Biscan v. Brown, No. M2001-02766-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 12/15/2003)
| Decision Date | 15 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. M2001-02766-COA-R3-CV.,M2001-02766-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | JENNIFER L. BISCAN, ET AL. v. FRANKLIN H. BROWN, ET AL. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County; No. 98C-2721, Carol Soloman, Judge.
Affirmed and Remanded.
Alan M. Sowell, John J. Hollins, Jr., Joseph T. Howell, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Franklin Hughes Brown, Paul N. Worley.
Philip N. Elbert, Mark P. Chalos, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Jennifer L. Biscan and Robert S. Biscan.
Patricia J. Cottrell, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Ben H. Cantrell, P.J., M.S., and W. Michael Maloan, SP. J., joined.
After attending a party where alcohol was present, a minor intoxicated driver and minor guest passenger were involved in an automobile accident in which the passenger suffered serious injury. The passenger sued the driver and the adult host of the party. The jury awarded the minor guest passenger damages and allocated fault 70% to the minor intoxicated driver, 15% to the adult party host, and 15% to the minor guest passenger. The driver and the host appeal various rulings of the trial court. We affirm.
In this appeal, the defendants appeal a judgment entered after a jury verdict awarding damages to Jennifer Biscan and her father, Robert Biscan, for serious brain injuries Jennifer incurred in an automobile accident, which injuries left her permanently impaired. Jennifer, 16 at the time, was riding as a passenger in the car driven by Hughes Brown, then 17, who was intoxicated. The accident occurred after Jennifer and Hughes left a party at the home of Paul Worley, where some guests had consumed beer. It is uncontested that Hughes Brown's negligent operation of the car while intoxicated was the cause of the accident.
After a jury trial, damages of $3,954,810 were awarded to Jennifer and Mr. Biscan. The jury found Hughes Brown, Jennifer Biscan, and Mr. Worley to be negligent and also found that their negligence was the legal cause of the accident and resulting injuries. The jury assessed fault 70% to Hughes Brown, 15% to Mr. Worley, and 15% to Jennifer Biscan.1 Both Mr. Brown and Mr. Worley appealed.
The appellants do not directly raise a question of whether the jury's verdict is supported by material evidence. Instead, they have identified a total of fifteen issues on appeal that primarily involve (1) legal questions regarding proper parties as plaintiff, defendant, and for purposes of allocating fault, (2) evidentiary rulings, and (3) jury instructions.
As general background, on October 18, 1997, Paul Worley hosted a party for his daughter Ashley's eighteenth birthday at his home. A majority of the children who attended the party were students at Ashley Worley's school, where she was a senior. People were invited to the party by word of mouth, some being personally invited by Ashley Worley. Others only heard about the party.
The Worleys did not serve alcohol or make it available at the party. Although many attendees did not drink, a number brought alcohol, primarily beer, to the party and drank it there. Mr. Worley fully expected that the minor guests would both bring and consume beer on his property. He intended that a rule he had implemented in previous parties given by his son would apply: that is, that any guest who chose to drink alcohol would be required to turn over car keys and spend the night rather than drive home.
Sometime after 11:00 p.m., Jennifer Biscan decided she wanted to leave the party. She ran into her longtime friend Hughes Brown, who had been drinking, and asked him for a ride. The two left the Worley residence together in Hughes Brown's car, and approximately one mile away, at the intersection of Sawyer Brown and Sneed Road, Hughes Brown ran into a guardrail. Mr. Brown was not seriously injured in the wreck; Jennifer, on the other hand, was severely injured. Tests taken shortly after the accident revealed Hughes Brown's blood alcohol level to be .17%.2
The original complaint herein was filed on October 2, 1998, naming as the plaintiff Jennifer Biscan, by her next friend and natural guardian, Robert S. Biscan, and seeking damages for Jennifer's injuries. It is undisputed that Mr. Biscan did not originally sue in his individual capacity for damages he sustained as Jennifer's parent.
