Binkowski v. Bd. of Educ. of New Haven, AC 39298
Decision Date | 29 November 2017 |
Docket Number | AC 39298 |
Citation | 180 Conn.App. 580,184 A.3d 279 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Amy BINKOWSKI v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al. |
John R. Williams, New Haven, filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).
Audrey C. Kramer, assistant corporation counsel, filed a brief for the appellees (defendant Yolanda Jones–Generette et al.).
The plaintiff, Amy Binkowski, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants Yolanda Jones–Generette and Linda O'Brien1 following the granting of their motion to strike her third revised complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that her complaint failed, as a matter of law, to allege facts that would bring it within the intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (act), General Statutes §§ 31–275 et seq., as set forth in General Statutes § 31–293a. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiff's third revised complaint2 contains two counts, one against each defendant, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. Both counts allege identical facts. The plaintiff's claims arise out of a work related incident that occurred on February 26, 2014. At that time, the plaintiff was a tenured teacher in the New Haven public school system at Lincoln–Bassett Elementary School (school) in New Haven. Jones–Generette was the principal, and O'Brien was the assistant principal, for the school during the 2013–2014 school year.
In the summer of 2013, the defendants instituted a policy for the school regarding student discipline. The policy established that the administrators of the school would not be involved in any issues related to student discipline. In accordance with the policy, the defendants "refused to allow classroom teachers to send disruptive students out of the classroom to a different environment, refused to intervene in any disrupted classroom, refused to discipline disruptive or violent students or to permit classroom teachers to discipline disruptive or violent students, refused to allow help to be summoned from outside of the school under any circumstances, and refused to provide any protection whatsoever to teachers confronted with disruptive or violent students."
During the 2013–2014 school year, violence at the school escalated. On February 26, 2014, two students assaulted the plaintiff in her classroom, knocking her to the floor. As a result of the assault, the plaintiff severely sprained her left ankle and knee. The plaintiff was unable to stand, so she called out for help. Adrianna Petrucci, the teacher in the classroom across the hall, responded to the plaintiff's call for help. The plaintiff was in pain, lying on the floor, and Petrucci immediately called the school's main office for assistance. Petrucci "also sent a text message to ... O'Brien, stating: ‘[The plaintiff] is on the floor in her room from being shoved out of the way.’ " After receiving the text message, O'Brien told Petrucci to send a student to the office. Petrucci repeated that the plaintiff "is on the floor" in her classroom, and O'Brien responded that she did not know what that meant.
Although O'Brien did not send security to assist the plaintiff or go to the classroom herself, she sent the school nurse to help the plaintiff. While the nurse and another teacher helped place the plaintiff in a wheelchair, some students began fighting in the classroom; the defendants still had not gone to the plaintiff's classroom. The plaintiff alleged that
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants' conduct was The plaintiff further alleged that the defendants' conduct "was extreme and outrageous and was carried out with the knowledge that it would cause the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress." The plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages, claiming that she suffered physical injuries and emotional distress as the result of the defendants' conduct.
The defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's third revised complaint. They argued that the plaintiff's claims are barred by the exclusivity provision of the act because the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to support the claim that the defendants' conduct was wilful or malicious. Following a hearing on June 22, 2015, the trial court, Nazzaro, J. , issued a memorandum of decision granting the defendants' motion to strike. The court concluded that there was "nothing in the complaint to suggest that there was intent on the part of the defendants to cause the plaintiff's particular injuries." Specifically, the court held that The plaintiff filed a notice of intent to appeal on October 9, 2015, and, thereafter, the trial court, Blue, J. , granted the defendants' motion for judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. This appeal followed.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review and legal principles that govern our resolution of this appeal. (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mercer v. Champion , 139 Conn. App. 216, 223, 55 A.3d 772 (2012).
Section 31–293a provides in relevant part that "[i]f an employee ... has a right to benefits or compensation under [the act] on account of injury ... caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee ... and no action may be brought against such fellow employee unless such wrong was wilful or malicious ...."
(Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dinino v. Federal Express Corp. , 176 Conn. App. 248, 255–56, 169 A.3d 303 (2017).
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that her complaint states a cause of action under both the actual intent standard and the substantial certainty standard. We disagree.
The plaintiff first claims that her complaint "clearly and explicitly alleged intentional conduct ... with great factual detail." The plaintiff argues that the factual allegations in her complaint "would support a jury's finding that the defendants intentionally and maliciously took affirmative actions, and took some of those actions with the intent that this specific plaintiff suffer the injuries which she did suffer." We are not persuaded.
The actual intent prong of Suarez II requires that (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez II , supra, 242 Conn. at 279, 698 A.2d 838. "Without a showing that the employer's violations of safety regulations were committed with a conscious and deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting an injury ... [a] wrongful failure to act to prevent injury is not the equivalent of an intention to cause injury." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramos v. Branford , 63 Conn. App. 671, 685, 778 A.2d 972 (2001). "A result is intended if the act is done for the purpose of accomplishing such a result ...." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez II , supra, at 279, 698 A.2d 838.
In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the...
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