Bishop v. State

• Decision Date: 12 November 1913
• Parties: BISHOP v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

160 S.W. 705

BISHOP v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

November 12, 1913.

Appeal from District Court, Comanche County; J. H. Arnold, Judge.

Willie Bishop was convicted of seduction, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Callaway & Callaway, of Comanche, and J. R. Stubblefield, of Eastland, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HARPER, J.

This is the third appeal in this case, the opinions on the two former appeals being found reported in 151 S. W. 821, and 144 S. W. 278, and we deem it unnecessary to recite again the evidence, but merely refer to those opinions. In the first opinion the case was reversed on account of an error in the court's charge on corroboration of an accomplice; on the second appeal the case was reversed on account of the district attorney referring to the former conviction of appellant, and the failure of the court to give a special charge requested by appellant in regard to letters introduced in evidence, and which were proven up only by the accomplice, it being held she could not corroborate herself. On this trial it seems the case must be reversed again.

The defendant, on the trial, tendered witnesses whom it is shown would have testified that they knew appellant; knew his reputation in the community where he resided, and that his reputation as a peaceable, law-abiding citizen was good. The state's objection to this testimony was sustained, and appellant reserved a proper bill of exceptions. The court, in approving the bill, states: "In explanation of the above bill, I desire to say the defendant not having gone on the stand, and the state in no way attacked his character in any respect, and being prohibited by law from so doing, the law making it a penal offense to seduce a woman under promise of marriage, I concluded that the particular trait of character involved the offense, to wit, morality or chastity would be as far as the defendant would be permitted to go in proof and that he could not in such a case prove his general reputation as being law-abiding and peaceable, and this view is sustained by the case of Jones v. State, 10 Tex. App. 558; Greenleaf on Evidence, 25; Underhill on Evidence (2d Ed.) § 77, pp. 137-139. With this explanation bill is approved and will be made a part of the record." The authorities cited by the court we do not think sustain his ruling. Under the cases and authorities cited by him it is held that, wherever criminal intent is an issue in the case, his general reputation as a law-abiding citizen is admissible, if the defendant desires to put his reputation in issue. A case of seduction proceeds upon the theory that by seductive wiles the man obtained the love of the woman, her trust and confidence, and he had entered into an engagement to marry her, leading her to believe that he intended to carry out the promise, yet in fact had no such intention, was not sincere in his promise, and used the blandishment, wiles, and promise but to accomplish her ruin; that this was his intention, and necessarily this would involve a criminal intent, and under all the authorities would render his general reputation as a law-abiding citizen admissible, if he desired to place it in issue. In Branch's Criminal Law, the rule is said to be: "Defendant may prove his general good character when criminal intention is of the essence of the offense"—citing Poyner v. State, 48 S. W. 516; House v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 128, 57 S. W. 825; Jones v. State, 10 Tex. App. 558; Coffee v. State, 1 Tex. App. 548; ...