Twenty-two months after the complaint was filed, Mr. Worley moved for partial summary judgment as to any claim for medical expenses. He also asked the court to preclude proof of medical expenses unless Jennifer Biscan could prove she personally paid the expenses or was legally obligated to pay them. In the memorandum in support of this motion, Mr. Worley also argued that Jennifer's parents were barred from bringing a cause of action for Jennifer's medical expenses because the statute of limitations had expired.3
Soon thereafter and in response, Jennifer Biscan moved for leave to amend her complaint to add Mr. Biscan as a plaintiff in his individual capacity. The amendment was requested to avoid any potential technical pleading issue by asserting a direct claim by Plaintiff Robert S. Biscan, the father of Plaintiff Jennifer L. Biscan, to recover any medical expenses incurred as a result of the injuries to Jennifer L. Biscan that might be held not recoverable by Jennifer Biscan herself because she was a minor. . . .
The trial court denied the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment and granted the Biscan motion to amend the complaint. On appeal, Mr. Worley and Mr. Brown argue that Robert Biscan was not a plaintiff in the original complaint; that the next friend of a minor plaintiff is not a party plaintiff; and that he failed to bring a claim in his individual capacity within the one-year statute of limitations. Therefore, defendants assert, he cannot sue for or recover any damages he suffered individually as Jennifer's parent. They assert the amendment to add Mr. Biscan as a plaintiff was improperly granted. They also argue that since Mr. Biscan was not a plaintiff in his individual capacity, no damages for medical expenses were recoverable because Jennifer Biscan was not entitled to damages she did not incur. They argue she was a minor, her parents were responsible for those expenses, and she did not pay for medical expenses.
The Biscans, on the other hand, argue that Mr. Worley and Mr. Brown were given notice of the accident which is the subject of the suit, the allegations of their fault in contributing to the accident and injuries, and the fact that the lawsuit was intended to recover all elements of damages relating to the injuries Jennifer Biscan sustained. Further, Mr. Worley and Mr. Brown were provided copies of Jennifer Biscan's medical bills throughout discovery. Consequently, the Biscans assert, the amendment adding Robert Biscan as a separate party relates back to the filing of the original complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 and is therefore not time barred. In the alternative, they assert that Jennifer Biscan is entitled to maintain her own action for the recovery of her medical expenses, the original complaint seeks redress for Jennifer Biscan's entire injury, and therefore, Robert Biscan has relinquished his direct cause of action to Jennifer Biscan.
If Mr. Biscan was properly added as a plaintiff in his individual capacity and that amendment related back to the filing of the original complaint, then it is undisputed he could recover medical expenses attributable to Jennifer's injuries. Because we find the amendment was proper, that determination is dispositive of the question, and there is no need to examine the other issues raised.
The questions about the amendment to add Mr. Biscan as a plaintiff are governed by Rule 15.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. "The goal behind Rule 15, as with all the Rules of Civil Procedure, is `to insure that cases and controversies be determined upon their merits and not upon legal technicalities or procedural niceties.'" Doyle v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Karash v. Pigott, 530 S. W. 775, 777 (Tenn. 1975)). Thus, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 is construed liberally in order to promote the consideration of claims on their merits. Floyd v. Rentrop, 675 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Tenn. 1984); Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co., Inc., 50 S.W.3d 446, 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); McCracken v. Brentwood United Methodist Church, 958 S.W.2d 792, 797 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). The rule in question provides:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in amended pleadings arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party or the naming of the party by or against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and if, within the period provided by law for commencing an action or within 120 days after commencement of the action, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.
The principal purpose of the Rule is "to enable a plaintiff to correct a pleading error after the statute of limitations has run if the correction will not prejudice his adversary in any way." Doyle, 49 S.W.3d at 856-57 (quoting Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 38, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2389 (1986) (Stevens, J. dissenting)).
The Biscans' amendment herein is covered by the second sentence of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 because it adds a party by whom a claim is asserted. "Changing" a...
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