Bingham v. American Screw Products Co.

• Decision Date: 01 October 1975
• Docket Number: No. 10,10
• Citation: 398 Mich. 546,248 N.W.2d 537
• Parties: Arlie K. BINGHAM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMERICAN SCREW PRODUCTS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, and Michigan Employment Security Commission, Defendant-Appellant. ,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 537

248 N.W.2d 537

Arlie K. BINGHAM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMERICAN SCREW PRODUCTS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee and Michigan Employment Security Commission Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10, October Term, 1975.

398 Mich. 546, 248 N.W.2d 537

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 21, 1976.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., George M. Blaty, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Michigan Employment Security Commission, appellant.

Goodenough, Smith & May by Leonard W. Smith, Detroit, for American Screw Products Co.

John A. Fillion, Gen. Counsel, Jordan Rossen, M. Jay Whitman, Asst. Gen. Counsels, Detroit, for UAW; Edwin G. Fabre, Leonard R. Page, Marley S. Weiss, Anne M Trebilcock, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Detroit, of counsel, amicus curiae.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

This complex unemployment compensation case involves the interpretation of inter-related provisions of § 28 ('Eligibility for Benefits') and § 29 ('Disqualification from Benefits') of the Michigan Employment Security Act. There are two issues: (1) whether claimant, disqualified under the act for voluntarily terminating his employment, can requalify for benefits under the act outside the state of Michigan; (2) whether claimant, after he moved home to Kentucky, was disqualified from receiving benefits for refusing the employer's offer of his former job or whether claimant's rejection of this reemployment offer was with 'good cause' because the offer was not an offer of 'suitable work' due to the unreasonable distance between his Kentucky residence and the Michigan job offer.

At the outset, it is essential we bear in mind that our unemployment compensation act is part of a federal-state unemployment compensation system. This federal-state system is grounded in the Federal Social Security Act, the Wagner-Peyser Act, and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, together with state laws enacted in conformity with the standards set forth by these federal laws. The federal-state system is implemented by a federal tax offset to the employers of a state provided that the state's unemployment compensation law conforms to minimum federal standards. Furthermore, every state Legislature has included in its state unemployment compensation law provisions authorizing the responsible executive (in Michigan, the Michigan Employment Security Commission--MESC) to enter into interstate agreements. These agreements are essentially designed to deal with claimants who earned qualifying wages in one state but who upon being separated from employment moved their residence to another state and claimants who at the time of their separation from employment had accumulated wage credits sufficient to make them eligible for benefits in more than one state. Inherent in these agreements is the recognition of every state legislature of the federal dimension of the unemployment laws and the mobility of labor essential to the operation of our private enterprise system. Both the spirit and letter of our act support these federal and interstate aspects of unemployment compensation.

Accordingly, because of the plain language of our act as well as the aforesaid state-federal implications, we hold that claimant Bingham, a Kentucky worker who left a Michigan job because he could not find adequate housing for his family at a price he could afford, returned to Kentucky, registered for work with the appropriate employment office there, diligently sought and made himself available for suitable work, but turned down a job offer from his former Michigan employer due to the distance from his Kentucky residence, (1) requalified for benefits after serving the period of disqualification under the act, and (2) was not disqualified for refusing his former employer's job offer because the offer was not an offer of 'suitable work' and was therefore rejected by claimant with 'good cause' due to the fact that the job was too far distant from his residence.

We reinstate the administrative determination of the Michigan Employment Security Commission, and reverse the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

I--FACTS

Claimant Arlie K. Bingham was employed by American Screw Products Company from February 17, 1969 to November 17, 1969. He worked as a machine operator; his last wage-rate was $3.10 per hour.

Bingham testified that he left his Michigan employment because he had been unable to find adequate housing for his wife and four children in Michigan at a price which he could afford. Bingham explained that while he was employed in Michigan he had searched continuously for a home in which his wife and our children could live. His family came to Michigan and lived with him for approximately one month; but the living quarters were inadequate. Because he was unable to find adequate living quarters within his means, his family was forced to return to Pineville, Kentucky, his original home. After his family returned to Kentucky, Bingham made further efforts to find adequate living quarters, but his efforts proved futile. He thereupon severed his Michigan employment, returning to Pineville, Kentucky, to join his family. (See Appendix, Defendant-Appellant's Brief, pp. 9a--15a.)

