Black ex rel. J.T. v. Colvin, 14 C 6018
| Decision Date | 24 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 14 C 6018,14 C 6018 |
| Parties | ANTOINETTE BLACK ex rel. J.T., a minor, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Antoinette Black filed this action on behalf of her minor daughter, J.T., seeking reversal of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (Act). 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 423 et seq; 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(c), and Plaintiff has filed a request to reverse the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision and remand for additional proceedings. For the reasons stated below, the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
To recover SSI, a claimant must establish that he or she is disabled within the meaning of the Act. York v. Massanari, 155 F. Supp. 2d 973, 976-77 (N.D. Ill. 2001).1 A child qualifies as disabled and therefore may be eligible for SSI if she has a "medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations" and the impairment "has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i); Hopgood ex rel. L.G. v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 2009). To determine whether a child under the age of 18 is disabled within the meaning of the Act, the ALJ applies a three-step evaluation. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). The ALJ must inquire whether: (1) the child is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) the child has a medically determinable impairment that is "severe" or a combination of impairments that is "severe"; and (3) the child has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets, medically equals, or functionally equals a listing in the Listings of Impairments contained in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Id.
To functionally equal the listings, the ALJ must find an "extreme" limitation in one category or a "marked" limitation in two domains. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a). The domains are: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for yourself; and (6) health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1)(i)-(vi). A "marked" limitation exists when the impairment seriously interferes with the child's "ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete ac-tivities." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). An "extreme" limitation exists when a child's "impairment(s) interferes very seriously with [her] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i).
Antoinette Black filed an application on January 3, 2012, for SSI on behalf of J.T., her minor daughter, alleging she became disabled due to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and a learning disorder. (R. at 85). The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 85-86, 99-101). Ms. Black and J.T., represented by counsel, appeared and testified at a hearing on January 16, 2013, before an ALJ. (Id. at 40-84). The ALJ also heard testimony from Larry Kravitz, a medical expert. (Id.). On April 26, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits. (Id. at 16-34).
Applying the three-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found, at step one, that J.T. has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 3, 2012, the application date. (R. at 26). At step two, the ALJ found that J.T. had the following severe impairments: learning disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. (Id.). At step three, the ALJ determined that J.T. does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets, medically equals or functionally equals the severity of one of the listed impairments enumerated in the regulations. (Id. at 22-23). The ALJ concluded that J.T. has not been disabled, as defined in the Act, since January 3, 2012. (Id. at 34).
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on July 2, 2014. (Id. at 1-3). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ's decision, which stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2009).
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Act. In reviewing this decision, the Court may not engage in its own analysis of whether the plaintiff is severely impaired as defined by the Social Security Regulations. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). Nor may it "reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the record, decide questions of credibility, or, in general, substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner." Id. The Court's task is "limited to determining whether the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Evidence is considered substantial "if a reasonable person would accept it as adequate to support a conclusion." Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2004); see Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 2014) () (citation omitted). "Substantial evidence must be more than a scintilla but may be less than a preponderance." Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). "In addition to relying on substantial evidence, the ALJ must also explain his analysis ofthe evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review." Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005).
Although this Court accords great deference to the ALJ's determination, it "must do more than merely rubber stamp the ALJ's decision." Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Moon v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court must critically review the ALJ's decision to ensure that the ALJ has built an "accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion." Young, 362 F.3d at 1002. Where the Commissioner's decision "lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review, the case must be remanded." Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).
J.T. was born on February 15, 2004, and was seven years old at the time of her application. (R. at 172-80). J.T's behavioral and academic issues were first documented in kindergarten, during the 2009-2010 school year. (Id. at 204). Progress reports indicate that J.T. was an energetic child with a nice personality; however, she lacked self-control and did not remain focused on tasks. (Id. at 204-05). In March 2011, J.T. was identified as an "at risk student." (Id. at 203). She was earninggrades of "D" or "F" in mathematics, science, social studies, and literacy - including phonics, fluency, comprehension, and writing. (Id.). J.T. was also having problems at home. (Id. at 342). In August 2011, J.T.'s parents took her to a psychological evaluation to assess her cognitive and emotional functioning. (Id.). She was examined by psychologist, Darrell Snyder, Ph.D. (Id. at 344). J.T.'s parents reported that J.T. was always "busy" since the age of three, and that she had behavioral problems at day care, school, summer camp, and at home. (Id.). They also reported that she usually demonstrated poor concentration, impulsivity, defiance, and tantrums. (Id. at 342). During the examination, one parent accompanied her to the washroom, as they feared what she might do alone, and they also reported that J.T. was not fully capable in hygiene. (Id.). Dr. Snyder indicated that there were no indications of attention deficit disorder (ADD) or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)2 in session, though perhaps J.T. was attentive because of the constant new materials and questions. (Id. at 343). Testing revealed that she had a full scale intelligence quotient (IQ) of 73,3 which is in the borderline range of intelligence, and that her working memory was poor. (Id.). Dr. Snyder opined that J.T.'s IQ and potential tolearn were fine but were compromised by lower auditory attention and perhaps emotional features. (Id.). Testing administered to J.T.'s parents revealed that J.T. had problems in the areas of communication, daily living skills, and socialization. (Id.). J.T.'s parents also indicated that she fails to sustain attention, to listen, and to follow through; she is easily distracted or loses things; and she fidgets, and leaves her seat in school, church, at dinner, or while watching television. (Id. at 344). Dr. Snyder felt that ADHD was likely and indicated that he would recommend a trial course of medication to see its effects. (Id.).
On November 11, 2011, Barbara Taylor, J.T.'s second grade teacher of two months, completed a NICHQ Vanderbilt Assessment.4 (R. at 213). Ms. Taylor indicated that J.T. occasionally was angry or resentful, physically cruel to people, fearful, anxious or worried, self-conscious or easily embarrassed, afraid to try new things for fear of making mistakes, and lost things necessary for tasks or activities. She often did not seem to listen when...
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