Bivens v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 28 March 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:12-cv-05383-KLS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington
• Parties: TERESA M. BIVENS, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

TERESA M. BIVENS, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W COLVIN Commissioner of Social Security, ¹ Defendant.

Case No. 3:12-cv-05383-KLS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA

DATED: March 28, 2013

ORDER REVERSING AND

REMANDING DEFENDANT'S

DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS

Plaintiff has brought this matter for judicial review of defendant's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73 and Local Rule MJR 13, the parties have consented to have this matter heard by the undersigned Magistrate Judge. After reviewing the parties' briefs and the remaining record, the Court hereby finds that for the reasons set forth below, defendant's decision to deny benefits should be reversed and that this matter should be remanded for further administrative proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 25, 2008, plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits, alleging disability as of September 16, 2007, due to posttraumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"),depression, a chronic pain syndrome, problems with her wrists and right shoulder, left hip pain, learning disabilities, panic attacks, and headaches. See Administrative Record ("AR") 32, 171, 189. That application was denied upon initial administrative review on June 2, 2009, and on reconsideration on September 21, 2009. See AR 32, 110, 118. A hearing was held before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") on October 15, 2010, at which plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified, as did a vocational expert. See AR 61-102.

On December 7, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision in which plaintiff was determined to be not disabled. See AR 32-51. Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision was denied by the Appeals Council on March 16, 2012, making the ALJ's decision defendant's final decision. See AR 1; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. On May 4, 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court seeking judicial review of defendant's final decision. See ECF #3. The administrative record was filed with the Court on August 28, 2012. See ECF #10. The parties have completed their briefing, and thus this matter is now ripe for the Court's review.

Plaintiff argues defendant's decision should be reversed and remanded for an award of benefits, because the ALJ erred: (1) in evaluating the medical evidence in the record; (2) in discounting plaintiff's credibility; (3) in failing to accommodate the limitations stemming from her somatoform disorder in assessing her residual functional capacity; and (4) in finding her to be capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. The Court agrees the ALJ erred in determining plaintiff to be not disabled, but, for the reasons set forth below, finds that while defendant's decision should be reversed, this matter should be remanded for further administrative proceedings.

DISCUSSION

The determination of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") that aclaimant is not disabled must be upheld by the Court, if the "proper legal standards" have been applied by the Commissioner, and the "substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports" that determination. Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Batson v. Commissioner of Social Security Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004); Carr v. Sullivan, 772 F.Supp. 522, 525 (E.D. Wash. 1991) ("A decision supported by substantial evidence will, nevertheless, be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision.") (citing Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987)).

Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation omitted); see also Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193 ("[T]he Commissioner's findings are upheld if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record."). "The substantial evidence test requires that the reviewing court determine" whether the Commissioner's decision is "supported by more than a scintilla of evidence, although less than a preponderance of the evidence is required." Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975). "If the evidence admits of more than one rational interpretation," the Commissioner's decision must be upheld. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Where there is conflicting evidence sufficient to support either outcome, we must affirm the decision actually made.") (quoting Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1971)). ²

I. The ALJ's Evaluation of the Medical Evidence in the Record

The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility and resolving ambiguities and conflicts in the medical evidence. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). Where the medical evidence in the record is not conclusive, "questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts" are solely the functions of the ALJ. Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). In such cases, "the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld." Morgan v. Commissioner of the Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 601 (9th Cir. 1999). Determining whether inconsistencies in the medical evidence "are material (or are in fact inconsistencies at all) and whether certain factors are relevant to discount" the opinions of medical experts "falls within this responsibility." Id. at 603.

In resolving questions of credibility and conflicts in the evidence, an ALJ's findings "must be supported by specific, cogent reasons." Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. The ALJ can do this "by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings." Id. The ALJ also may draw inferences "logically flowing from the evidence." Sample, 694 F.2d at 642. Further, the Court itself may draw "specific and legitimate inferences from the ALJ's opinion." Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755, (9th Cir. 1989).

The ALJ must provide "clear and convincing" reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of either a treating or examining physician. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). Even when a treating or examining physician's opinion is contradicted, that opinion "can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record." Id. at 830-31. However, the ALJ "need not discuss all evidence presented" to himor her. Vincent on Behalf of Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.3d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). The ALJ must only explain why "significant probative evidence has been rejected." Id.; see also Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706-07 (3rd Cir. 1981); Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 1984).

In general, more weight is given to a treating physician's opinion than to the opinions of those who do not treat the claimant. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. On the other hand, an ALJ need not accept the opinion of a treating physician, "if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings" or "by the record as a whole." Batson v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). An examining physician's opinion is "entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a nonexamining physician." Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. A non-examining physician's opinion may constitute substantial evidence if "it is consistent with other independent evidence in the record." Id. at 830-31; Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149.

A. Dr. Raney

In mid-May 2009, plaintiff was examined by James Raney, M.D., who diagnosed her with a "pain disorder associated with both psychological factors and a medical condition, a recurrent, moderate major depressive disorder, and mild chronic PTSD, and gave her a global assessment of functioning ("GAF") score of 55 indicating "moderate symptoms . . . only."³ See AR 415. In terms of plaintiff's ability to function, Dr. Raney opined in relevant part:

But for the pain problem she does have the ability to perform simple and repetitive tasks as well as detailed and complex tasks.

There are no . . . restrictions to accepting instructions from supervisors or interacting with coworkers and the public.

Work activities can be done consistently without special or additional instruction. Only the pain and physical disabilities may interfere.

Her psychiatric conditions should not interrupt regular attendance in the workplace or complete a normal workday or workweek without interruptions. The proviso there is that she should probably not work in a situation where her patients are elderly or demented.

With the exception of triggers of posttraumatic stress disorder she should be able to deal with the usual stress encountered in a competitive work [sic].

AR 415-16. Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in failing to discuss Dr. Raney's opinion in his decision. The Court agrees.

As noted above, the ALJ must explain why "significant probative evidence has been rejected." Vincent, 739 F.3d 1394-95; see also Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706-07 (3rd Cir. 1981); Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 1984). Defendant argues Dr. Raney's opinion does not constitute significant probative evidence, because Dr. Raney "did not describe any specific limitations resulting from" the impairments he diagnosed. ECF #17, p. 12. But Dr. Raney clearly indicated plaintiff's ability to work could be adversely impacted by her impairments. For example, his statement that "[b]ut for the pain problem" she could perform simple and repetitive tasks as well as detailed and complex ones (AR 416), suggests she might not be able to perform such tasks due to the pain she experiences....