Birdsong v. State
| Decision Date | 12 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. A09A0963.,A09A0963. |
| Citation | 680 S.E.2d 159,298 Ga. App. 322 |
| Parties | BIRDSONG v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
C. Samuel Rael, Atlanta, for appellant.
James David McDade, Dist. Atty., James Alan Dooley, Jeffrey L. Ballew, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.
Barry Birdsong appeals from the denial of his plea in bar of former jeopardy, arguing that the trial court improperly granted the State's motion for mistrial on the ground that cross-examination of the victim (Birdsong's ex-wife) violated the Rape Shield Statute.1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
"The appellate standard of review of a grant or denial of a double jeopardy plea in bar is whether, after reviewing the trial court's oral and written rulings as a whole, the trial court's findings support its conclusion." (Punctuation omitted.) Leonard v. State.2 In this matter, the record shows that following his alleged attack on his then estranged wife, Birdsong was indicted on one count of kidnapping with bodily injury, one count of rape, three counts of aggravated assault, one count of aggravated battery, one count of making terroristic threats, one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and one count of family violence battery. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to exclude any character evidence regarding Birdsong's wife that violated OCGA § 24-2-3. On the day of Birdsong's trial, before the jury was seated, the State requested that its motion be addressed; however, Birdsong's counsel noted that there were exceptions to the Rape Shield Statute but that the case was "not about that." Consequently, the trial court did not rule on the State's motion at that time.
As the first witness called at trial, Birdsong's wife testified that on January 1, 2007, she and Birdsong were separated, but that she went to Birdsong's house to retrieve their son's video game console. She further testified that after she entered the house, Birdsong dragged her into the bedroom, threatened to kill her while poking her in the chest and face with a shotgun, and forced her to have sexual intercourse before releasing her under the threat that she had one hour to move back into the home. On cross-examination, Birdsong's counsel asked the wife if she was familiar with names of several different men and how she knew them. After asking Birdsong's wife if she and Birdsong had consensual sexual intercourse during the separation but prior to the incident, defense counsel asked: "After [the incident], do you have sex often?" The State immediately lodged an objection, which the trial court sustained, and the jury exited the courtroom so that the issue could be discussed outside its presence. During that discussion, Birdsong's counsel argued that Birdsong's wife had been engaging in sexual intercourse with other men after the incident and that the Rape Shield Statute did not preclude him from impeaching her claim that she was traumatized by the incident by asking her about those other sexual encounters. The State disagreed and moved for a mistrial on the ground that the victim had been prejudiced in the eyes of the jury. Agreeing that Birdsong's counsel had violated the Rape Shield Statute, the trial court granted the State's motion and declared a mistrial. Thereafter, the State re-indicted Birdsong on the same charges. Birdsong filed a plea in bar of former jeopardy, which the trial court denied after a hearing on the matter. This appeal followed.
1. Birdsong contends that the trial court erred in denying his plea of former jeopardy, arguing that the mistrial was improperly granted because his cross-examination of the victim did not violate the Rape Shield Statute. This contention is without merit.
The Rape Shield Statute (OCGA § 24-2-3) "prohibits admitting the past sexual behavior of an alleged rape victim unless the trial court finds that the past behavior directly involved the participation of the defendant and further finds that the behavior supports an inference that the defendant could have reasonably believed that the victim consented to the conduct at issue." Jennings v. State.3 Such "evidence may also be admitted on a finding that it is so highly material that it will substantially support a conclusion that the accused reasonably believed that the complaining witness consented to the conduct complained of and that justice mandates admission of such evidence." (Punctuation omitted.) Williams v State.4 The statute "is a strong legislative attempt to protect the victim-prosecutrix in rape cases by the exclusion of evidence which might reflect on the character of the witness without contributing materially to the issue of the guilt or innocence of the accused." (Punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State.5 Given this purpose, "there appears no meaningful distinction between sexual behavior before and after the crime, so that evidence of `past sexual behavior' includes evidence of any sexual behavior by the victim before trial." Williams, supra, 263 Ga.App. at 599(1), 588 S.E.2d 790. See Murrell v. Ricks.6
In this matter, Birdsong specifically cross-examined his wife as to how often she had engaged in sexual intercourse after the alleged rape. This question undisputedly concerned his wife's past sexual behavior and was therefore subject to the restrictions of the Rape Shield Statute. See OCGA § 24-2-3(a). Thus, unless the questioned sexual behavior directly involved the participation of Birdsong and supported an inference that he could have reasonably believed that his wife consented to the sexual intercourse for which he was being prosecuted, the question was improper. See OCGA § 24-2-3(b); Jennings, supra, 292 Ga.App. at 153(2)(a), 664 S.E.2d 248. However, Birdsong makes no such argument here. In fact, during the colloquy with the State's prosecutor and the court that occurred prior to the mistrial being declared, Birdsong's counsel argued that the Rape Shield Statute was not applicable in this matter whatsoever because his question was intended to show that the wife was engaging in behavior that was not indicative of having been traumatized as she claimed. At the hearing on Birdsong's plea of former jeopardy, his counsel reiterated this argument, stating that his question to Birdsong's wife was intended to impeach her credibility under the theory that she would not have been having consensual sex with other men if she had truly been raped.
Birdsong's argument is without merit. OCGA § 24-2-3(b) (Punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State.7 See Logan v. State.8 Furthermore, Birdsong's contention that the Rape Shield Statute is not applicable because his counsel's question about sex with other men was more focused on impeaching the wife as to whether the aggravated battery actually occurred is equally without merit. In Osterhout v. State,9 we held that the Rape Shield Statute applied to aggravated assault charges that were being prosecuted in conjunction with a rape charge arising from the same attack. We find no logical reason or authority, nor does Birdsong present any, for the proposition that OCGA § 24-2-3 should not apply to a related aggravated battery count in a rape case. See Osterhout, supra, 266 Ga.App. at 321(1), 596 S.E.2d 766; McBride v. State.10 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that Birdsong's cross-examination of his wife violated the Rape Shield Statute.
2. Birdsong contends that the trial court erred in denying his plea of former jeopardy, arguing that there was no manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial. We disagree.
(Punctuation omitted.) Howell v. State.11 "A manifest necessity exists when the defendant's right to have the trial completed must be subordinated to the public interest in affording the prosecutor a fair opportunity to present evidence to an impartial jury, and the ends of substantial justice cannot be attained without discontinuing the trial." (Punctuation omitted.) Perez v. State.12 "The trial court's decision that there was a manifest necessity to grant a mistrial is entitled to great deference." Id. In fact,
[a] trial judge has acted within his sound discretion in rejecting possible alternatives and in granting a mistrial if reasonable judges could differ about the proper disposition, even though in a strict, literal sense, the mistrial is not necessary. This great deference means that the availability of another alternative does not without more render a mistrial order an abuse of sound discretion. Deference to the judge's sound discretion also precludes a reviewing court from assuming, in the absence of record evidence, that the trial judge deprived a defendant of constitutional rights.
(Punctuation omitted.) Tubbs v. State.13
Furthermore, in three cases involving the same defendant, this Court, the Supreme Court of Georgia, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit have held that the introduction of evidence prohibited by the Rape Shield Statute gives a court grounds to find manifest necessity for a mistrial. State v. Abdi;14 Abdi v. State;15 Abdi v. Georgia.16 In fact, "a single unanswered question by defense counsel about the victim's sexual history may alone give rise to the manifest necessity for a mistrial." Banks v. State.17 Where "the remarks by...
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