Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley

• Decision Date: 27 June 1975
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Trude BIRKENFELD et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF BERKELEY, Defendant and Appellant, and Fair Rent Committee et al., Intervenors and Appellants. Civ. 34378.

Page 891

122 Cal.Rptr. 891

49 Cal.App.3d 464

Trude BIRKENFELD et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF BERKELEY, Defendant and Appellant, and Fair Rent Committee et al., Intervenors and Appellants.

Civ. 34378.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

June 27, 1975.

For Opinion on Hearing, see 130 Cal.Rptr. 465, 550 P.2d 1001.

Edmund L. Regalia, Robert A. Belzer, Leslie A. Johnson, Miller, Starr & Regalia, Oakland, for plaintiffs and respondents.

Donald P. McCullum, City Atty., Michael Lawson, Deputy City Atty., Susan Watkins, Asst. City Atty., Berkeley, Charles O. Triebel, Jr., Oakland, for defendant and appellant.

Myron Moskovitz, Lawrence L. Duga, Barbara Dudley, Jeffrey J. Carter, Berkeley, for intervenors and appellants.

SCOTT, Associate Justice.

This case presents a number of issues concerning the constitutionality and validity of a Berkeley City Charter amendment that empowers the city to establish a rent control board with authority to set maximum rents on certain residential rental properties. The charter amendment, ¹ which was enacted by the process of initiative and is Article XVII of the Berkeley City Charter, also gives the rent control board power to prohibit a landlord from evicting a tenant from a rent-controlled unit if there are 'outstanding Code violations' on the premises, violations which are unrelated to enforcement of rent controls.

In determining the constitutionality and validity of a legislative enactment by the process of initiative, the courts may, in order to ascertain the immediate objective and ultimate effect of the act, consider the events and conditions that led to its enactment. (See Mulkey v. Reitman (1966) 64 Cal.2d 529, 533-534, 50 Cal.Rptr. 881, 413 P.2d 825, affirmed Reitman v. Mulkey (1967) 387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct 1627, 18 L.Ed.2d 830; Parr v. Municipal Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 861, 864-865, 92 Cal.Rprt. 153, 479 P.2d 353.)

In the summer of 1969, the Berkeley City Council appointed a committee, consisting of nine persons who represented a cross-section of the community, to investigate and study problems of rental housing and rent levels in Berkeley and to make recommendations. During the next 16 months, the committee, which was headed by Councilman Warren Widener, collected data, consulted experts, conducted numerous public hearings, and prepared an exhaustive report which recommended certain remedial measures, but did not recommend rent controls.

In early 1972, a group of Berkeley residents drafted a rent control amendment to the Berkeley City Charter and presented it to the Berkeley City Council for placement on the ballot at the next general election. On February 8, 1972, the Berkeley City Council, with one member dissenting, decided not to place the proposed rent control amendment on the ballot.

Proponents of the rent control amendment then succeeded in placing the proposed amendment on the June 1972 ballot by the process of initiative. (see Cal. Const., art. XI, § 3(b); Gov.Code, § 34459; Elections Code, §§ 4080-4085.) On June 6, 1972, a majority of the Berkeley electorate approved the proposed charter amendment by a vote of 27,915 to 25,301. And, on August 2, 1972, the state Legislature approved the charter amendment, pursuant to Article XI, section 3(a), of the state Constitution.

In October 1972, six owners of rental properties affected by the Berkeley rent control amendment commenced a class action against the City of Berkeley, an action that developed into an action for declaratory relief to determine the constitutionality and validity of the rent control measure. Three tenants and seven organizations identified as the Fair Rent Committee, Associated Students of the University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley Tenants Organizing Committee, Tenant Action Project, Oceanview Committee, People's Architecture, and the Center for Independent Living, Inc., were allowed to intervene. (see Code Civ.Proc., § 387.)

Trial before the Alameda County Superior Court commenced in February 1973. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the rent control amendment on twenty or more grounds. The principal issue, however, was whether a 'serious public emergency,' consisting of a severe shortage of rental housing and exorbitant rents, in fact existed in Berkeley at the time the charter amendment was enacted. The court found that no such 'emergency' in fact existed. The trial court also found: (1) local rent control regulations are not preempted by either state or federal law; (2) the initiative procedure in this case violated the landlords' right to due process of law by failure to give them notice and a hearing on the merits of the initiative proposal; (3) the charter amendment failed to provide a method for terminating emergency rent controls, and thus invalidated the amendment; (4) sections 7 and 10 of the charter amendment are preempted by state law as embodied in Code of Civil Procedure sections 1159-1179a; and (5) the 'freezing' of rent levels from the effective date of the charter amendment (August 2, 1972) to the date of judgment (June 22, 1973) was, because of equitable considerations involving parties to pending unlawful detainer actions, declared valid as to those parties.

