Bishop v. Town of Barre

• Decision Date: 02 February 1982
• Docket Number: No. 393-80,393-80
• Citation: 442 A.2d 50,140 Vt. 564
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: Leroy BISHOP, Jr. v. TOWN OF BARRE and Travellers' Insurance Company.

Page 50

442 A.2d 50

140 Vt. 564

Leroy BISHOP, Jr. v. TOWN OF BARRE and Travellers' Insurance Company.

No. 393-80.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Feb. 2, 1982.

George K. Belcher of Abare, Donaghy & Nicholls, P.C., Barre, for plaintiff.

Leo A. Bisson, Jr., of Downs, Rachlin & Martin, St. Johnsbury, for defendants.

Before BARNEY, C. J., and BILLINGS, HILL, UNDERWOOD and PECK, JJ.

HILL, Justice.

This case concerns the proper standard for computing benefits under the Vermont Workmen's Compensation Act, 21 V.S.A. §§ 601-709. The claimant, Leroy Bishop, challenges the amount of compensation he was awarded by the Commissioner of Labor and Industry. The claimant also contests the denial of vocational rehabilitation benefits.

I.

The facts in this case are straightforward. On October 3, 1973, the claimant suffered an injury to his back while employed as a laborer by the Town of Barre. Although he returned to work for short periods of time, he has not worked since October of 1977. From December 15, 1973, to April 8, 1974, and from October 3, 1977, to January 22, 1979, the claimant received temporary total disability benefits. On January 22, 1979, the defendants discontinued temporary benefits on the ground that the claimant had reached the "end result" of the healing process.

The claimant filed for permanent disability and vocational rehabilitation benefits. At the hearing on these claims, the medical testimony stood uncontradicted: the claimant's back impairment would not improve, resulting in a thirty-five to forty per cent permanent impairment of the spine, and a twenty per cent impairment to the whole man. The claimant also adduced testimony that, taking account of his age, training, and educational background, he would be unable to work again. In addition, the claimant presented a vocational rehabilitation plan, under which the claimant would receive $2,695.00 in funds to establish a small livestock venture at his home. The return on this vocational rehabilitation plan was estimated at approximately $200.00 annually.

The Commissioner found that the claimant was entitled to sixty-six weeks of permanent partial disability benefits, computed on the basis of a twenty per cent impairment to the whole man. The Commissioner based this decision on medical evidence alone, and did not address the claimant's age, education, or training. The claimant was denied vocational rehabilitation benefits. The Commissioner also deducted $145.56 from the claimant's compensation award, because of overpayments of temporary disability benefits.

The claimant appealed the Commissioner's decision to the Washington Superior Court, which certified the following questions to this Court under V.R.A.P. 5(a):

(1) Did the Commissioner of Labor and Industry err in concluding that claimant was only 20% permanently disabled?

(2) Is the Commissioner of Labor and Industry's conclusion of 20% permanent partial disability in error because it is based only on permanent physical impairment and not permanent economic impairment?

(a) Did the Commissioner of Labor and Industry err in not finding that the claimant has sustained permanent economic impairment?

(3) Was it error for the Commissioner of Labor and Industry to conclude the claimant is only 20% permanently partially disabled in light of Dr. Felix Callan's testimony that claimant sustained a 20% permanent partial disability to the "whole man" and 35-40% permanent partial disability to his spine?

(4) Is the claimant entitled to the payment of $2,695.00 for the purpose of vocational rehabilitation?

(5) Was there an overpayment of temporary disability benefits pursuant to 21 VSA § 650(d)?

We answer questions one, three, and five in the affirmative, and two, two(a), and four in the negative, for reasons which will be discussed in the remainder of this opinion.

II.

A.

The Vermont Workmen's Compensation Act provides two distinct classes of benefits. Temporary disability benefits are provided for workers who suffer a "disability for work," 21 V.S.A. §§ 642, 646, during the period between their injury and final recovery. Once the recovery process has ended, or the worker has achieved the maximum possible restoration of his earning power, he is no longer entitled to temporary disability benefits. At this point, the worker has reached the "end result" of the healing process. Moody v. Humphrey & Harding, Inc., 127 Vt. 52, 57, 238 A.2d 646, 649 (1968); Orvis v. Hutchins, 123 Vt. 18, 24, 179 A.2d 470, 474 (1962). Because the claimant's condition has reached an "end result," claims for benefits are then treated under the permanent disability sections, 21 V.S.A. §§ 644, 648. See Orvis v. Hutchins, supra, 123 Vt. at 24, 179 A.2d at 474.

