Black v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 02 July 1985
• Docket Number: No. 15299,15299
• Citation: 707 P.2d 388,109 Idaho 277
• Parties: Paul BLACK, natural parent of Leona Black, Deceased, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Brian Dale REYNOLDS, a single man, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 388

707 P.2d 388

109 Idaho 277

Paul BLACK, natural parent of Leona Black, Deceased, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Brian Dale REYNOLDS, a single man, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15299.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

July 2, 1985.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 31, 1985.

Michael E. Ramsden, Boise, for defendant-appellant.

Fred R. Palmer, Sandpoint, for plaintiff-respondent.

Ronald J. Landeck, Moscow, for amicus curiae, Idaho Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

HUNTLEY, Justice.

Brian Reynolds appeals from a judgment in favor of Paul Black, the surviving father, in an action for the wrongful death of Black's minor child, Leona.

Leona, a sixteen-year-old, was killed while walking along the edge of State Highway 57 when she was struck by a Chevrolet van driven by Reynolds. The jury returned a verdict of $275,000 for Black. Reynolds appeals from the judgment and the order denying motion for a new trial. We affirm.

The evidence established that Leona Black and two companions were walking along the shoulder of the highway at approximately 11:45 a.m. on March 29, 1979, when the van driven by Reynolds hit Leona, causing her death.

Much of the testimony focused upon the relationship Paul Black, a member of the Cheyenne Tribe, had with Leona. Tribe members testified regarding the extended family and other aspects of the Cheyenne Indian culture. The testimony reflected that it is a social norm in the Cheyenne Indian culture for parents to leave a child with persons outside the nuclear family and that this placement of the child outside the parent's home does not necessarily constitute abandonment or neglect. Reynolds contended throughout trial that Black had abandoned Leona prior to her death. Reynolds argued that as a consequence of the alleged abandonment Black should not be permitted to recover for Leona's wrongful death, and if recovery were to be allowed, the damages should be de minimis.

I. Interpretation of I.C. § 5-310

The primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in determining that under I.C. § 5-310, abandonment of a minor child by a parent prior to the child's death does not in itself preclude the parent from maintaining an action for the wrongful death of the child. The court concluded that I.C. § 5-310 permits a sole surviving parent who has abandoned his or her child to maintain an action.

At all relevant times, I.C. § 5-310 provided:

5-310. Action for injury or death of unmarried child.--The parents may maintain an action for the injury or death of an unmarried minor child, and for the injury or death of a minor child who was married at the time of his death and whose spouse died as a result of the same occurrence and who leaves no issue, and a guardian for the injury or death of his ward, when such injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, but if either the father or mother be dead or has abandoned his or her family, the other is entitled to sue alone. Such action may be maintained against the person causing the injury or death, or if such person be employed by another person, who is responsible for his conduct, also against such other person. ¹

In the present case, the trial court ruled that since Leona's mother was dead, Black was entitled to maintain the action even if he had abandoned his daughter prior to her death.

Reynolds submits that the statute stands for the proposition that a parent who has abandoned his or her child has no right to recover for the child's death, whether or not the other parent is alive. Clearly, under I.C. § 5-310 when both parents are alive and one has abandoned the child, the abandoning parent may not recover for the child's death. Reynolds argues that by abandoning a child, a parent forfeits his or her right to recover for the child's wrongful death. Reynolds urges the court to interpret the statute so as to discern that its primary purpose is the punishment of the abandoning parent. Relying on his proposed interpretation of the statute, Reynolds reasons that the death of the non-abandoning parent is irrelevant with regard to the "guilty" parent's right to recover. We reject Reynolds's suggested interpretation of I.C. § 5-310 and conclude that the statute merely confers a preference to the non-abandoning parent to bring a wrongful death cause of action where both parents are alive; it does not deprive a sole surviving abandoning parent of a cause of action. If, as Reynolds suggests, the legislature had intended to punish abandoning parents, the statute could have been written to preclude an abandoning parent's right to recover under any circumstances. This the legislature did not do. No wording in the statute indicates the legislature's intent in adopting the statute was to punish an abandoning parent. Rather the statute merely establishes a preference in the situation where one parent had abandoned a child and the other had not abandoned the child, so that the non-abandoning parent alone can maintain the action.

