Black v. Ferrellgas, Inc.

Decision Date19 December 2017
Docket NumberCase Number: 114915
Citation417 P.3d 1267
Parties Derrick BLACK, an individual, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. FERRELLGAS, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Ferrellgas L.P., a Delaware Corporation, and Jimmy Childs, an individual, Defendants/Appellees.
CourtUnited States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma

Robert L. Rode, David C. Bean, RODE LAW FIRM, P.L.L.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant

Jennifer D. Ary, FRANDEN/FARRIS/QUILLIN GOODNIGHT+ROBERTS, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellees

JERRY L. GOODMAN, JUDGE:

¶ 1 Plaintiff Derrick Black appeals the trial court's March 22, 2016, Journal Entry of Judgment, entered on a jury verdict, in Plaintiff's vehicle negligence case. Based on our review of the facts and applicable law, we affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Plaintiff was severely injured on March 6, 2009, in a single-vehicle, non-contact accident, when he struck a curb while riding his motorcycle. He alleged he was forced to take evasive action when a truck, driven by Defendant Childs, and owned by Defendants Ferrellgas, Inc. and Ferrellgas, L.P., entered his lane from a cross street in order to make a left turn.1 Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging negligence.

¶ 3 A key disputed fact, which forms the basis of this appeal, is whether Defendant Childs, who was operating the Ferrellgas truck, had actually entered the intersection, causing Plaintiff to take evasive action. Plaintiff testified he did, and Childs testified he did not.

¶ 4 What is undisputed is that Childs exited an expressway and had driven to the end of the off ramp, stopping at a stop sign, with the intention of turning left. The off ramp had a single right turn lane and two left turn lanes. Childs stopped his truck in the left lane of the double left turn lanes. What happened next is in dispute.

¶ 5 Plaintiff and his motorcycle approached the intersection from Defendant Childs' left, at a disputed rate of speed.2 Childs testified he first stopped at the wide, painted white stop lines, just before the two narrower, white crosswalk lines. He testified he moved his truck forward from the wide white line to the narrower pedestrian line, and stopped once again. Not seeing Plaintiff approaching because of the curvature of the road, Child's wrote a statement at the scene of the accident at the request of the investigating officer in which he stated:

I was turning left from left hand left turn lane, inter-section was clear until motorcycle passed east bound on Apache stricking [sic ] meadian [sic ] becomeing [sic ] airborn [sic ] at high rate of speed. When motorcycle approach [sic ] from my left I stopped. ...3

¶ 6 In a sworn deposition taken 18 months later and again at trial, Childs stated that he had: "stopped behind the first white line...."4 Then, "I proceeded to the crosswalk once I knew it was clear and stopped there ... to look again to make sure there wasn't any further traffic."5 Childs continues, "So I pulled up to the line of the crosswalk to look left and back to the right and then looked left again ... and that's when I saw the motorcycle approaching."6 Childs concluded, "When I stated that I had pulled out, I did not specify [to the investigating officer] how far I had pulled out. I had proceeded from the broad white line to the edge of the crosswalk to make sure that the intersection was still clear from both directions."7

¶ 7 It was at this point that Plaintiff, riding the motorcycle, encountered the intersection. He testified:

A All I can remember is seeing something moving from that stop sign as I was coming out from under that highway, and ... all I can remember is just seeing something white. That's all I can remember.
Q Was it in your lane?
A Yes.8

¶ 8 There was no collision between the motorcycle and the Ferrellgas truck, but Plaintiff lost control of the motorcycle and crashed into a curb, suffering severe injuries. Whether the truck moved into the intersection became the focus of much testimony.

¶ 9 Plaintiff cross-examined Childs extensively regarding the apparent contradiction between Childs' written statement and his testimony at trial regarding whether Childs' vehicle was moving into the intersection or merely moving up to the curb before turning.

