Bissonnette v. Ventura, PC 02-3437

• Decision Date: 22 November 2004
• Docket Number: PC 02-3437
• Parties: KAREN A. BISSONNETTE v. ANTHONY F. VENTURA
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

KAREN A. BISSONNETTE
v.
ANTHONY F. VENTURA

No. PC 02-3437

Superior Court of Rhode Island

November 22, 2004

DECISION

GIBNEY, J.

Before this Court is a matter for decision following a non-jury trial in which Plaintiff Karen A. Bissonnette (Bissonnette) brought a complaint against Defendant Anthony F. Ventura (Ventura). Bissonnette sought a partition by sale of property owned in joint tenancy with Ventura, as well as attorney's fees and such other relief as the Court deems just. Ventura counterclaimed seeking compensatory damages for his payment of all joint accounts, plus interest and costs; compensatory damages for repairs caused by vandalism to his truck; compensatory damages for all payments made toward the mortgage, taxes, insurance, utilities, sewer and water bill, maintenance and improvements; attorney's fees; and such other relief the Court deems just. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-13.

FACTS AND TRAVEL

On September 14, 1988, Bissonnette and Ventura, as joint tenants, purchased a parcel of real property with a house. Bissonnette and Ventura purchased the property for $110,000.00, making a down payment of $11,000.00 and mortgaging the remaining $99,000.00. Bissonnette and Ventura each contributed $5,500.00 to the down payment.

Bissonnette and her minor child and Ventura and his minor child resided at the home until July 1, 1997. (Ventura's minor child resided at the home on weekends and during vacations at first, but eventually resided there permanently.) From September 14, 1988 until July 1, 1997, Ventura made mortgage payments totaling approximately $80,855.69 and also paid taxes, insurance, water and sewer bills from funds in a joint checking account with Bissonnette. Bissonnette paid all other household expenses, such as utility and food bills, out of a checking account held jointly with her mother. When Bissonnette left the property in July 1997, she ceased payments for mortgage, taxes, insurance, and any household expenses. She never received any rents or proceeds from the property.

Ventura's truck was twice vandalized within several months of Bissonnette's departure from the home. The first instance involved spray paint on the side of the truck, while the second involved damage to the truck's tires caused by roof nails. The repair costs total approximately $638.16.

This Court has heard testimony, examined all exhibits, and reviewed the evidence before it. Decision is herein rendered.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon . . . ." R.I. Super. R. Civ. P. 52(a). In a non-jury trial, "the trial justice sits as a trier of fact as well as of law." Hood v. Hawkins, 478 A.2d 181, 184 (R.I. 1984). "Consequently, [s]he weighs and considers the evidence, passes upon the credibility of witnesses, and draws proper inferences." Id. "The task of determining credibility of witnesses is peculiarly the function of the trial justice when sitting without a jury." State v. Sparks, 667 A.2d 1250, 1251 (R.I. 1995) (citing Walton v. Baird, 433 A.2d 963, 964 (R.I. 1981)). "It is also the province of the trial justice to draw inferences from the testimony of witnesses. . . ." Id.; Rodriques v. Santos, 446 A.2d 306, 312 (R.I. 1983) (holding question of who should be believed one for trier of fact). When rendering a decision in a non-jury trial, "the trial justice need not engage in extensive analysis to comply with this requirement." White v. LeClerc, 468 A.2d 289, 290 (R.I. 1983). Thus, "even brief findings will suffice as long as they address and resolve the controlling factual and legal issues." Id.

FAILURE TO JOIN MORTGAGE COMPANY

As a preliminary issue, Ventura, citing § 34-15-20, argues that Bissonnette's failure to join the mortgage company to this suit is fatal to her claim for partition. This Court does not agree. Section 34-15-20 specifically refers to reversioners and remaindermen, while a mortgagor is akin to a lien holder. The statute provides for the ascertainment of persons in being who would have a reversionary or remainder interest in the property, such as in the making of a testamentary class gift. This Court does not read § 34-15-20 to...