Our case law has established different criteria for computing temporary, as opposed to permanent, benefits. Temporary disability benefits are awarded on the basis of an individual's incapacity for work. See Sivret v. Knight, 118 Vt. 343, 346, 109 A.2d 495, 497-98 (1954); Roller v. Warren, 98 Vt. 514, 517-18, 129 A. 168, 169-70 (1925). This involves consideration of not only physical injury, but also of other factors restricting the claimant's capacity to obtain work. See Gee v. City of Burlington, 120 Vt. 472, 476-77, 144 A.2d 797, 799-800 (1958). In contrast, permanent disability benefits are calculated solely on the basis of physical impairment: "(The permanent disability) statute has arbitrarily fixed the amount of compensation to be paid for scheduled specific injuries regardless of loss of present earning power." Beane v. Vermont Marble Co., 115 Vt. 142, 145, 52 A.2d 784, 786 (1947). See Orvis v. Hutchins, supra, 123 Vt. at 22-23, 179 A.2d at 473 (comparing temporary and permanent disability sections).

The claimant challenges the validity of these different standards set forth in Vermont case law. He asserts that permanent disability, like temporary disability, should be evaluated by reference to any factor which restricts capacity for work. In support of this position, he advances several arguments. First, he contends that the Act's use of the word "disability" connotes more than physical impairment, thereby requiring evaluation of ability to work. Second, he asserts that by allowing compensation for unscheduled injuries, see 21 V.S.A. §§ 644(b), 648(20), the Act sanctions consideration of factors other than physical injury. Third, he argues that the purpose of the statute is to compensate for lost wages, which requires consideration of capacity for work. Thus, he concludes that the Commissioner erred in failing to consider the claimant's ability to work, and in relying solely on physical impairment in setting compensation.

The claimant's arguments do not persuade us to reject our precedent. Earning capacity is significant to the Workmen's Compensation Act, but it performs a far different function than envisioned by the claimant.

The claimant correctly assigns protection against wage loss as one of the Act's purposes. The Act, however, also seeks to establish an expedient, efficient remedy for injured workers. See Kittell v. Vermont Weatherboard, Inc., 138 Vt. 439, 441, 417 A.2d 926, 927 (1980) (quoting Morrisseau v. Legac, 123 Vt. 70, 76, 181 A.2d 53, 57 (1962)). Simplifying the elements of recovery is the Act's mechanism for achieving efficiency. To be entitled to benefits, a claimant need only establish that he suffered "a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by an employer subject to (the Act)." 21 V.S.A. § 618. The employee need not show that the employer was negligent, see Grenier v. Alta Crest Farms, Inc., 115 Vt. 324, 328, 58 A.2d 884, 887 (1948), or that he actually suffered a wage loss. See Beane v. Vermont Marble Co., supra, 115 Vt. at 144, 52 A.2d at 785-86. Because resolution of these issues on a case by case basis would impede the process, thereby delaying awards to needy beneficiaries, the legislature has chosen a "scheduled benefits" system. The rate of compensation for listed injuries has been conclusively determined in the Act. See 21 V.S.A. §§ 644, 648. The system still protects against wage loss, but it fulfills this aim by awarding permanent disability benefits on the basis of physical impairment as a means to insure against wage loss. Professor Larson explains how a scheduled benefits system, such as Vermont's, insures against wage loss:

(Exclusion of individual wage loss evidence) is not, however, to be interpreted as an erratic deviation from the underlying principle of compensation law-that benefits relate to loss of earning capacity and not to physical injury as such. The basic theory remains the same; the only difference is that the effect on earning capacity is a conclusively presumed one, instead of a specifically proved one based on the individual's actual wage-loss experience.

2 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 58.11, at 10-173 to 174 (1981) (footnotes omitted).

The yardstick is general, not particular. The total disability section compensates for injuries which, as a general rule, tend to have the most severe impact on earning capacity. The partial disability section compensates for injuries which generally have a less serious impact, and rates the scheduled impairments accordingly.

The claimant's arguments that the plain meaning of disability and the presence of compensation for unscheduled injuries compel consideration of individual wage loss must be rejected in light of the elaborate and carefully drawn scheme of scheduled benefits. See Beane v. Vermont Marble Co., supra, 115 Vt. at 145, 52 A.2d at 786. The Act enumerates "partial disabilities" in 21 V.S.A. § 648, and "total disabilities" in 21 V.S.A. § 644. Yet, each of the "partial disabilities" could, depending upon a person's age, occupation, and training, prevent a worker from obtaining employment. Similarly, a worker could suffer a disability listed as "total," yet return to his or her previous job. ¹ If we...