Lisee v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities
Decision Date | 06 November 2001 |
Docket Number | (SC 16419) |
Citation | 782 A.2d 670,258 Conn. 529 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | DEBORAH LISEE v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES ET AL. |
Sullivan, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, JS. Albert Zakarian, with whom were Suzanne Garrow and, on the brief, Meredith G. Diette, for the appellant (defendant Aetna Retirement Services, Inc.).
Charles Krich, with whom was Philip A. Murphy, Jr., commission counsel, for the appellee (named defendant).
Robert J. Williams, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).
The defendant, Aetna Retirement Services, Inc. (Aetna),1 appeals from the trial court's order remanding the administrative appeal of the plaintiff, Deborah Lisee, from the decision of the named defendant, the commission on human rights and opportunities (commission), dismissing the plaintiffs disability discrimination complaint against Aetna, the plaintiff's former employer. On appeal, Aetna claims that the remand order was not statutorily authorized and that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority in failing to affirm the commission's decision to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint in view of the substantial evidence to support that decision. The commission contends that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Aetna's appeal because the trial court's remand order is not an appealable final judgment.2 We agree with the commission and, accordingly, dismiss Aetna's appeal. We, therefore, do not reach the merits of Aetna's claims.
The relevant facts and procedural history are undisputed. On February 24, 1998, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the commission alleging that Aetna had terminated her employment and had failed to accommodate reasonably her disability stemming from certain ailments of her hips and back in violation of General Statutes §§ 46a-58 (a)3 and 46a-60 (a) (1),4 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The commission conducted an investigation of the plaintiffs allegations and, on February 11, 1999, issued a notice of final agency action in which it found no reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff had been terminated or denied reasonable accommodations as a result of her disability. The commission thereupon dismissed the plaintiffs complaint.
The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the commission's decision dismissing her complaint. The trial court held a hearing on February 10, 2000, at which it entertained argument on the issue of whether Aetna had provided the plaintiff with reasonable accommodations as required under applicable federal and state law. Upon conclusion of the hearing, Aetna sought leave to file a supplemental brief on that issue, and the trial court granted the parties two weeks in which to file additional briefs. The court scheduled further argument for March 23, 2000.
In the meantime, on February 24, 2000, the commission filed a motion to remand the case to itself so that it could conduct further investigation and make a new probable cause determination. In its motion, the commission represented that the plaintiff had no objection to its motion. Aetna, however, did object to the commission's motion. At the hearing before the trial court on March 23, 2000, the commission contended that a remand was required because the commission investigator had failed both to interview certain witnesses and to review certain records concerning Aetna's Return to Work program.5 On March 27, 2000, the trial court granted the commission's motion to remand, and Aetna appealed to the Appellate Court. The commission then filed a motion for articulation of the trial court's decision. Specifically, the commission sought clarification as to whether the trial court's remand order was intended to be a final judgment. In its ruling on the motion for articulation,6 the trial court stated: 8 9
Thereafter, the commission filed with the Appellate Court a motion to dismiss Aetna's appeal "on the ground that it ha[d] not been taken from a final judgment." The Appellate Court denied the motion without prejudice, allowing the parties to address the final judgment issue in their briefs on the merits of the appeal. Aetna thereafter filed a motion to transfer the appeal to this court from the Appellate Court, which we granted pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-2.
General Statutes § 4-18410 restricts an appellate court's subject matter jurisdiction in the context of administrative appeals to appeals from final judgments. Therefore, we must first address the commission's claim that the trial court's remand order is not a final judgment and that, consequently, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. See State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30, 463 A.2d 566 (1983) (). We conclude that the trial court's remand order is not an appealable final judgment.
General Statutes § 4-183 (j)11 which took effect in 1989; see Public Acts 1988, No. 88-317, §§ 23, 107 (P.A. 88-317); provides in relevant part that, "[f] or purposes of this section, a remand is a final judgment."12 (Emphasis added.) Aetna contends that, under the plain language of § 4-183 (j), a remand to an administrative agency pursuant to any subsection of § 4-183, including the remand ordered by the trial court in the present case pursuant to subsection (h) of § 4-183, is a final judgment for purposes of § 4-184. Aetna also relies on this court's dicta in Jones v. Crystal, 242 Conn. 599, 699 A.2d 961 (1997), and Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 233 Conn. 486, 659 A.2d 714 (1995), that, under § 4-183 (j), "any remand to the administrative [agency] is a final judgment for purposes of an appeal." Jones v. Crystal, supra, 602 n.4, citing Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, supra, 496; see also Johnston v. Salinas, 56 Conn. App. 772, 774 n.4, 746 A.2d 202 (2000) (); Dacey v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 41 Conn. App. 1, 5, 673 A.2d 1177 (1996) ( ). We disagree with Aetna and conclude, instead, that the conclusion that logically flows from this court's holding and analysis in Schieffelin & Co. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 202 Conn. 405, 406, 409-12, 521 A.2d 566 (1987) (Schieffelin) ( ), that some remand orders in administrative appeals are not appealable final judgments, survived the subsequent enactment of § 4-183 (j).
The issue of whether the trial court's remand order is a final judgment under § 4-183 (j) is a matter of statutory interpretation. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doyle v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 252 Conn. 79, 84, 743 A.2d 156 (1999).
We first review the history of § 4-183 (j). Bittle v. Commissioner of Social Services, 249 Conn. 503, 513, 734 A.2d 551 (1999). As part of those amendments, subsection (g) of General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 4-18313 was redesignated as subsection (j); see footnote 12 of this opinion; and, among other changes, the following sentence was added: "For purposes of this section, a remand is a final judgment." P.A. 88-317, § 23.
Prior to the passage of P.A. 88-317, § 23, this court had subjected remands in administrative appeals to the same analysis as rulings in other judicial proceedings for purposes of determining whether they were appealable final judgments. Generally, we recognized that "[a]n otherwise interlocutory order is appealable in two circumstances: (1) where the order or action terminates a separate and distinct proceeding, or (2) where the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them." State v. Curcio, supra, 191 Conn. 31.
InSchieffelin, we concluded that "[t]here is no reason why administrative appeals should not be governed by the principles of Curcio.... A [ruling] by a trial court ordering further administrative proceedings cannot meet the first prong of the Curcio test ... because, whatever its merits, the trial court's order has not terminate[d] a separate and distinct proceeding. The more difficult question is whether the trial court's order so concludes the rights of ...
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