Bingue v. Prunchak

• Decision Date: 15 January 2008
• Docket Number: No. 05-16388.,05-16388.
• Citation: 512 F.3d 1169
• Parties: Edwige BINGUE, an individual; Marjorie Bingue, an individual; and Donald House, an individual, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Eli PRUNCHAK, individually, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

512 F.3d 1169

Edwige BINGUE, an individual; Marjorie Bingue, an individual; and Donald House, an individual, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Eli PRUNCHAK, individually, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-16388.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 14, 2007.

Filed January 15, 2008.

Thomas D. Dillard, Jr. & Felicia Galati, Rawlings, Olson, Cannon, Gormley & Desruisseaux, Las Vegas, NV, for the appellant.

Anthony P. Sgro, Stephen K. Lewis & Maria Loventime Estanislao, Patti, Srgo & Lewis, Las Vegas, NV, for the appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada; James C. Mahan, District Judge Presiding. D.C. No. CV-04-01085-JCM.

Before: JAY S. BYBEE, MILAN D. SMITH, JR., and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges.

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

In Onossian v. Block, we applied the Supreme Court's decision in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998), and held that a police officer in a high-speed chase—whether he injures the fleeing suspect or a bystander—is entitled to qualified immunity unless his behavior "shocks the conscience" because it demonstrates an intent "to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest." 175 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). We were not called upon to, consider whether the district court must apply this "intent to harm" standard to all high-speed chases, or only those chases that involve "emergencies" or "split-second decisions." Today we refine our Onossian analysis and hold, following the Eighth Circuit, that police officers involved in all high-speed chases are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the plaintiff can prove that the officer acted with a deliberate intent to harm. See Helseth v. Burch, 258 F.3d 867 (8th Cir.2001) (en banc). The officer involved in the high-speed chase in this case is entitled to summary judgment based on step one of the qualified immunity analysis as set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). We thus reverse the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

At approximately 3:41 p.m., on November 29, 2003, officers with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department ("LVMPD") attempted to pull over a stolen Toyota Camry. When the driver refused to stop, a police chase ensued. The chase would last an hour, cover nearly 90 miles, and involve at least a dozen units and a helicopter. Officer Eli Prunchak was at a car dealership "ordering a new door panel for [his] patrol vehicle" when he "heard radio traffic that units were in pursuit of a stolen vehicle ... heading southbound on Boulder Highway." Based on the radio traffic, Prunchak "thought that [he] was close enough to the pursuit that[he] had a good chance of catching up to it and assisting other officers, in apprehension of the suspects." Ten minutes after LVMPD first attempted to stop the Toyota, it entered the southbound lanes of the U.S. 95, a major north-south freeway. At that point, Prunchak "still thought that [he] was close enough to help and did not know at the time how many other units were in pursuit." Calculating that he was "still approximately a half mile to a mile behind the pursuit," Prunchak, with emergency lights active, entered the left lane of southbound U.S. 95.

At about the same time, Edwige Bingue, and her mother, Marjorie Bingue (collectively "Bingue"), were traveling on southbound U.S. 95 when they saw several police units in pursuit of the Toyota.¹ Bingue moved to the right to avoid those units, and the units safely passed. Minutes later, Prunchak approached—traveling "somewhere around 100 miles per hour"—and while rounding "a long, wide, left curve ... felt [his] tires slip from underneath[him] and [his] patrol vehicle ... drift[] into the number-two lane." Though there were no cars in the number two lane when Prunchak attempted to regain control of his car, he quickly drifted into the number-three lane and "sideswiped" the driver's side of Bingue's Mercedes. Both vehicles spun out of control and came to rest on the divider between the north and southbound lanes of the freeway. Realizing he was not seriously injured, Prunchak immediately moved to assist Bingue, who was "extremely shaken up, but did not appear to have' serious injuries." Shortly' after, another unit arrived and relieved Prunchak. Police ulti mately stopped the Toyota with spike strips² just a few miles from the California border and arrested its three occupants.

Bingue filed this suit in state court against Prunchak, LVMPD, and others, alleging state law negligence and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.³ The case was removed to federal court, where Prunchak moved, on qualified immunity grounds, for partial judgment on the pleadings on Bingue's federal claims. The district court denied the motion in a very short order finding "that the issue of what standard to apply [to Bingue's claims]—(1) the `intent to harm' standard or (2) the `deliberate indifference'—to determine whether there is a substantive due process violation is a fact-based inquiry that looks at whether deliberation was practical" and that "[Bingue has] demonstrated substantial questions of material fact as to whether [Prunchak] had opportunity to deliberate." Prunchak timely appealed.

II. JURISDICTION

Bingue argues that we lack jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of whether Prunchak is entitled to qualified immunity as this is an interlocutory appeal, and our review of such appeals is limited to legal issues. Relying on the district court's characterization of the issue as one of "fact," Bingue argues that our review is limited to the question of "whether the facts alleged support ... a claim of a violation of clearly established law." Perez v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County, 432 F.3d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir.2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2971, 165 L.Ed.2d 953 (2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted, alteration in original).⁴ We review challenges to our jurisdiction over such interlocutory appeals de novo and reject Bingue's argument. See Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir.2003) ("We review de novo ... [an] appeal from a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity."); Rosales-Rosales v. Ashcroft, 347 F.3d 714, 716 (9th Cir.2003) ("We determine our own jurisdiction de novo.").⁵

Bingue's argument, presumably, arises from the general principle that the denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings or "summary judgment is not ordinarily an appealable order," and that when such orders are appealable, as in the qualified immunity context, our jurisdiction is "limited to questions of law and does not extend to claims in which the determination of qualified immunity depends on disputed issues of material fact." Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir.2001) (per curiam).

While this general principle stands, the "denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not always unappealable simply because the district court concludes that the issues of fact, in dispute are material." Thomas v. Gomez, 143 F.3d. 1246, 1248 (9th Cir.1998). Indeed, "[w]here disputed facts exist, ... we can determine whether the denial of qualified immunity was appropriate by assuming that the version of the material facts asserted by the non-moving party is correct." Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 903; accord Knox v. Sw. Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 110 (9th Cir.1997). Alternatively, we may also determine that the disputed facts simply are not material. See Thomas, 143 F.3d at 1248 ("[A]n appellate court has jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal where defendants assert that the district court erred in determining that the disputed facts were material.").

Applying this rule, we have jurisdiction to determine, based on the facts alleged by Bingue, whether Prunchak is entitled to qualified immunity. Accepting the district court's implied holding—that a court should wait to determine qualified immunity whenever there is a disputed factual issue-would eviscerate the very purpose of qualified immunity, which is "to protect defendants even from defending the action." Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 907; see also Scott v. Harris, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 n. 2, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) ("Qualified immunity is `an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability ....' Thus, ... an order denying qualified immunity is immediately appealable even though it is interlocutory ...." (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (emphasis in original)); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (holding that "deny[ing] summary judgment any time a material issue of fact remains on [a § 1983 claim] could undermine the goal of qualified immunity to `avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.'" (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). We have jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

We now turn to the merits of the appeal, whether Prunchak is entitled to qualified immunity on Bingue's federal claims. In making this determination, we apply the Supreme Court's two-part sequential test. See Meyers v. Redwood City, 400 F.3d 765, 769-70 (9th Cir.2005). First, as a "threshold question," we ask whether "[t]aken in the, light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the [official's] conduct violated a constitutional right?" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). If the answer to the question is "no," then no further inquiry is necessary and the official is entitled to a favorable judgment. Id. "On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions,...