Smith, P.J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from two Pickaway County Common Pleas Court decisions and entries. The first decision and entry denied Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus for failure to state a claim. The second decision and entry denied Appellant's motion for reconsideration. Because, in a criminal context, there is no authority for the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a final judgment, such a motion is generally considered a legal nullity and thus, an order denying such motion does not constitute a final, appealable order and this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the related arguments on the merits.1 State v. Campbell, 4th Dist. Adams No. 16CA1029, 2017-Ohio-4252, ¶ 8, 11 and 12. Accordingly, to the extent Appellant is appealing the trial court's denial of his motion for reconsideration, his appeal is dismissed.
{¶2} Appellant raises four very lengthy assignments of error, however, related to the trial court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, Appellant essentially contends 1) that the trial court erred in determining he was not denied access to the courts, which he claims caused his motion for a delayed appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio to be denied; 2) that the trial court erroneously determined his arguments regarding double jeopardy and the failure to prove venue were barred by res judicata; 3) that the trial court erroneously determined he did not meet the standard for habeas corpus relief; and 4) that the trial court erroneously accepted "the state's misdirection that the double jeopardy issue is only about the indictment."
{¶3} However, because we conclude Appellant's current appeal fails on procedural grounds as a result of his failure to comply with the filing requirements of R.C. 2969.25(A), we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Furthermore, because we find Appellant's petition fails on substantive grounds, wecannot conclude that the trial court erred in granting Appellee's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim. As such, the arguments raised by Appellant on appeal are without merit. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY {¶4} Because Appellant has not provided this Court with the entire criminal record of this case, including the underlying criminal record from his convictions in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas, we take judicial notice of the facts of this matter as set forth in his first, direct appeal, as follows:
Appellant and his wife, Mary Billman, are foster parents working with Monroe County Child and Family Services. According to testimony, the two live in Monroe County at 31143 Liberty Ridge Rd., Wingett Run, Ohio 45789 and have lived there since 1994. A total of seven children lived in the house under the care of the couple at all periods relevant to this matter. In 2006 Appellant and his wife accepted responsibility for Child X and Child Y, who had been removed from the home of their biological father due to sexual abuse. According to Appellant's wife, when the two children entered Appellant's home, both had physical indications of sexual abuse. Both children lived in Appellant's home from February of 2005 until the present. Appellant resided in the family home until 2011, when his wife asked him to leave. Appellant moved out on October 28, 2011, after his wife confronted him with the accusations of Child X and Child Y, who told her that Appellant had been sexually abusing Child Y the entire time she lived with him, and that he had just started abusing Child X.
On October 28, 2011, after he left the house, Appellant called a friend, David A. Preston, and announced: "I molested [Child Y]." (Pretrial Motion Hrg. Tr., p. 46; Tr. Vol. III, p. 93.) Preston was initially uncertain who was speaking because Appellant had not identified himself. When Appellant identified himself, Preston asked if he had a place to stay and offered to allow Appellant to stay the night in his house. Appellant and Preston had been friends for more than six years; they initially met through work near Cincinnati. Although they met because of their work, the two bonded through their Christian faith and regularly discussed religious issues. The two men were both assistant pastors, but attended different non-denominational churches. Neither man attended seminary or had undertaken any formal program of religious or pastoral study. Each man had been "ordained" by the pastor of his respective church. Neither church is formally affiliated with any organized Christian denomination. Appellant stayed with Preston for a brief period, but eventually called the Monroe County Sheriff's Department and turned himself in.
On November 17, 2011, Appellant was indicted on twelve counts alleging abuse of both Child X and Child Y. The counts included two instances of gross sexual imposition with regard to Child X, who was then eight years old. The remaining ten counts involved Child Y, who was then nine years old, and included two instances of rape, two instances of attempted rape, and six instances of gross sexual imposition. The charges as they related to Child X were alleged to have occurred between January 1, 2011 and October 28, 2011. The charges as they related to Child Y were alleged to have occurred between January 1, 2006 and October 28, 2011. The trial court found both children competent to testify at trial and their testimony, coupled with that of the various adults to whom Appellant admitted his crimes, composed the bulk of the case against Appellant.
Although Appellant was originally charged with two counts of gross sexual imposition involving Child X, her testimony at trial was confused, and ultimately, she described a single incident. Child Y, however, described Appellant touching and rubbing her vagina on ten separate occasions in three different locations in the home: the living room, her mother's bedroom, and another sister's room. Child Y also described having been made to touch Appellant's genitals on six occasions and revealed multiple instances when Appellant licked her genitals. Child Y recounted three instances when Appellant placed his penis, which she described as a "[s]oft-ish/hard-ish thing," in her mouth. (Tr. Vol.III, p. 71.) During two of these incidents, according to Child Y, a "clear-ish" liquid went into her mouth, which she then spit into the toilet. (Tr. Vol.III, p. 74.) According to Child Y, during one of the three occasions there was no liquid. In the entirety of Child Y's testimony she related nineteen separate encounters with Appellant that could support gross sexual imposition charges. At least three and possibly thirteen of those nineteen incidents involved conduct constituting rape (oral and digital). Child Y said Appellant told her not to tell anyone about the things he did "cause I could go to prison for it." (Tr. Vol. III, p. 74.)
Ten of the original twelve counts were submitted to the jury: two counts of gross sexual imposition involving Child X; two counts of rape involving Child Y; and six counts of gross sexual imposition involving Child Y. The jury returned guilty verdicts on nine of the ten counts. Appellant was acquitted of the second count of gross sexual imposition involving Child X.
After sentencing, Appellant filed a motion for new trial based on an audio recording made by his wife of the two girls. Appellant argued that in the recording the girls suggested that they would recant their testimony. The state responded with affidavits describing conversations between Appellant and his wife that were recorded by the facility in which Appellant was being held. The recorded conversations between Appellant and his wife reflected that the two had planned the best way to record the girls to undermine their testimony. Appellant's wife told the girls that they would not have to testify in court at the sentencing hearing if they made a tape for her. The trial court concluded, without a hearing, that the recording offered by Appellant was self-serving and not credible. The trial court overruled Appellant's motion for new trial. Appellant filed timely appeals of his conviction and sentence and of the ruling denying his motion for new trial and the two appeals were consolidated.
State v. Billman, 7th Dist. Monroe Nos. 12MO3 and 12MO5, 2013-Ohio-5774, ¶ 2-7. {¶5} Appellant's first, direct appeal to the Seventh District Court of Appeals resulted in a complete affirmance of Appellant's convictions by a decision issued on December 16, 2013. In affirming Appellant's convictions for gross sexual imposition and rape, the court denied Appellant's arguments that the State failed to sufficiently prove venue, i.e. that the crimes occurred in Monroe County. Id. at ¶ 11, 18. The court also considered and rejected Appellant's argument, under a plain error analysis, that his indictment was "duplicative" in that it "failed to allege with enough specificity what events made up the gross sexual imposition charges, and a bill of particulars and testimony at trial did not correct for [sic] this deficiency, in violation of his right to due process of law." Id. at ¶ 18. Further, in rejecting this argument the court found no merit to Appellant's claim that the indictment was insufficient because it charged multiple instances of the same crime, and therefore failed to "satisfy the notice and double jeopardy protection purposes of grand jury indictments." Id. at ¶ 33.
{¶6} Thereafter, it appears that Appellant filed a motion for a delayed appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which was denied on April...
