Bishop v. Takata Corp.

Decision Date26 September 2000
Docket NumberNo. 94,751.,94,751.
Citation2000 OK 71,12 P.3d 459
PartiesMarilyn BISHOP, Personal Representative of the Estate of Amy Elizabeth Bishop, deceased, Plaintiff v. TAKATA CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Takata, Inc., a Delaware corporation, General Motors Corporation, a Delaware corporation, General Motors of Canada Ltd., a foreign corporation, Cami Automotive, Inc., a foreign corporation, Suzuki Motor Company Limited, a foreign corporation, and Suzuki Motor Corporation, a corporation, Defendants
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Duke Halley, Woodward, Oklahoma, David K. Petty, Guymon, Oklahoma for Plaintiff.

John R. Woodard, III, Jody R. Nathan Tulsa, Oklahoma for Defendants Takata Corp. and Takata, Inc.

Mary Quinn-Cooper Tulsa, Oklahoma for Defendants General Motors Corp., General Motors of Canada, Ltd., CAMI Automatic, Inc., and Suzuki Motor Corp.

Rex Travis, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Amicus Curiae, Oklahoma Trial Lawyers Association.

¶ 1 KAUGER, J

¶ 2 We are asked to answer the question of whether the Oklahoma Mandatory Seat Belt Use Act,1 [the Act] precludes the introduction of evidence of the use or nonuse of seat belts in a manufacturers' products liability claim based on a defective seatbelt restraint system in Oklahoma. The applicable statute, 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420,2 provides that "the use or nonuse of seat belts shall not be submitted into evidence in any civil suit in Oklahoma." The question is answered as follows: although the Act prevents a person from being penalized in a civil proceeding for choosing not to wear a seat belt,3 it does not prohibit the introduction of evidence of the use or nonuse of seat belts in a manufacturers' liability action for a defective seat belt restraint system.

FACTS

¶ 3 On March 4, 1997, Amy Elizabeth Bishop, lost control of her 1991 Geo Metro while driving on a gravel road near Hugoton, Kansas. According to the police report, the car went off of the left side of the road, veered into a ditch, rolled, ejected the driver, and trapped her beneath it. The next day, she died from the injuries sustained in the accident.

¶ 4 On February 16, 1999, Marilyn Bishop, Amy Bishop's personal representative (personal representative) initiated an action in federal district court against the manufacturers and distributors,4 (Takata/General Motors/collectively, manufacturers) of the car and its occupant restraint/seat belt system. The complaint sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages resulting from the driver's death. The personal representative alleged that: 1) the driver died because her seat belt disengaged during the accident resulting in her ejection from the car; 2) the car's seat belt system was defective and unreasonably dangerous; 3) the manufacturers were negligent in the design, manufacture, and marketing of the car; and 4) the manufacturers intentionally misrepresented to the public that the car was safe and without defects.

¶ 5 On March 7, 2000, Takata moved for summary judgment, arguing that 47 O.S.1991 § 12-4205 barred an action for manufacturers' products liability. General Motors joined in the motion for summary judgment on March 8, 2000.6 The federal district court certified the question to this Court pursuant to the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S. Supp.1997 § 1601 et seq., on May 25, 2000. We set a briefing cycle which was completed when the amicus curiae brief was filed on July 17, 2000.

¶ 6 TITLE 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420 PREVENTS A PERSON FROM BEING PENALIZED IN A CIVIL PROCEEDING FOR CHOOSING NOT TO WEAR A SEAT BELT. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OF THE USE OR NONUSE OF SEAT BELTS IN A MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY ACTION FOR A DEFECTIVE SEAT BELT RESTRAINT SYSTEM.

¶ 7 Oklahoma adopted the theory of manufacturers' products liability in Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 1974 OK 52, 521 P.2d 1353. Kirkland teaches that one who sells a product in a defective condition, which is unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, is strictly liable for the physical harm to the person or property caused by the defect. To maintain a cause of action under manufacturers' products liability, the plaintiff must prove the product was the cause of the injury, that the product was defective when it left the control of the manufacturer, and that the defect made the product unreasonably dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it.7 Even if the defect may not have caused the accident, if it increases the severity of the injury which would have occurred absent the defect, the manufacturer is liable for damages for increased injuries attributable to an enhanced injury.8 ¶ 8 The personal representative argues that the Legislature, by enacting 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420,9 did not intend to abrogate products liability actions resulting from defective seat belts. She asserts that automotive manufacturers are charged with the duty, imposed by federal and state law,10 See also, regulations 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 and § 571.209, which were promulgated pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq. to make non-defective seat belts and that they should be liable when a seat belt is defective and causes an injury. The amicus curiae insists that the purpose of the statute was to prevent people from being punished for failure to wear a seat belt, not to grant immunity to the manufacturer for the failure to install working seat belts.

