the judgment and stipulation. The defendant is entitled to $28,833.80 representing the balance of his 25 percent share of the marital home.

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court (1) did not have the authority to determine that the insurance policy was part of a property settlement and (2) improperly determined that the defendant's obligation to maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of the plaintiff was intended as a property settlement and therefore nonmodifiable. We disagree.

A

The defendant's claim that the trial court lacked authority to decide, sua sponte, that the insurance policy was part of a property settlement must fail. General Statutes § 46b-86 (a)² specifically allows for the modification only of "alimony or support or an order for alimony or support pendente lite...." It further states that the trial court does not have the authority to modify a property settlement entered into pursuant to § 46b-81.³ Section 46b-86 (a) gives the trial court only limited jurisdiction to modify a judgment. "By its terms, the statute deprives the Superior Court of continuing jurisdiction over that portion of a dissolution judgment providing for the assignment of property of one party to the other party under General Statues § 46b-81." Bunche v. Bunche, 180 Conn. 285, 289, 429 A.2d 874 (1980); see also Woodward v. Woodward, 44 Conn. App. 99, 101, 686 A.2d 1010 (1997); Croke v. Croke, 4 Conn. App. 663, 665, 496 A.2d 235 (1985). "The terms of § 46b-86 (a) cannot be expanded to include matters beyond the court's jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miner v. Miner, 48 Conn. App. 409, 415, 709 A.2d 605 (1998).

"[W]hen the absence of jurisdiction is brought to the attention of the court, cognizance of that fact must be taken and the matter determined before it can proceed further in the case.... In whatever...