Birge v. Bryant Air Conditioning

• Decision Date: 29 August 1979
• Docket Number: No. 2-677A219,2-677A219
• Citation: 182 Ind.App. 1,393 N.E.2d 790
• Parties: Alexander BIRGE, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. BRYANT AIR CONDITIONING, Appellee-Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 790

393 N.E.2d 790

182 Ind.App. 1

Alexander BIRGE, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. BRYANT AIR CONDITIONING, Appellee-Defendant.

No. 2-677A219.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Fourth District.

Aug. 29, 1979.

James E. Sandifer, Graber & Sandifer, P. C., Indianapolis, for appellant-plaintiff.

Edwin Bunny, Travelers Ins. Co., John T. Rocap, Rocap, Rocap, Reese & Young, Indianapolis, for appellee-defendant.

CHIPMAN, Judge.

This workman's compensation claim arose from an accident suffered by plaintiff-appellant Alexander Birge while in the course of his employment with defendant-appellee Bryant Air Conditioning. On May 3, 1977, the Full Industrial Board found appellant to be totally disabled from an organic brain disorder, but denied compensation because he failed to prove medical causation between the accidental injury and his brain condition. Both parties agree all elements for an award, other than medical causation, have been established.

We affirm.

FACTS

On January 23, 1973, appellant struck the back of his head on a steel I-beam. The company nurse sent him to a doctor who told him to take a few days off from work. The next day, appellant felt better and returned to work. Sometime later, appellant began to experience pain in his head and went to see his private physician. Over the next two years, appellant was examined by a number of different medical specialists each of whom conducted a wide variety of extensive tests. Based upon this evidence, the Full Industrial Board denied appellant compensation. Appellant challenges that ruling, raising the following issues.

ISSUES

I. Were the findings of the Full Industrial Board contrary to the evidence?

II. Did the Full Industrial Board ignore competent evidence in reaching its decision?

I. FINDINGS

Appellant argues the evidence clearly supports his claim for compensation. He asserts the Board incorrectly interpreted the testimony of Dr. Oldnich Kolar, and that once Kolar's testimony is properly considered, all evidence points to a causal link between appellant's head injury and his disability. Appellee contends there is more than sufficient evidence to support the Board's findings. We think appellee is correct.

The scope of review for examining this issue has been delineated many times by our court. We give great deference to the factual findings of the Industrial Board. We will not weigh the evidence, but will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the Board's findings. Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. Cummings, (1974) 160 Ind.App. 160, 310 N.E.2d 565; Smith v. Graver Tank and Manufacturing Company, (1973) 158 Ind.App. 431, 302 N.E.2d 852. If the Industrial Board reaches a legitimate conclusion from its consideration of the evidence, this court will not disturb that conclusion even though we might prefer another, equally legitimate conclusion. Wolf v. Plibrico Sales and Service Company, (1973) 158 Ind.App. 111, 301 N.E.2d 756. In other words, this court will not disturb the findings of the Industrial Board unless there is substantial, undisputed evidence which leads conclusively to a result contrary to the one reached by the Board. Parks v. Sheller-Globe Corp., Harley-Davidson, (1978) Ind.App., 380 N.E.2d 110.

Appellant argues the evidence is, in fact, undisputed and it supports his claim for compensation. We do not agree. Appellant correctly states that Dr. Jean Woerner and Dr. Thomas Woerner testified he suffered from a pre-existing organic brain syndrome which was aggravated by the blow to his head. Additionally, Dr. Ralph Reitan testified his neuropsychological examination revealed an organic impairment of the brain.

Appellant is incorrect, however, when he argues the testimony of Dr. Oldnich Kolar supports his position. We find Dr. Kolar's testimony equivocal at best. He admitted there may have been a possibility of organic brain dysfunction prior to the injury, ¹ and he did not discount aggravation of the dysfunction as a result of appellant's head injury. The gist of his lengthy testimony, however, is to the effect he thought these possibilities highly unlikely. He found no positive neurological evidence of brain deterioration and felt the relatively long period of time between the head injury and the onset of appellant's pain to be inconsistent with a traumatic disorder. We think this evidence supports the findings of the Industrial Board.

Even if Dr. Kolar's testimony supported appellant's position, we find other evidence in the record to support...