I.C. § 5-310 is silent as to whether a judicial proceeding resulting in the termination of parental rights is a condition precedent to the operation of the statute's language pertaining to abandonment. Clearly, where there has been a proceeding resulting in the termination of the parent-child relationship, an abandoning parent would have no right to recover for a child's wrongful death regardless of whether the other parent was alive or dead, his or her own parental status having been legally extinguished. In the instant case there was no judicial termination of Black's parent-child relationship with Leona. We conclude that in the absence of a proceeding terminating the parent-child relationship, a sole surviving parent's abandonment of a child will not in and of itself preclude maintenance of an action to recover for wrongful death.

Reynolds cites Clark v. Jelinek, 90 Idaho 592, 414 P.2d 892 (1966) for the proposition that an abandoning parent forfeits his or her right to custody of a child where the other parent has died and, by analogy, asserts that an abandoning parent forfeits the right to recover for a child's wrongful death where the other parent has died. However, the holding in Clark does not apply in the context of a wrongful death action.

The legislature's intent in enacting a statute may be implied from the language used or inferred on grounds of policy or reasonableness. Summers v. Dooley, 94 Idaho 87, 481 P.2d 318 (1971). If a sole surviving abandoning parent is not permitted to bring suit for the wrongful death of a child, the tortfeasor, barring the imposition of criminal penalties, will be able to completely evade legal sanctions because of the sad coincidence that his or her victim had been orphaned by one parent and "abandoned" by the other. Moreover, if there has been no proceeding terminating the parent-child relationship, we cannot conclude that the parent-child relationship has ceased to exist. The "abandonment" may be merely temporary and, had the child lived, a reconciliation might have taken place.

Hence, we conclude that the fact of abandonment if found by a jury may operate to mitigate the amount of damages recoverable; however, the abandonment itself does not preclude the right to recover.

In the case at bar, it is apparent that the jury did not accept Reynolds's theory of abandonment. Had the jury found complete and permanent abandonment, it is highly improbable that they would have returned a verdict of $275,000 for Black.

II. New Trial Motion--Excessive Damages

Reynolds next assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial on the grounds that the jury awarded excessive damages.

I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) provides:

Rule 59(a). New Trial--Amendment of judgment--Grounds.--A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues in an action for any of the following reasons:

5. Excessive damages or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.

As Justice Shepard, writing for a unanimous Court, declared in Meissner v. Smith, 94 Idaho 563, 565, 494 P.2d 567, 569 (1972), I.C. §§ 5-310 and 5-311 "clearly enunciate a legislative policy that the only limitation to be assigned to the amount of recovery is that amount 'under all the circumstances of the case [as] may be just.' "

Trial judges have traditionally been granted wide discretion in reviewing jury awards in the area of compensatory damages. Cheney v. Palos Verdes Investment Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 665 P.2d 661 (1983). In McLean v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 430 P.2d 670 (1967) this Court remarked that we are "firmly committed to countenance a wide discretion vested in the trial court to grant or refuse a new trial on the ground of an excessive verdict, and the exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless it manifestly appears to have been abused." (Citations omitted). 91 Idaho at 784, 430 P.2d at 675. We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for new trial in light of the evidence. The order denying Reynolds's motion stated, in part The evidence presented to the jury shows that the Black family are of Cheyenne-Arapahoe Indian descent. Leona was born unto Paul and Eunice Black on November 10, 1962.

The Black family, which also includes three other sons, stayed together until around 1970.

Witness Ed Star, Jr., described the family as very close and associated in fishing, playing games and swimming together. Star testified that Paul Black always managed to find work, was a good provider for the family and never abused any of the family members.

In 1968, Paul Black moved his family from Oklahoma to Lame Deer, Montana. Paul's wife, Eunice, wanted to be near her mother in Lame Deer.

There was no work to be found near Lame Deer and in 1970 Paul left his family in Lame Deer, Montana, and returned to Oklahoma to work as a "roughneck" in the oil fields.

Although Paul's wife refused to join...