Bishop v. Oakstone Academy

• Decision Date: 05 March 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-CV-404.,06-CV-404.
• Citation: 477 F.Supp.2d 876
• Parties: Courtland BISHOP, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. OAKSTONE ACADEMY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

477 F.Supp.2d 876

Courtland BISHOP, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. OAKSTONE ACADEMY, et al., Defendants.

No. 06-CV-404.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

March 5, 2007.

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Kathi Jean Machle, RJ Donovan Co. LPA, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiffs.

Robert Harrod Willard, Harris & Mazza, S. Adele Shank, Todd Robert Marti, Columbus, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

MARBLEY, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Defendants Oakstone Academy ("Oakstone"), the Ohio State University Children's Center for Developmental Enrichment ("CCDE"), CCDE Therapies, Rebecca Morrison ("Morrison"), Galen Stover, Douglas Brown, Elliot Brody, Esther Brody, James Martin, Edward Snodgrass, and Jenny Stover (collectively "Defendants") move this Court to dismiss Counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.Pro. 12(b) for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted, or, in the alternative, for failure to join an indispensable party. In a separate motion, Defendant the Ohio Department of Education moved for summary judgment on the final remaining count (Count IV) of the Amended Complaint.

For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

II. FACTS

Worthington School District ("Worthington") placed C.B. ("Minor Plaintiff') at Oakstone after he was identified as a child with disabilities under the Individuals with Disabilities Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., in 2002. At the time of his placement, Minor Plaintiff was three years old. Minor Plaintiffs parents placed his non-disabled twin brother at Oakstone to serve as a peer model. During Minor Plaintiff's time at Oakstone, Worthington payed for his tuition.

Defendant CCDE is a private, non-profit organization that is organized under Ohio law for charitable and educational purposes. Oakstone is a name registered by CCDE which describes the portion of CCDE's business which operates a private school.¹ Oakstone's purpose is to "provide services for enhancing the lives if children with Autism Spectrum Disorder and their families."²

Minor Plaintiff attended Oakstone from 2002 until 2005. On or about April 26, 2005, C.B. was diagnosed with a form of autism, and CCDE prepared an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") to address his educational needs. Agents of CODE, Worthington, and Minor Plaintiff's parents all signed the IEP. C.B.'s parents also received a copy of the "parent notice of procedural safeguards."

Oakstone provided educational services to C.B. pursuant to the IEP until on or about August 25, 2005, when Oakstone allegedly expelled C.B. after his mother "questioned" his classroom assignment. Minor Plaintiffs parents later withdrew C.B.'s brother from Oakstone.

On October 25, 2005 Plaintiffs filed a Complaint Notice and Request for Due Process Hearing with the ODE. Plaintiff alleges that all notices regarding the hearing indicated that the only parties to the hearing would be Plaintiffs and Worthington. Prior to the hearing, Plaintiffs withdrew this complaint and hearing request. Instead, Plaintiffs Courtland and Michelle Bishop, individually and as next friends of Minor Plaintiff, filed this action.

Plaintiffs claim that, as a result of Minor Plaintiff's alleged expulsion from Oakstone, Defendants: 1) violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 504; 2) violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 ("ADA"); 3) denied C.B. a free and appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. ("IDEA") and; 4) denied Plaintiffs due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants are liable for breach of contract and tortious interference with contract. Plaintiffs further claim that C.B. suffered academic, social and sensory regression, emotional distress, economic and emotional damages and loss of parental and filial consortium entitling Plaintiffs to compensatory and punitive damages.

All Defendants, except the ODE, have moved to dismiss the relevant counts of the Amended Complaint.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this Court is limited to evaluating whether a plaintiffs complaint sets forth allegations sufficient to make out the elements of a cause of action. Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155, 158 (6th Cir.1983). A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the [p]laintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir.1996) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). This Court must "construe the complaint liberally in the plaintiffs favor and accept as true all factual allegations and permissible inferences therein." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99. While the complaint need not specify every detail of a plaintiff's claim, it must give the defendant "fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1064 (6th Cir.1994). While liberal, this standard of review does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir.1993). A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations with respect to all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc. 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir.1988).

IV. LAW and ANALYSIS

A. Counts I, II, and III

In Count I of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seek to recover under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.³

In Count II of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants abridged his due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

In Count III of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.

All three of these complaints arise from Defendants' alleged violation of the terms of the IEP and subsequent expulsion of the Minor Plaintiff in an around August 25, 2005.

Defendants move to dismiss Counts I, II, and II of the Amended Complaint because, among other reasons, Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing this action.

It is well settled that a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit to obtain relief that is available under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1); Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340, 1343 (6th Cir.1989); Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 873 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir.1989). The IDEA specifically provides for a due process hearing and a subsequent appeal at the state agency level. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f),(g).⁴

Moreover, Plaintiff may not avoid the exhaustion requirement of the IDEA by also stating claims under the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, or bringing suit for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the Plaintiffs claims are also actionable under the IDEA. Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1475-76 (6th Cir.1990); J.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that the plaintiffs "claims under 504 of Rehabilitation Act and § 1983, both of which sought to ensure free appropriate public education that was also available under IDEA, were both subject to IDEA exhaustion requirement"); Covington v. Knox Sch. Sys., 205 F.3d 912, 916 (6th Cir.2000).

The law prohibits Plaintiffs from proceeding with Counts I, II, and III of their Amended Complaint unless they have first exhausted their administrative remedies. Plaintiffs withdrew their request for a due process hearing and pursued no other administrative remedies before bringing this action. Thus, Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as the IDEA requires.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the IDEA requires that they exhaust their administrative remedies before they seek redress in this Court. Nor do they dispute that they failed to exhaust these remedies. Rather, they assert that pursuing their administrative remedies would have been futile, and as such, the IDEA's exhaustion requirement should be waived.

Exhausting administrative remedies is not required if such efforts would be futile or inadequate to protect a plaintiffs rights. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988); Covington, 205 F.3d at 917. The burden of establishing the futility or inadequacy of the administrative remedies rests on the party seeking to bypass them. Honig, 484 U.S. at 327, 108 S.Ct. 592. Mere speculation at the futility or procedural deficiencies of a proposed administrative proceeding is not enough to satisfy this burden. M.T.V. v. Dekalb County Sch,, Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1159 (11th Cir.2006).

Plaintiffs claim that the due process hearing would have been futile because it would not have provided any remedies in regard to Plaintiffs' claims against Oakstone Academy, which was not a party to the hearing.⁵

Plaintiffs fail to show how the absence of Oakstone Academy from the due process hearing would render the administrative process futile. In his petition for a due process hearing, Minor Plaintiff requested placement in a pre-kindergarten class at Oakstone Academy or placement in a half-day class at Worthington with specialized therapy, an additional aide to be provided to assist Minor Plaintiff in his transition to his new placement, and remedial services until a placement was made. In summary, Minor Plaintiff requested that...