BKC v. State

• Decision Date: 09 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-0202-JV-174.,49A02-0202-JV-174.
• Citation: 781 N.E.2d 1157
• Parties: In the Matter of B.K.C., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

781 N.E.2d 1157

In the Matter of B.K.C., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.

No. 49A02-0202-JV-174.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

January 9, 2003.

Jan B. Berg, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Zachary J. Stock, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

SHARPNACK, Judge.

B.K.C. appeals the trial court's dispositional order finding him to be a delinquent child and ordering wardship of him to the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") for a determinate sentence of eighteen months. B.K.C. raises five issues, which we consolidate and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting hearsay evidence at the dispositional hearing II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's adjudication of B.K.C. as a delinquent;

III. Whether a determination that a juvenile delinquent, such as B.K.C., is a sex and violent offender under Ind.Code § 5-2-12-4 is a prerequisite to imposing a determinate wardship under Ind.Code § 31-37-19-9; and

IV. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering wardship of B.K.C. to the DOC for a determinate period of eighteen months because the wardship is punitive and does not further the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system.

We affirm.

The facts most favorable to the dispositional order follow. On November 22, 2001, Procelia Edwards was working at a Dairy Queen restaurant in Indianapolis when B.K.C., who was fourteen years old at the time, Terry Williams, and a third young man, entered the restaurant. Williams placed a food order for himself and B.K.C. B.K.C. gave Williams the money to pay for the order. After Williams paid Edwards for the food order, he brandished what appeared to be a handgun and ordered her to put money in a bag. At the same time, two other customers entered the Dairy Queen, which prompted the three young men to run and hide behind a staircase. This diversion gave Edwards an opportunity to activate the restaurant's alarm system. Williams then began asking Edwards about the surveillance tape and the safe located in the back of the restaurant. Edwards accompanied Williams and B.K.C. to the back of Dairy Queen and informed them that she did not have the combination to the restaurant's safe. B.K.C. told Edwards to open the back door and he and Williams left the restaurant. Williams left the Dairy Queen with $769.03.

On December 18, 2001, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that B.K.C. was a delinquent child for committing an act that would be robbery, a class B felony,¹ if committed by an adult and an act that would be carrying a handgun without a license, a class A misdemeanor,² if committed by an adult. At the denial hearing, Edwards identified B.K.C. as one of the men appearing in the surveillance tape of the incident. In addition, Detective Kevin Lauerman testified that B.K.C.'s mother had identified B.K.C. in the surveillance tape. Moreover, B.K.C. admitted being in the Dairy Queen with Williams when Williams brandished the weapon. At the conclusion of the denial hearing, the trial court adjudicated B.K.C. to be a delinquent for committing an act that would be robbery, a class B felony, if committed by an adult. The trial court ordered wardship of B.K.C. to the DOC for a determinate period of eighteen months. On February 19, 2002, B.K.C. filed a notice of appeal alleging that the trial court erred when it adjudicated him a delinquent and when it ordered wardship of him to the DOC for a determinate sentence of eighteen months.

Before we address B.K.C.'s claims on appeal, we observe that the choice of a specific disposition for a delinquent child is within the discretion of the trial court, subject to the statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, the safety of the community, and a statutory policy of favoring the least harsh disposition. A.M.R. v. State, 741 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). We may overturn the trial court's disposition order only if we find that the trial court has abused its discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Matter of Adoption of L.C., 650 N.E.2d 726, 733 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995),reh'g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1136, 116 S.Ct. 1423, 134 L.Ed.2d 547 (1996). With this law as our guide, we now address B.K.C.'s arguments.

I.

The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting hearsay evidence at the dispositional hearing. B.K.C. argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the investigating police officer, Detective Lauerman, to testify regarding a statement made to him by B.K.C.'s mother, wherein she identified B.K.C. as one of the individuals in the surveillance video. The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will reverse only upon an abuse of that discretion. Johnson v. State, 671 N.E.2d 1203, 1205 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. When reviewing a trial court's decision under an abuse of discretion standard, we will affirm if there is any evidence supporting the trial court's decision. Sparkman v. State, 722 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000). Moreover, a claim of error in the admission of evidence will not prevail on appeal "unless a substantial right of the party is affected." Id. (citing Kellett v. State, 716 N.E.2d 975, 978 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999)). In determining whether error in the introduction of evidence affected an appellant's substantial rights, we assess the probable impact of the evidence on the jury or fact finder. McClain v. State, 675 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind.1996). However, the admission of hearsay is not grounds for reversal where it is merely cumulative of other evidence admitted. Id. at 331-32.

Here, B.K.C. contends that Detective Lauerman's testimony regarding B.K.C.'s mother's identification constituted hearsay. As such, B.K.C. argues, the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Detective Lauerman to give hearsay testimony over a timely objection. B.K.C. further argues that the trial court's error prejudiced him

because neither the victims of the robbery nor the other persons present could identify B.K.C. as one of the perpetrators. Had the trial court correctly excluded the hearsay statement of B.K.C.'s mother identifying B.K.C. as one of the persons appearing in the robbery photos, there would have been no evidence linking B.K.C. to the robbery.

Appellant's Amended Brief at 9. We disagree.

Even assuming that the trial court erroneously allowed Detective Lauerman to testify that B.K.C.'s mother identified B.K.C. in the surveillance video, we are still unable to reverse the delinquency adjudication because any resultant error was harmless. Our review of the Record reveals that Detective Lauerman's testimony regarding B.K.C.'s mother's identification was merely cumulative of other evidence that placed B.K.C. at the Dairy Queen restaurant on the night it was robbed. First, Edwards repeatedly testified that B.K.C. was present at the Dairy Queen on the night of the robbery. She identified B.K.C. as being in the courtroom and as being the person on the surveillance tape and testified that he entered the restaurant with Williams and another male, hid behind a staircase when other customers entered the restaurant, and left through the back door with Williams after the robbery. Moreover, B.K.C., himself, testified that he was at the Dairy Queen on the evening of the robbery because he wanted to get something to eat. Because Detective Lauerman's testimony regarding B.K.C.'s mother's identification of B.K.C. in the surveillance tape merely established that B.K.C. was present at the Dairy Queen restaurant on the night of the robbery, it was cumulative. As such, any error in its admission is harmless. See, e.g., Sparkman, 722 N.E.2d at 1264

.

II.

The second issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's adjudication of B.K.C. as a delinquent. When we review sufficiency of the evidence claims with respect to juvenile adjudications, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Fields v. State, 679 N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ind.1997). Rather, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and will affirm if the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the judgment. Blanche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind.1998).

B.K.C. first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he committed robbery, a class B felony, if committed by an adult because the State failed to prove an essential element of the offense of robbery: that he was armed with a handgun. Second, B.K.C. contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he was an accomplice to the crime of robbery. We address each of B.K.C.'s claims separately.

A.

First, B.K.C. contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his delinquency adjudication because the State failed to prove every essential element of the crime of robbery. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution protects an accused against conviction "except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." J.T. v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1119, 1122 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). This protection applies to juveniles as well as adults. J.T., 718 N.E.2d at 1122. Thus, when the State seeks to have a juvenile adjudicated to be delinquent for committing an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult, the State must...