Bishop v. Goins

• Decision Date: 18 February 2019
• Docket Number: S18G0695, S18G0696
• Citation: 305 Ga. 310,824 S.E.2d 369
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: BISHOP v. GOINS et al. Bishop et al. v. Powell et al.

305 Ga. 310
824 S.E.2d 369

BISHOP
v.
GOINS et al.

Bishop et al.
v.
Powell et al.

S18G0695, S18G0696

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: February 18, 2019

Turner & Lawrence, William H. Turner, Jr., for appellants.

James Bates Brannan Groover, Hays B. McQueen, for appellees.

Benham, Justice.

305 Ga. 310

In Bishop v. Goins, 344 Ga. App. 174, 809 S.E.2d 280 (2017), the Court of Appeals held

824 S.E.2d 370

that OCGA § 16-5-94 (d) (3) authorizes a trial court to award a party costs and attorney fees incurred during appellate proceedings following the entry of a stalking-related protective order. We granted certiorari to consider the issue, and, following an examination of the plain language of the statute, we conclude that OCGA § 16-5-94 (d) (3) does not permit such an award in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

As the parties acknowledged at oral argument, neither the facts nor the procedural posture of this case are in question. After the Superior Court of Jasper County issued protective orders against Steve and Jodi Bishop in favor of their neighbors, Bernie and Michael Goins and Jana and Keith Powell ("the Neighbors"), the Bishops appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders in an unpublished decision.¹ The Neighbors then moved the trial court for costs and attorney fees incurred as a result of the appellate proceedings, asserting that such an award was permissible under OCGA § 16-5-94 (d) (3). The trial court granted the motions, over the Bishops’ objections, awarding the Goinses $ 4,907.06 in attorney fees against Steve Bishop and awarding the Powells $ 4,873.90 against both Jodi and Steve Bishop.²

The Bishops sought relief in the Court of Appeals, continuing their argument that OCGA § 16-5-94 (d) (3) does not authorize an award of costs and attorney fees in connection with appellate proceedings.³ See Bishop, supra. The Court of Appeals – which apparently reviewed the legal question under an abuse-of-discretion standard – concluded that the fee award was authorized because "nothing in the fee provision [in OCGA § 16-5-94 (d) (3) ] expressly limits recovery of attorney fees to those incurred in trial court litigation." Bishop, 344 Ga. App. at 176-179, 809 S.E.2d 280. We subsequently granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ decision, and we agree with the Bishops that the fee award here was not authorized by statute.

305 Ga. 311

As we now consider the text of the relevant statutory provision, we are mindful that we must

presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory text its "plain and ordinary meaning," we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173, 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013). Where the statutory text is "clear and unambiguous," we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends. See id. at 173, 751 S.E.2d 337. The issue before us is purely legal and, as such, is reviewed de novo. See Expedia, Inc....