Walton v. Baird

• Decision Date: 21 August 1981
• Docket Number: No. 79-224-A,79-224-A
• Citation: 433 A.2d 963
• Parties: Minnie WALTON et al. v. James C. BAIRD et al. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 963

433 A.2d 963

Minnie WALTON et al. v. James C. BAIRD et al.

No. 79-224-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Aug. 21, 1981.

Anderson, Henning & Anderson, Paul A. Anderson, Carol A. Zangari, Law Offices of Hugh L. Moore, Jr., Kevin M. Cain, Providence, for defendants.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This case comes before us on appeal by James C. Baird (Baird) from a judgment entered in the Superior Court denying recovery on his cross-claim against Willie D. Jackson (Jackson) for the killing of Baird's horse as a result of a collision between the horse and Jackson's motor vehicle on October 16, 1973. ¹ On the night of the accident, in some unexplained manner, two horses owned by Baird escaped from their enclosure and wandered onto Route 101 near its intersection with Route 94 in the town of Foster. The horse that is the subject of this action was standing in the westbound lane of travel when the Jackson automobile struck the animal, shattering its legs and causing it to crash through the convertible top of the automobile. As a result of those injuries, the horse had to be shot in order to prevent further suffering. After hearing testimony given by Baird and by Robert Olson, an eyewitness to the accident, the trial justice, in a comprehensive review of the evidence, found that the proximate cause of the accident was the failure of Baird properly to secure the animal's corral. He further found that "the mere presence of a horse going loose and unattended on the highway is * * * prima facie evidence of the negligence of the owner, to wit, Mr. Baird, * * * which was not rebutted * * *." He specifically found that defendant Jackson was not guilty of any negligence that was the proximate cause of the injuries. We affirm.

In his brief and at oral argument, Baird attacks the findings of the trial justice as inconsistent with uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony. However, the trial justice in this case specifically found that Baird and Olson were not entirely credible as witnesses. He pointed out that, in his opinion, Baird "flavored his testimony" in order to "achieve the result * * * sought in his cross complaint." The trial justice also found that Mr. Olson's apparently vivid recollections of the details of the accident were inconsistent with his inability to remember other details with which he should have been equally conversant. The task of determining the credibility of witnesses is peculiarly the function of the trial justice when sitting without a jury. Kem Manufacturing Corp. v. Howland, R.I., 401 A.2d 1284 (1979); Raheb v. Lemenski, 115 R.I. 576, 350 A.2d 397 (1976). It is also the province of the trial justice as a part of the factfinding process to draw inferences from the testimony of witnesses, and such inferences, if reasonable, are entitled on review to the same weight as his other factual determinations. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Israel, R.I., 377 A.2d 341, 345 (1977). In this instance the trial justice analyzed Mr. Olson's testimony concerning the visibility of the horse, the time frame within which Olson saw the Jackson vehicle approach, and the alleged speed of the Jackson vehicle. From this testimony the trial justice drew the inference that Jackson had only seconds in which to react to the sudden emergency.

To these facts as found, the trial justice applied principles of law derived from the case of Round v. Burns, 77 R.I. 135, 74 A.2d 861 (19...