Black Mountain Corporation v. Adkins

• Decision Date: 24 November 1939
• Citation: 280 Ky. 617
• Parties: Black Mountain Corporation v. Adkins et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

280 Ky. 617

Black Mountain Corporation v. Adkins et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

November 24, 1939.

1. Master and Servant; Workmen's Compensation. — The Federal Fair Labor Standards Act manifests intent of Congress to benefit employees by increasing their wages rather than to diminish their compensation in event of injury (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A., secs. 201-219).

2. Master and Servant. — The purpose of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act was not to limit the number of hours which an employer engaged in interstate commerce might require his employees to work during each week, but to require that they be paid additional compensation in the event that they were compelled to work for a longer number of hours than the maximum prescribed (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, sec. 7(a), 29 U.S. C.A., sec. 207(a)).

3. Workmen's Compensation. — Under the provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act that compensation shall be computed at the average weekly wage earned by employee at time of injury reckoning wages as earned while working at "full time," the phrase "full time" means a full working day for six days in every week of the year, notwithstanding provision of Federal Fair Labor Standards Act for a 44 hour week (Ky. Stats., sec. 4905).

4. Workmen's Compensation. — The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to afford financial protection to the employee and his dependents in the event he is injured or killed in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

5. Workmen's Compensation. — The Workmen's Compensation Board had power to award injured employee who had sustained injury to right knee compensation to which permanent partial disability to body as a whole of 33 1/3 per cent. entitled employee, where evidence sustained finding that leg injury resulted in permanent disability of 33 1/3 per cent. to his body as a whole, notwithstanding that compensation to which employee would have been entitled for loss of leg would have been a lesser amount (Ky. Stats., sec. 4899).

Appeal from Harlan Circuit Court.

J.B. Snyder for appellant.

Golden & Lay for appellees.

Before James M. Gilbert, Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE TILFORD.

Affirming.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Harlan Circuit Court affirming an award of the Workmen's Compensation Board and adjudging that the appellee, Adkins, recover of the appellant $9.87 per week for a period of sixteen weeks for temporary total disability and $3.29 per week for a period of three hundred and nineteen weeks for a permanent partial disability of 33 1/3% to his body as a whole, all subject to a credit for monies theretofore paid. Two grounds in opposition to the award are urged: (1) That since the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Chapter 676 of Acts of the Seventy-Fifth Congress of the United States, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.A., Sections 201-219, provides for a 44 hour work week for employees of employers engaged in interstate commerce, the Board was in error in computing the average weekly wage earned by Adkins on the basis of a 6 day rather than a 5 1/2 day week; and (2) that since Adkins' injury was to his leg below the knee, the award should have been limited to compensation for a period of 200 weeks, the maximum provided by Section 4899, Kentucky Statutes, for the loss of a leg. We shall dispose of these contentions in their order.

I. It was the intention of Congress in enacting the

Fair Labor Standards Act to benefit employees by increasing their wages, rather than to diminish their compensation in the event of injury. Assuming, but not deciding, that Congress has the power to supercede state laws enacted for the benefit of employees engaged in interstate commerce, by no stretch of the imagination could it be said that Congress had any such intention in enacting the legislation under consideration. Moreover, its purpose was not to limit the number of hours which an employer engaged in interstate commerce might require his employees to work during each week, but to require that they be paid additional compensation in the event they were compelled to work for a longer number of hours than the maximum prescribed. Subsection (a), Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A., Section 207(a), is as follows:

"No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in this section, employ any of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce —

"(1) for a workweek longer than forty-four hours during the first year from the effective date of this section,

"(2) for a workweek longer than forty-two hours during the second year from such date, or

"(3) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration of the second year from such date, unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed." (Italics ours).

It is true that Kentucky Statutes,...