Bittner v. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 29 October 1926
• Docket Number: No. 2409.,2409.
• Citation: 15 F.2d 652
• Parties: BITTNER et al. v. WEST VIRGINIA-PITTSBURGH COAL CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

15 F.2d 652 (1926)

BITTNER et al. v. WEST VIRGINIA-PITTSBURGH COAL CO.

No. 2409.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

October 29, 1926.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Henry Warrum, of Indianapolis, Ind. (T. C. Townsend, of Charleston, W. Va., on the brief), for appellants.

John A. Howard, of Wheeling, W. Va. (Wm. C. Howard and J. M. Ritz, both of Wheeling, W. Va., on the brief), for appellee.

Before WADDILL, ROSE, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

WADDILL, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

The sequence of the various steps in the suits are: (1) Filing of the bill of May 11, 1925; (2) motion to dismiss, made May 15, 1925; (3) awarding the preliminary injunction on May 19, 1925; (4) motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction on May 19, 1925; (5) answer of the defendants filed May 22, 1925; and (6) the action of the court on the motion to dissolve the injunction, and entering the decree denying the same, filed June 2, 1925.

Four grounds are assigned, and especially insisted upon, for reversing the decree of the District Court, namely: First, that under the doctrine of res adjudicata, the complainant is not entitled as against the defendants to the relief prayed for in the bill; second, that the court is without jurisdiction to afford the relief sought; third, that the decree asked for would be violative of the law; and, fourth, that the granting of the same would create an unconscionable situation, whereby the United Mine Workers of America would be entirely denied the right of having their side of the controversy heard.

The doctrine of res adjudicata, sought to be invoked, is predicated alone upon the fact that heretofore the litigation in question has been fully heard and determined adversely to the complainant, and that the same cannot be reopened and heard anew in this proceeding. Briefly, the defendants' position is that on the 2d of December, 1913, complainant, in its bill in equity against John P. White and the defendant Van A. Bittner, and others, procured an injunction seeking to secure relief of the character herein asked, which injunction, however, was modified, pursuant to a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals for this circuit, on the 3d day of July, 1914, and on the 10th of July, 1923, the injunction in its modified form was made permanent, and that in addition a contempt proceeding was duly instituted by the complainant in that cause, seeking to secure the benefits of the injunction proceeding.

The contempt proceedings in this cause were dismissed, and the original injunction, as modified by the Circuit Court of Appeals, was attempted to be enforced; but upon consideration of the application herein for injunction, and in the light of the disposition of the contempt proceedings favorably to the defendants, the temporary injunction of the 19th of May, 1925, was modified by the omission of the seventh paragraph thereof, which resulted, in effect, in the reinstatement of the original injunction of the 2d of December, 1913. This whole theory of the doctrine of res adjudicata as applicable to the present case is predicated upon the fact that what was done in the first case was dependent upon the same facts as those here involved. This is by no means true. The cases depend entirely upon a different state of facts, though they refer to the same general subject-matter.

The first original injunction suit against White and Van Bittner involved many of the legal questions that arise here, and the dismissal of the defendants in the contempt proceeding was because it was held that they had not violated the injunction order in the first case. But, further than that, what was done either in equity or under the contempt proceeding should not control in the determination of the action to be taken here. More than 12 years have elapsed since the suit in the White case was instituted, since which time, certainly for the period covering from 1917 to the 2d of January, 1922, some five years afterwards, the complainant's mines were operated on the union basis, and hence the facts controlling this situation depend upon what occurred on and after the 1st of March, 1925, indeed, if not since 1922, when complainant again attempted to operate its mines as nonunion mines.

The facts as to what occurred in reference to the original injunction have no material bearing here. On the contrary, the condition prevailing and what occurred after the effort to operate the complainant's mines upon the original plan of nonunion mines should control. The authorities are quite clear as to this question, and the effect of new litigation of this character, and when it is sought to use or avail of what occurred in the first suit as an estoppel in the new, it is entirely manifest that in such cases we must necessarily determine what was the cause actually litigated and determined in the original suit.

"If it is doubtful whether a second suit is for the same cause of action as the first, it has been said to be a proper test to consider whether the same evidence would sustain both. If the same evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action, although the two actions are different in form. If, however, different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the other. It has been said that this method is the best and most accurate test as to whether a former judgment is a bar in subsequent proceedings between the same parties, and it has even been designated as infallible. Sometimes the rule is stated in the form that the test of the identity of causes of action for the purpose of determining the question of res judicata is the identity of the facts essential to their maintenance." 15 R. C. L. topic "Judgments," § 439.

"Where, however, the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered. In all cases, therefore, where it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of action, the inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action, not what might have been thus litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the judgment conclusive in another action. In order that a judgment may operate as a bar to the prosecution of a second action and conclude parties and privies as to all matters which might have been litigated in the first action, there must be identity of the subject-matter of the suit, of the cause of action, of the persons and parties, and of the capacity in which the parties appear as litigants, or as it is sometimes expressed, identity of the quality in the persons for or against whom the claim is made." 15 R. C. L. supra, § 429.

"It is not the mere recovery in a prior action that constitutes the bar or estoppel, but the decision upon the merits of the question in dispute between the parties, and in order to be conclusive as an estoppel, or as a bar under the doctrine of res judicata, the general rule is that a judgment must have been rendered on the merits of the case." 15 R. C. L. supra, § 431.

"But when after the entry of a judgment subsequent events transpire creating a new legal situation, the judgment may no longer act as an estoppel to prevent a new suit." R. C. L. supra, § 437, p. 962.

The case of Tosh and Others v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 252 F. 44, 164 C. C. A. 156, 15 A. L. R. 376, a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, will be found of special interest. There the West Kentucky Coal Company filed a bill in equity during a strike affecting its employés and its mining business, in an attempt to unionize its mines. In November, 1907, a final decree was entered enjoining the defendants and all others associated with them, and all persons whatsoever who had acquired notice, information, or knowledge of the decree, from in any manner interfering with or molesting, hindering, obstructing, or stopping any of the business of the complainant, or its agents, servants, and employés, in the operation of its business at any of its mines, or upon any of its property. On the 2d of June, 1917, the coal company instituted contempt proceedings against the defendants, and upon trial by jury they were convicted of contempt of court for violating the injunction, and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Upon a writ of error brought to review and reverse the conviction, the court on page 48 (164 C. C. A. 160) said:

"Does it appear that the condition existing in 1917, when the alleged violation of the injunction was committed, was in substance the strike of 1907, or that plaintiffs in error were so far associated with, or so far represented, the defendants in the injunctional decree, as to make them amenable to it by reason of their acts in 1917? We find nothing in either allegations or proofs indicating that the strike of 1907, or the interference with the business of complainant which formed the basis of the injunction, had continued subsequent to the decree made in that year, or that the conditions existing in 1917 were anything more than a new and independent effort to unionize the mines. The most which can be said is that there was danger of a strike or of serious troubles if agitation was permitted, or interference with the company's employés tolerated, and that the issue of union or nonunion mines was the same in 1917 as it had been in 1907."

Again, on page 50 of the same case (164 C. C. A. 162), the court said:

"The conviction of plaintiffs in error by the jury was made to depend solely upon their making the threats or committing the acts of violence charged against them, with knowledge that the...