Dueweke v. Morang Drive Greenhouses

• Decision Date: 02 November 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 63973,No. 11,11
• Citation: 311 N.W.2d 712,411 Mich. 670
• Parties: Eric DUEWEKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MORANG DRIVE GREENHOUSES and Michigan Employment Security Commission, Defendants-Appellees. Calendar411 Mich. 670, 311 N.W.2d 712
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 712

311 N.W.2d 712

Eric DUEWEKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MORANG DRIVE GREENHOUSES and Michigan Employment Security Commission, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 63973.

Calendar No. 11.

411 Mich. 670, 311 N.W.2d 712

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Nov. 17, 1980.

Decided Nov. 2, 1981.

Wayne County Neighborhood Legal Services, Jeanne Mirer, Robert F. Gillett, Detroit, Assisted by David Cripps, Law Student at Detroit College of Law, for plaintiff-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., by David A. Voges, Asst. Atty. Gen., Detroit, for Michigan Employment Security Commission.

Clark, Klein & Beaumont by Dwight H. Vincent, J. Walker Henry, John R. Spreitzer, Detroit, for Michigan Manufacturers Association and Employers Unemployment Compensation Council, amicus curiae.

Jordan Rossen, Associate Gen. Counsel, U.A.W., Detroit, Rothe, Mazey, Mazey & Hamburger, P. C., by William Mazey, Southfield, for U.A.W.

KAVANAGH, Justice.

This appeal involves the construction and application of § 29(1)(e) ¹ of the Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA) in a situation where a claimant refuses an offer of the same job he previously quit and served a disqualification for under § 29(1)(a) ² of the MESA. The pertinent issues raised on appeal are (1) whether, as a matter of law, a claimant who has voluntarily separated from an employer, and has requalified under § 29(3) of the MESA, may be further disqualified under § 29(1)(e) for refusing to accept an offer of his former job under the same working conditions, and (2) assuming such an offer is suitable work, whether the claimant had good cause to refuse the offer.

We reverse and remand to the Michigan Employment Security Commission (MESC) for reconsideration in accordance with this opinion.

On May 16, 1975, the plaintiff-appellant, Eric Dueweke, voluntarily terminated his employment relationship with Morang Drive Greenhouses, Inc., and applied for benefits. The MESC determined that he had left his employment without good cause attributable to the employer and imposed a disqualification under § 29(1) (a) of the MESA.

After the plaintiff-appellant served a six-week requalification period, he refiled his application for benefits and was sent by the MESC to his former employer who had notified the Commission that "(c)laimant's position with us is still open". Although there is a dispute as to what transpired between Mr. Dueweke and his former employer during their meetings, it is undisputed that the employer indicated on an MESC form that Mr. Dueweke was reoffered the job he had already quit and that he did not accept it.

The MESC then ruled that plaintiff-appellant was disqualified under § 29(1)(e) of the MESA for refusing to accept suitable work without good cause. The referee and the Appeal Board affirmed.

On appeal to the Wayne Circuit Court, the Appeal Board's decision was reversed, but in turn the Court of Appeals reversed the Circuit Court.

The basic purpose of the MESA is to provide relief to the unemployed worker and his family from the burden of involuntary unemployment. M.C.L. § 421.8(2); M.S.A. § 17.508(2). As originally enacted, the MESA totally disqualified an individual who was voluntarily unemployed from receiving unemployment benefits. In 1965, the Act was amended to provide for a penalty period and a reduction in benefits rather than total disqualification ³ to individuals who were voluntarily unemployed so that such individuals might requalify and come within the purpose of the MESA.

The plaintiff-appellant asks us to hold that once a claimant has been disqualified under § 29(1)(a) and requalified, he or she cannot subsequently be disqualified under § 29(1)(e) for refusing to return to the same work. We refuse to do so.

The Board must pass on the suitability of the work, and also (and separately) assay the reasonableness of a claimant's refusal of it. We decline to hold that the former work can never be suitable work, for in most instances the former work would probably meet the statutory criteria for suitable work. However, the reasons for refusing to return to the work, including the fact that claimant previously quit the job offered, go to the question of good cause for refusing the offer.

The MESA, as it read before the 1980 amendment, sets forth criteria for determining whether work is suitable in § 29(6): "(T)he commission shall consider the degree of risk involved to his health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, his experience and prior earnings, his length of unemployment and prospects for securing local work in his customary occupation, and the distance of the available work from his residence." M.C.L. § 421.29(6); M.S.A. § 17.531(6).