¶ 9 The manufacturers do not dispute that they are required to install non-defective seat belts.11 Nevertheless, they argue that because the personal representative must prove that the seat belt improperly disengaged during the accident and caused the injury the action must fail because 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420,12 by its plain language, prevents her from submitting any evidence relating to the use of seat belts.13

¶ 10 The manufacturers cite our recent decision in Comer v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 1999 OK 86, 991 P.2d 1006 as dispositive. Although Comer involved the same statutory provision under consideration here, it does not dictate the answer to the certified question. In Comer, we specifically noted that "[t]he question of the statutes's application to a products liability action is not before us and we need not address it."14Comer involved a member of a church youth group who was killed in an automobile accident. The parents sued the church alleging that it was negligent for failing to require their daughter, a back seat passenger of the automobile, to wear a seat belt. The parents argued that the church had a duty to require back seat passengers to use seat belts, and that the statute should be interpreted to preclude the use of a "seat belt defense" of contributory negligence or mitigation of damages, but not to preclude negligence actions altogether.

¶ 11 In Comer we decided that 47 O.S.1991 § 12-42015 precludes the introduction of evidence of the use or nonuse of seat belts to support a claim of negligence in a wrongful death action. We determined that: 1) the Act did not impose a statutory duty upon the operator of a passenger vehicle to require back seat passengers to use a seat belt, nor had this Court ever recognized such a duty at common law; and 2) even if there were such a duty, § 12-420 precludes the introduction of evidence of the use or nonuse of a seat belt to support a negligence claim.

¶ 12 We also recognized in Comer that the Legislature could have mandated the use of seat belts by all passengers, or made particular requirements with regard to minor passengers other than child safety restraint requirements, and that it could have established a basis for a negligence action. Instead, it added 47 O.S.1991 § 12-420,16 prohibiting seat belt evidence in civil actions. Unlike other states with broader statutes, § 12-420 is tightly drafted. At issue in Comer was the conduct of the driver and the seat belt user whether the driver had a duty to require a back seat passenger to wear a seat belt and whether a negligence claim would be supported if the back seat passenger failed to do so. At issue in a defective seat belt products liability case is the condition of the seat belt not the conduct of the seat belt user.

¶ 13 Prior to § 12-420's enactment, the Court held in Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 1976 OK 106, 555 P.2d 48, 84 A.L.R.3d 1199, that there was no common law or statutory duty requiring the use of seat belts and that the failure to use a seat belt was not a defense to establish contributory negligence or to reduce the amount of damages to the injured party. The Court essentially invited legislation on the subject of seat belts. It recognized that the seat belt phenomenon was in its infancy, and that the only legislation relating to seat belts at that time was a statute which made it unlawful to sell a post-1966 vehicle without seat belts for the front right and left seats.17

¶ 14 The Legislature responded to Fields in 1983, with its enactment of 47 O.S. Supp.1983 § 11-1112,18 regulating the use of child passenger restraint systems and again in 1985, with the enactment of the Oklahoma Mandatory Seat Belt Use Act.19 The Act sets forth the requirements of seat belt use in passenger cars in Oklahoma, allows for exceptions for certain drivers or passengers,20 and imposes fines and court costs for violations of the Act.21 Considering the Act as a whole, and the context from which it was enacted, the obvious purposes of the Act are to codify public policy of encouraging seat belt use and to make seat belt use mandatory for drivers and front-seat passengers by providing a penalty for nonuse. Section 12-420 expressly clarifies that the sole legal sanction for the failure to wear a seat belt is the fine imposed by the Act and that a person will not be penalized in a civil proceeding, by connotations of fault, for choosing to refrain from wearing a seat belt.22 To read the statute...

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