Bingham v. Idaho Dept. of Transp.

• Decision Date: 29 December 1989
• Docket Number: Nos. 17058,17232,No. 52,52,s. 17058
• Citation: 786 P.2d 538,117 Idaho 147
• Parties: , 58 Ed. Law Rep. 1041 Richard Paul BINGHAM and Dawn Bingham, husband and wife, as heirs of Richard Paul Bingham, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondents, v. IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, an agency of the State of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent, and Snake River Valley School District, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant, and Bingham County, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho; and Cynthia Jo Reed, an individual, Defendants.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 538

786 P.2d 538

117 Idaho 147, 58 Ed. Law Rep. 1041

Richard Paul BINGHAM and Dawn Bingham, husband and wife, as heirs of Richard Paul Bingham, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondents, v. IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, an agency of the State of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent, and Snake River Valley School District No. 52, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant,

and

Bingham County, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho; and Cynthia Jo Reed, an individual, Defendants.

Nos. 17058, 17232.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Dec. 29, 1989.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 22, 1990.

Holland & Hart, Langroise, Sullivan, Boise, for appellants. Sheila A. Bush argued, Boise.

Quane, Smith, Howard & Hull, Boise, for respondent Dept. of Transp. Brian K. Julian argued, Boise.

Racine, Olson, Nye, Cooper & Budge, Pocatello, for respondent Snake River Valley School Dist. No. 52. Reed W. Larsen argued, Pocatello.

BISTLINE, Justice.

The parents of Richard Paul Bingham, Jr. (plaintiffs) brought this action against the Idaho Department of Transportation (Transportation Department), Snake River Valley School District Number 52 (Snake River), Bingham County, and Cynthia Jo Reed when their son died after he was hit by a truck driven by Ms. Reed. Ms. Reed was driving a potato truck along State Highway 39, adjacent to the Snake River Valley School, when she accidentally struck Richard Bingham. This appeal reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Transportation Department, as well as the court's grant of partial summary judgment to Snake River. We affirm the court's grant of partial summary judgment to Snake River, and reverse in part the grant of summary judgment to the Transportation Department.

"[I]f the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," then the district court's order of summary judgment should be affirmed. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Moreover, the pleadings and everything else on file should be liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment. Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 179-180, 731 P.2d 171, 174-175 (1986). With that in mind, we begin by examining the plaintiffs' four claims against the Transportation Department.

I. TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT

The district court, after a scholarly discussion of precedent and I.C. § 6-904(1) of the Tort Claims Act, granted the Transportation Department's motion for summary judgment with respect to all four claims in the plaintiffs' complaint directed against the Department. We agree with the district court that summary judgment was proper for the claim alleging that the Transportation Department was negligent in the inspection and maintenance of Highway 39. We reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment on the plaintiffs' three other claims, because the district court incorrectly interpreted I.C. § 6-904(1) ¹ as providing a complete shield from liability for the Transportation Department with respect to these three other claims. As this opinion makes clear, the district court also failed to consider I.C. § 6-904(8) ² of the Tort Claims Act.

Summary judgment was proper for the claim against the Department based upon the alleged negligent inspection and maintenance of the highway, since no triable issue of material fact has been raised by plaintiffs on this claim. R., Vol. 2, 67. Where no issue of material fact exists, summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Jones v. EG & G Idaho, Inc., 111 Idaho 591, 592-593, 726 P.2d 703, 704-705 (1986); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 488, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962). The district court's grant of summary judgment to the Transportation Department as to this claim is affirmed.

The district court also held that the Transportation Department is immune from liability for (1) failing to properly plan and design the highway; (2) failing to provide for an appropriate speed limit on the highway adjacent to the Snake River School complex; and (3) failing to place adequate signs along the highway. The court found that I.C. § 6-904(1) shielded the Department from liability for each of these three claims. R., Vol. 2, 69-70. For reasons which we will set out, the court's analysis of I.C. § 6-904(1) was incorrect, and the grant to the Department of summary judgment dismissing these claims is reversed.