On December 2, 1969, Bingham filed an inter -state claim for unemployment benefits with the Commonwealth of Kentucky Division of Employment Service in Middlesboro, Kentucky. On February 20, 1970 the Michigan Employment Security Commission issued a determination holding (1) claimant's separation from employment was 'a voluntary leaving without good cause attributable to the employer' under § 29(1)(a) of the Michigan Employment Security Act; (2) claimant was thereby disqualified under § 29(1)(a) of the Act for the week ending November 22, 1969 and was subject to a six-week requalification period under § 29(3), the requalification period having been completed as of January 10, 1970; (3) claimant's benefit entitlement was reduced by six weeks as provided in § 29(4) of the Act (from twenty-six to twenty weeks). (See Appendix, Defendant-Appellant's Brief, p. 48a.)

On March 9, 1970, the employer protested the MESC determination. The employer took no exception to the MESC's finding that Bingham's separation was 'voluntary * * * without good cause attributable to the employer' under § 29(1) (a) of the Act. However, the employer stated that on March 9, 1970 notice had been sent to Bingham to report to work on his regular job not later than March 16, 1970. Bingham, at that time living in Kentucky, refused the offer of work because of its distance from his home. (See Appendix, Defendant-Appellant's Brief, pp. 49a--50a.)

On April 3, 1970, the MESC issued a redetermination affirming its determination of February 20, 1970. The MESC held:

'* * * Claimant established good cause for not reporting when recalled to report on 3/12/70 and is not subject to disqualification under the provisions of Subsection 29(1)(a) of the Act.

'Claimant has a car for transportation and is seeking work within a radius of 50 miles of Middlesboro, Ky. where work is generally similar to work he performed in Michigan is available. He is not placing any restrictions on his availability for work as to hours or wages. He is actively seeking work and the Kentucky agency stated that his chances of securing employment are fair.

'Claimant completed the requalification requirements of the Michigan Act based on his separation. He fully meets the eligibility requirements of the Michigan Act and is held eligible for benefits.' (Appendix, Defendant-Appellant's Brief, p. 52a.)

This redetermination was affirmed by a Michigan Employment Security Commission Referee on October 14, 1970. On March 24, 1971, the Michigan Employment Security Commission Appeal Board also affirmed the redetermination. (See Appendix, Defendant-Appellant's Brief, pp. 57a--73a.)

On August 20, 1973, the circuit court reversed the Appeal Board decision. The court held that (1) the Act prohibited Bingham from requalifying for unemployment benefits while residing outside the State of Michigan; (2) Bingham was required to have been available for work within the community where he lived when his employment relationship was severed (in this case Michigan) in order to have met the eligibility requirements of § 28(1)(c) of the Act, M.C.L.A. § 421.28; M.S.A. § 17.530; thus claimant was ineligible to receive benefits because he refused to accept the employer's Michigan job offer although he was living in Kentucky at the time the offer was made. (See Appendix, Defendant-Appellant's Brief, pp. 76a--78a.)

On November 27, 1974, the Court of Appeals affirmed part (2) of the circuit court's opinion, which held 'suitable' the Michigan offer of work made to Bingham while he was living in Kentucky. 57 Mich.App. 21, 225 N.W.2d 199 (1974). The court held that as a matter of law the Act required Bingham be available for work both at the locality in which he resided at the time the offer of work was made (Kentucky) and at the locality at which he resided during the period he earned his base period credit weeks (Michigan). The court did not rule on part (1) of the circuit court's opinion, i.e. whether Bingham could requalify for benefits while residing outside the State of Michigan. The court held that this issue was not properly before it because the employer had not timely protested the February 20, 1970 MESC determination of this issue.

The MESC applied for leave to appeal the Court of Appeals decision. This

Court granted leave on February 6, 1975. II--CLAIMANT

REQUALIFIED FOR BENEFITS WHILE OUTSIDE THE STATE

OF MICHIGAN

The first issue, properly ¹ raised by the trial court, is whether Bingham satisfied the requalification requirements of § 29(3) while outside the state of Michigan.

Section 29(3) stated:

'(3) An individual who is disqualified under subsection 29(1) ² shall * * * complete 6 requalifying weeks * * * for each of which he * * *

'(b) would otherwise meet all the requirements of this act to receive a waiting period...