Consistent with these findings and conclusions, the trial court rendered a judgment declaring Berkeley City Charter Article XVII unconstitutional and void, except as to the freezing of rent levels from August 2, 1972 to June 22, 1973. The City of Berkeley and the Intervenors appeal from that judgment. Authority of Charter City to Impose Rent Controls

The City of Berkeley operates under a charter, known historically as a 'Freeholders Home Rule Charter,' as authorized by Article XI, section 3(a) (formerly § 8), of the CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION. SECTION 3(B)² of this Article provides that amendment of a city charter may be proposed by initiative. ³ Before it was amended in 1974, section 3(a) of Article XI provided that a charter amendment became effective upon approval of the state Legislature. Once the state Legislature approved the charter amendment, it became the law of the state and in effect a legislative enactment. ⁴ (Taylor v. Cole (1972) 201 Cal. 327, 257 P. 40; Whitmore v. Brown (1929) 207 Cal. 473, 481, 279 P. 447; Stern v. City of Berkeley (1941) 25 Cal.App. 685, 688-689, 145 P. 167.)

Article XI, section 3(a) of the state Constitution provides that a city may adopt a charter 'for its own government.' As a general rule, a city charter may include provisions pertaining to 'municipal affairs,' as distinguished from matters of state-wide concern. (see Wilson v. Beville (1957) 47 Cal.2d 852, 858-859, 306 P.2d 789.) As to municipal affairs, a charter city has the power, within the limits of its charter and the state Constitution, to govern without interference from the state. (Butterworth v. Boyd (1938) 12 Cal.2d 140, 147, 82 P.2d 434.) Where a charter provision concerning a municipal affair conflicts with general state law, the charter provision prevails. (see Butterworth v. Boyd, supra.) On the other hand, where a charter provision conflicts with general state law on a matter of state-wide concern, the general law of the state may prevail under the concept of preemption. ⁵ (Wilson v. Beville, supra; see also, Healy v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1953) 41 Cal.2d 118, 122, 258 P.2d 1.)

Because the availability of rental housing and the level of rents varies from municipality to municipality, the need for rent control measures is essentially a 'municipal affair' to be determined and administered by local government. ⁶ It follows that a city charter may be amended to provide for rent controls, at least in the absence of state legislation preempting the field. Since the state Legislature has enacted no general rent control law, this case presents no question of conflict between the rent control provisions of the Berkeley City Charter and state law, and hence no issue of preemption. ⁷ Nor is the field of rent controls preempted by federal law at this time. ⁸

Respondents contended, and the trial court declared, that the initiative process failed to give persons adversely affected by the proposed charter amendment, notably landlords, reasonable notice and a hearing on the merits of the proposal, and hence denied them due process of law. Thereafter, however, the California Supreme Court filed its opinion in San Diego Building Contractors Association v. City Council of the City of San Diego (1974), 13 Cal.3d 205, 118 Cal.Rptr. 146, 529 P.2d 570, holding: (1) the provisions of the San Diego City Charter authorize the enactment of all ordinances, including zoning ordinances, by the process of initiative, and (2) under the due process clause of the United States Constitution, general zoning legislation may be enacted by initiative without affording affected landowners notice and hearing. The court explained that due process requires 'notice and hearing' only in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory settings and not in the adoption of general legislation. Accordingly, it is clear from the foregoing case that the initiative process in the instant case was not unconstitutional for failure to give the affected landlords notice and hearing. Judicial Review; Emergency Rent Control Legislation as Valid Exercise of Police Power; Constitutional Standard

The law governing judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes, ordinances, and city charters is well established in this state. (see 13 Cal.Jur.3d, Constitutional Law, §§ 53-80.) In reviewing legislation for the purpose of determining its constitutionality under the police power, a court is limited to determining whether the subject of the legislation is within the state's power, that is, whether it is reasonably necessary to promote the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the people of the community, and if so whether the means adopted to accomplish the objective of the legislation are reasonably designed...