The Transportation Department is immune from any theory of liability that stems from the design or plan for State Highway 39, but only if that plan or design conformed to then existent design standards and the plan had been approved in advance of construction. I.C. § 6-904(8) specifies that any governmental entity shall not be liable for any claim which "[a]rises out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways ... or other public property where such plan or design is prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or design standards, approved in advance of the construction...." (Emphasis added.)

The district court did not reach any determination as to whether the plan or design for State Highway 39 had in fact been "prepared in substantial conformance" with then existent design standards, or whether the plan and design had been "approved in advance." Instead, the court simply held that the Transportation Department was immune from any claim which arose out of the plan or design of the highway because of I.C. § 6-904(1). Subsection (1), however, must be read and interpreted in conjunction with Subsection (8). Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 222, 723 P.2d 755, 766 (1986) ("[A]ll provisions of a statute must be given effect, [and] no one part should be rendered mere surplusage by the overly broad construction of another.") (citations omitted).

Contrary to the district court's holding, the plan or design of a highway is not immune from liability under Subsection (1). Subsection (1) may insulate the Transportation Department from liability for having exercised its discretion by deciding (or not deciding) to make a plan or design for Highway 39 in the first place. However, once the Department has made the decision to plan and design the highway, it must comply with the two requirements of Subsection (8) to be immune from any suit arising out of that plan or design.

Since questions of fact concerning the Transportation Department's advance approval of the design of the highway and conformance to engineering standards were not addressed by the district court, the court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' claim that the Department was negligent in the design of Highway 39 is reversed. If plaintiffs can establish that either of these two requirements of Subsection (8) were not met, then immunity from liability for the plan and design of State Highway 39 under I.C. § 6-904(8) is no longer available to the Department.

We now turn to the two other claims which the district court held are barred by I.C. § 6-904(1). The court stated that:

[T]he record clearly shows that the type of roadway, the speed limit, the crosswalks and signing of the highway were all decisions made on planning information and/or design information and based upon [Transportation] Department policy and planning procedures. These decisions regarding signs and speed limits are precisely those types of matters meant to be protected under 6-904.1, Idaho Code, as the Supreme Court in Sterling [v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986) ] points out.

R., Vol. 2, 70 (emphasis added). The district court held that the Transportation Department should be immune from liability in suits that allege, as plaintiffs do here, that the Department negligently failed to provide for an appropriate speed limit, and failed to properly and adequately place warning and other traffic signs along the highway.

Immunity from liability for planning or design decisions regarding highways, bridges, and other public property is furnished by the code provision just discussed, I.C. § 6-904(8). Immunity for discretionary decisions is supplied through I.C. § 6-904(1). As we explain below, the court erroneously determined that it was discretionary for the Transportation Department to determine the speed limit and place traffic signs and other signals along Highway 39.

The Idaho Tort Claims Act "makes liability the rule with certain specific exceptions." Sterling, 111 Idaho at 214-215, 723 P.2d at 758-759 (citations omitted). See also I.C. § 6-903(a). This Court in Sterling went on to explain the I.C. § 6-904(1) discretionary function exception:

[T]he term 'discretionary function' could not include the execution or performance of, i.e., the implementation of statutory or regulatory policy. Since discretionary functions involve actions qualitatively different from implementing policy, and since the former by definition involve the exercise of choice, judgment, and the ability to make responsible decisions, then discretionary functions must actually involve the formulation of policy.

111 Idaho at 227, 723 P.2d at 771.

According to the district court's application of Subsection (1), the determination of the speed limit on Highway 39, as well as the placement of warning signs and other signals along the highway, are "activities involving the setting of regulation and policy." Sterling, 111 Idaho at 228, 723 P.2d at 772 (footnote omitted). The district court's application of Subsection (1) is incorrect, because the Transportation Department is constrained by statute and its own rules when it determines the speed limit and places warning signs along a highway. While it is true that the Department has some discretion in the placement of signs and the determination of speed limits...