Billingsley v. St. Louis County, 95-1413

• Decision Date: 14 November 1995
• Docket Number: No. 95-1413,95-1413
• Citation: 70 F.3d 61
• Parties: Lucinda J. BILLINGSLEY, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Defendant, James E. O'Mara; George M. Corcoran, Jr.; John A. Grellner, individually and in their official capacities as officials of St. Louis County, Defendants/Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 61

70 F.3d 61

Lucinda J. BILLINGSLEY, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Defendant James E. O'Mara; George M. Corcoran, Jr.; John A Grellner, individually and in their official capacities as officials of St. Louis County, Defendants/Appellants.

No. 95-1413.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 15, 1995.

Decided Nov. 14, 1995.

Patricia Redington, Clayton, MO, argued, for appellant.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Mary Anne Sedey, St. Louis, MO, argued (William E. Moench and Jon A. Ray, on the brief), for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Lucinda J. Billingsley brought this action for monetary and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. She claimed that she was wrongfully discharged from her job as a St. Louis County Council Administrative Assistant because she did not support James E. O'Mara in his campaign bid for councilman. Defendants O'Mara, George M. Corcoran, Jr., County Council Chairman, and John A. Grellner, County Administrative Director, appeal the district court's order denying their motion requesting summary judgment based on qualified immunity grounds. We reverse and remand.

I. Background

Billingsley was hired as an administrative assistant for St. Louis County in May 1982 and was assigned to work for various councilmen. In January of 1991 she began working exclusively for O'Mara. As O'Mara's assistant, Billingsley performed a wide range of administrative duties. She acted as his liaison in dealing with the public. She answered his phone calls and gathered and communicated information to him. Billingsley organized meetings and did research on proposed legislation. She also dealt with county officials and researched proposed developments. Her main role was as a conduit of information between O'Mara and his constituents. Billingsley was terminated in June of 1991. She then brought this suit against O'Mara for wrongful discharge, alleging a violation of her First Amendment rights. Specifically, she alleged that she was fired because she would not participate in O'Mara's election campaign. Billingsley also sued Corcoran and Grellner, claiming that they helped effectuate O'Mara's decision to terminate her.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. They alleged that there was no material issue of fact and argued that they were immune from suit. The district court found that material issues of fact did exist respecting Billingsley's job description and the reasons for which she was terminated. The court further held that it could not adjudicate the qualified immunity claim because the evidence was insufficient to determine whether Billingsley's conduct was constitutionally protected. Defendants appeal the trial court's ruling on the qualified immunity issue.

II. Discussion

The trial court's denial of the motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo. U.S. ex rel. Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992). Therefore, we employ the same standard that was used in the district court. Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir.1993). Summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

The Supreme Court set out the test for qualified immunity in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). It held that government officials are generally immune from suit in performing discretionary duties if "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. The court reaffirmed the test in Mitchell v. Forsyth and stated that qualified immunity is more than a defense to suit; it grants government officials the right not to be subject to the burden of trial at all. 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815-16, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).

To prove that a clearly established right has been infringed, plaintiffs must do more than assert that an abstract right has been violated. Runge v. Dove, 857 F.2d 469, 472 (8th Cir.1988). They "must make a 'particularized showing' that a 'reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violated that right' or that 'in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness' of the action was 'apparent.' " Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)).

In her affidavit opposing the motion for summary judgment, Billingsley alleged that O'Mara told her the dismissal was not based on her performance but rather it was "purely political." For purposes of this appeal, defendants accept Billingsley's allegations as true. The underlying issue, then, is whether the defendants violated a clearly established right when they discharged Billingsley because of her political affiliation. The wholesale practice of dismissing public employees based on their political affiliation is prohibited under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367-72, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2686-89, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (plurality opinion). Elrod recognized an exception to this rule for those employees who hold policymaking positions. Id. The Court focused on the nature of the employee's position in determining whether the employee was a policymaker, stating that policymakers are likely to have broad responsibilities that are not well-defined. Id.

The Supreme Court further elaborated on the constitutionality of patronage dismissals in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). In Branti, the Court modified the Elrod standard by stating that the ultimate inquiry is not whether the employee is a policymaker. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. at 1294-95. Instead, the Court held that patronage dismissals are only warranted when party affiliation is essential for effective performance of the particular job. ¹ Id.

In the aftermath of Elrod and Branti, various tests have been developed to determine when political affiliation is an appropriate condition for a particular job. As Justice Scalia has noted, "the 'tests' devised to implement Branti have produced inconsistent and unpredictable results." Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 112, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 2757, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

In the present case, we believe that the existing law did not clearly prohibit dismissal of a county council administrative assistant based on her lack of political loyalty to the legislator to whom she was exclusively assigned. We have recognized that government employees' "first amendment rights may have to yield to the government's vital interest in maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency if their private political beliefs would interfere with their public duties." Barnes v. Bosley, 745 F.2d 501, 505 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017, 105 S.Ct. 2022, 85 L.Ed.2d 303 (1985). We held in Barnes that political affiliation was not an appropriate requirement for employees in a clerk of court's office who mainly performed ministerial duties. 745 F.2d at 508. The defendants in that case attempted to show that the plaintiffs held policymaking positions because they were involved with mailing...