Bittle v. Comm'r of Social Services

• Decision Date: 20 July 1999
• Citation: 734 A.2d 551,249 Conn. 503
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: (Conn. 1999) BITTLE v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES (SC 15973)

734 A.2d 551 (Conn. 1999)

BITTLE v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES

(SC 15973)

Connecticut Supreme Court

Argued March 18

July 20, 1999

Alison Morantz, certified legal intern, with whom were Kathleen A. Sullivan, supervising attorney, and, on the brief, Robert A. Solomon, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Karen H. Fritzinger, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Richard J. Lynch, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).

Callahan, C. J., and Berdon, Norcott, Katz and McDonald, Js.

Norcott, J.

OPINION

The dispositive issue in this certified appeal is whether service of process pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 (c)¹ is perfected upon depositing in the mail, certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy of the appeal papers, addressed to the proper agency or the attorney general within forty-five days of the mailing of the agency's decision. The plaintiff, Akilah Bittle, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant, the commissioner of the department of social services (department), denying her application for an emergency security deposit. The plaintiff, using certified mail, return receipt requested, mailed the appeal documents forty-four days after the mailing of the department's decision. The trial court dismissed the appeal, sua sponte, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the documents had not been received by the department until forty-eight days after the mailing of the decision by the department.

Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision. See Bittle v. Commissioner of Social Services, 48 Conn. App. 711, 712-13, 711 A.2d 1198 (1998). Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded that service under § 4-183 (c) is not completed until the appeal papers are in the actual possession of the administrative agency or the attorney general, whether service is by certified mail or in-hand service. Id., 717. We disagree and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

I.

The facts are undisputed and are aptly set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. "The plaintiff applied to the department for an emergency security deposit so that she might rent a new residence. The department informed her that before she could be eligible for an emergency security deposit she would have to obtain a judgment of eviction against herself. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff obtained such a judgment. When she advised the department that she had obtained the judgment of eviction, the department informed her that she had never been qualified to receive an emergency security deposit.

"The department issued its denial of the plaintiff's request for an emergency security deposit on August 29, 1995. On October 12, 1995, forty-four days after the issuance of the judgment, the plaintiff attempted to appeal from the denial of her request for an emergency security deposit. This was accomplished by depositing the appeal documents in the United States mail by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the [department] and to the office of the attorney general. The attorney general's office and the [department] received the appeal documents on October 16, 1995, forty-eight days after notice of the denial of the requested emergency security deposit was mailed to the plaintiff. The trial court found that service was not completed until it was received by the defendant and, therefore, that the plaintiff had not satisfied the requirement of § 4-183 (c), depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction." Id., 712-13.

Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. We granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that service of process pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 (c) is not perfected upon depositing in the mail, certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy of the appeal papers, addressed to the proper agency or the attorney general within forty-five days of the agency decision?" Bittle v. Commissioner of Social Services, 245 Conn. 922, 717 A.2d 237 (1998).

II.

This appeal concerns, in essence, the statutory construction of § 4-183 (c) (1). The plaintiff argues that service of process of appeal papers pursuant to § 4-183 (c) (1) is perfected when the appeal papers are deposited in the mail within the time limits set, and by the specific mail services prescribed by that statute. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court's Conclusion that service is not effective upon mailing, pursuant to § 4-183 (c) (1), conflicts with the plain language of the statute and undermines the legislative intent to enhance rather than constrain the rights of an appellant under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. The department counters that service is not perfected until the appeal papers physically are received by the agency. We agree with the plaintiff.

"Statutory construction is a question of law and therefore our review is plenary." Davis v. Norwich, 232 Conn. 311, 317, 654 A.2d 1221 (1995). "In interpreting statutes, we are guided by well established tenets of statutory construction. [O]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.... Furthermore, [w]e presume that laws are enacted in view of existing relevant statutes... and that [s]tatutes are to be interpreted with regard to other relevant statutes because the legislature is presumed to have created a consistent body of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunnihan v. Mattatuck Mfg. Co., 243 Conn. 438, 444, 705 A.2d 1012 (1997). Having considered these factors, we conclude that a party appealing from an administrative decision perfects service of process on the agency pursuant to § 4-183 (c) (1) upon depositing the appeal documents in the mail.

"It is an axiom of statutory construction that legislative intent is to be determined by an analysis of the language actually used in the legislation. Caltabiano v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 662, 666, 560 A.2d 975 (1989)." Vaillancourt v. New Britain Machine/Litton, 224 Conn. 382, 391, 618 A.2d 1340 (1993). We, therefore, begin our analysis with the relevant language in § 4-183 (c).

The department claims that the language that must be given full effect is the first sentence in § 4-183 (c), which provides in relevant part: "[A] person appealing as provided in this section shall serve a copy of the appeal on the agency that rendered the final decision at its office...." According to the department, the phrases "on the agency," and "at its office" demonstrate that service can be made only if it physically is received by the agency. This reading of the statute is misdirected. The phrases on which the department has focused merely provide upon whom, and where, the service must be made. The operative part of the statute is the verb "serve." The meaning of "serve," therefore, is the focus of our analysis.

Methods of effecting service of appeal papers on agencies are set forth in § 4-183 (c), which provides in relevant part: "Service of the appeal shall be made by (1) United States mail, certified or registered, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, without the use of a sheriff or other officer, or (2) personal service by a proper officer or indifferent person making service in the same manner as complaints are served in ordinary civil actions." (Emphasis added.) Prior to 1988, service of appeal papers could "be made by the appellant mailing a copy of the petition... to the office of the commissioner of the agency or to the office of the attorney general in Hartford" pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 4-183 (b).² (Emphasis added.) The apparent linguistic differences between the current and the previous statutes are the results of the amendments made to the UAPA by No. 88-317, § 23, of the 1988 Public Acts (P.A. 88-317). Although the current language of § 4-183 (c) provides that "[s]ervice of the appeal shall be made by... United States mail," instead of "service upon an agency may be made by mailing," as was provided by General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 4-183 (b), the legislative history of P.A. 88-317 does not indicate that the linguistic changes in the statute were meant to incorporate material and consequential changes in the application of the previous revision of the statute. The operative language in General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 4-183 (b) that is material for the purposes of resolving the issue in this appeal is the phrase "made by... mailing." A plain reading of that phrase conveys that service is completed when the appeal is mailed.³ The history of the statutory development of § 4-183 (c) also supports the Conclusion that such an interpretation of the phrase "made by... United States mail," as it appears in § 4-183 (c), furthers the legislature's intent in providing a simple and efficient method of effectuating service of appeal papers by mail.

More than two and one-half decades ago, the statutory method for service of process of appeals from administrative agencies began to evolve. This evolution is reflected by several statutory amendments made to the UAPA since 1971. Our review of the legislative records related to these amendments shows that each amendment was motivated by public policies that were intended to enhance the rights of the public in regard to the service of process of appeals on the agencies specifically, and the process of prosecuting...