The record does not show that these criteria were ever considered in determining whether Mr. Dueweke refused an offer of suitable work. Accordingly, we remand to the MESC to consider the express statutory criteria in determining the issue of suitability.

The plaintiff-appellant alleges that the offer of work contains conditions that would result in an overtime payment procedure which violates the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), and the Michigan Minimum Wage Law of 1964, as amended, M.C.L. § 408.384a; M.S.A. § 17.255(4a). We direct the MESC to consider the evidence regarding this allegation in arriving at its determination of suitability. We find it implicit in the statute that an offer of work involving working conditions which are illegal would render the work unsuitable.

The plaintiff-appellant contends that, assuming an offer of suitable work was made, he had good cause to refuse the offer and is therefore entitled to unemployment benefits.

The referee's opinion states:

"that although claimant had good personal reasons for not wishing to return to the involved employer without an increase in pay, said reasons were not of such a nature as to show good cause for refusing to accept suitable employment under (s) 29(1)(e), 29(6) and 29(7)(b) of the Act."

It further states "that the personality conflict between the claimant and the general manager of the employer and the question of additional pay, beyond $180 per week, was not sufficient good cause for the claimant to refuse an offer of suitable work".

The Court of Appeals applied the rule in Losada v. Chrysler Corp., 24 Mich.App. 656, 660, 180 N.W.2d 844 (1970), which held that personal reasons were not good cause under the statute. Losada was followed by a split decision in Keith v. Chrysler Corp., 41 Mich.App. 708, 200 N.W.2d 764 (1972), in which the majority agreed with the Losada rule. The decision was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court. Keith v. Chrysler

Corp., 390 Mich. 458, 213 N.W.2d 147 (1973). ⁴

We conclude that personal reasons may constitute good cause under § 29(1)(e) of the MESA. In doing so, we adopt the rationale and standard of good cause set forth in Justice (then Judge) Levin's dissenting opinion in Keith, 41 Mich.App. 708, 712-715, 200 N.W.2d 764. ⁵

If the MESC finds the plaintiff-appellant's former job to be suitable according to the criteria set forth in the statute and in this opinion, it should evaluate Mr. Dueweke's reasons for refusing the work to determine whether his reasons for such rejection would be deemed valid by reasonable men and women and not indicative of an unwillingness to work.

Reversed and remanded to the Michigan Employment Security Commission for reconsideration in accordance with this opinion.

WILLIAMS, MOODY and LEVIN, JJ., concur.

COLEMAN, Chief Justice (To Affirm).

We disagree, in part, with the opinion of the Court and would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. ¹

The central legal issue is whether an offer of the same employment to an employee who has voluntarily quit cannot, as a matter of law, constitute an offer of suitable work so as to disqualify the employee from unemployment benefits pursuant to M.C.L. § 421.29(1)(e); M.S.A. § 17.531(1)(e).

We agree that an offer of the same job as that voluntarily abandoned can qualify as "suitable work".

However, we would not remand to the Michigan Employment Security Commission (MESC) for reconsideration in light of statutory criteria and a standard adopted from a Court of Appeals dissent in Keith v. Chrysler Corp., 41 Mich.App. 708, 714, 200 N.W.2d 764 (1972).

First, a reading of the transcript persuades us that the statutory criteria already have been considered. There is competent and material evidence to support the conclusion that plaintiff refused suitable work without good cause attributable to the employer.

Second, we cannot subscribe to the "good cause" standard stated in the Keith dissent. Although Keith does not concern a case of voluntary quitting, it is argued that the standard set forth in the dissent should be adopted in this situation. The opinion quotes from In the Matter of Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 635, 161 S.E.2d 1 (1968), stating:

"(W)e conclude that an employee, having been separated from his job through no fault of his own, rejects other tendered employment for 'good cause' when his reason for such rejection would be deemed by reasonable men and women valid and not indicative of an unwillingness to work."

Although we disagree, the record supports the decision of the referee even under that standard stated in the dissent in Keith.

I

The history of the case, now six years after plaintiff quit voluntarily on May 16, 1975, after 10-1/2 months of work as a full-time salaried supervisor in Morang Drive Greenhouses, Inc., is revealing.

1. After quitting, plaintiff was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits for six weeks, M.C.L. § 421.29(1)(a); M.S.A. § 17.531(1)(a).

2. Defendant then was notified by MESC and plaintiff presented a form

for verification of availability to employers (MESC Form No. 1323) to the employer, who completed it, saying that there was work available consisting of the "same job he left",...