¶ 10 Defendant's expert, Reynolds, is an expert in accident reconstruction. However, Plaintiff sought to disqualify Reynolds from testifying as an expert for the reason that the facts chosen by Reynolds, upon which he based his expert analysis, consisted of the "self-serving testimony provided by Childs at his deposition nearly eighteen months after the collision for which this testimony was contradictory to Childs' hand written statement at the scene of the collision as well as [Plaintiff's] trial testimony."9

¶ 11 At trial, Reynolds was asked:

Q Why did you put Mr. Childs' vehicle starting right there?
A This is the position taken from his deposition that he stopped at the stop bar....10
Q Have you been presented or provided Mr. Childs' statement he gave to the police?
A Yes, I have.
Q Does it in that statement state where he stopped?
A I don't believe—no, it does not.
Q So have you been provided his trial testimony?
A Yes, I have.11
Q [ ] You've read Mr. Childs' trial deposition, haven't you?
A The trial transcript?
Q Yes.
A Yes.
Q And you've read his deposition, correct?12
A That's correct.
Q And you used the deposition to formulate your opinion, correct?
A That is correct.
Q And both his trial testimony and his deposition testimony both say he stopped at the stop line.
A They were consistent, yes.
Q Does the statement he gave to the police mention where he stopped at any particular point?
A No, he does not.
Q Why did you use ... his deposition testimony as to where he stopped?
A The reason is when you're doing a calculation, you have to have a known starting point somewhere and ... in some accidents where there's actually a collision, you have marks there that you can go back from, known points. In this particular case, there was no collision. We have no known contact point for Mr. Childs' vehicle, so what I have to rely on is his stated position there at the stop line, which is also a legal requirement to stop at the stop line or the stop bar.13

¶ 12 The trial court denied Plaintiff's attempt to disqualify Reynolds' testimony. The matter was submitted to a jury, which deliberated five hours before it returned a verdict. Nine jurors found Plaintiff was 69 percent contributorily negligent, and Defendant Childs was 31 percent negligent. The trial court therefore entered judgment in favor of all Defendants. Both Plaintiff and Defendants appealed the judgment.14

STANDARD OF REVIEW
We must affirm a jury verdict if there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to support it, evidence which is relevant and material to the issue to be determined. Jos. A. Coy Co. v. Younger , 1943 OK 160, 192 Okla. 348, 136 P.2d 890. We do not weigh the evidence. We consider all the evidence tending to support the verdict, together with every reasonable inference from it, and must affirm unless there is an entire absence of proof on a material issue.

Covel v. Rodriguez , 2012 OK 5, ¶ 11, 272 P.3d 705, 710.

ANALYSIS

¶ 13 The sole issue on appeal is whether Defendant's expert witness was improperly allowed to testify. We review this trial court decision using the clear abuse of discretion appellate standard. Christian v. Gray , 2003 OK 10, ¶ 42, 65 P.3d 591, 608.

¶ 14 Plaintiff's first allegation of error in this regard is that the trial court erred in its Christian / Daubert "gatekeeping" role15 when it permitted Defendants' expert witness Reynolds to testify because he "inappropriately gave expert opinion on the placement of [Defendant] Childs' vehicle for which he had no scientific bases [sic ]."16 Plaintiff further argues "the placement of Childs' vehicle was a heavily contested fact in issue, and there was no scientific or physical evidence to pinpoint the position of Childs' vehicle...."17 Plaintiff's second allegation of error regarding this witness closely aligns with the first, and centers on the allegation that the expert's testimony failed four foundational challenges set out in Christian and Daubert .18

¶ 15 Those questions are set out in Christian :

Daubert provided a list of factors for the trial judge to consider when determining the admissibility of evidence. They include: 1. Can the theory or technique be, or has it been, tested; 2. Has the theory or technique been subjected to peer review and publication; 3. Is there a "known or potential rate of error ... and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation;" and 4. Is there widespread acceptance of the theory or technique within the relevant scientific community. Daubert , 509 U.S. at 593-594, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The inquiry is a flexible one, and focuses on the evidentiary relevance and reliability underlying the proposed submission, and not on the conclusions they generate. Id . 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786.

Christian v. Gray , 2003 OK 10, ¶ 8, 65 P.3d 591, 597–98. Christian set out the proper use of the Daubert analysis:

We agree ... that a Daubert inquiry will be limited to circumstances where the reliability of an expert's method cannot be taken for granted. Thus, a Daubert challenge includes an initial determination of whether the expert's method is one where reliability may be taken for granted.

Christian , at ¶ 11, at, 599–600 (footnote omitted). The Christian Court then explained the trial judge's gatekeeping role:

Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must determine at the outset, ... whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
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