Black v. State
| Decision Date | 10 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | A06A1181,A06A1182. |
| Citation | 281 Ga. App. 40,635 S.E.2d 568 |
| Parties | BLACK v. THE STATE. BLACK v. THE STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Eddie Black, Jr., and his wife, Pamela Black, were convicted of possession of methamphetamine,1 following a bench trial. In separate appeals, they both contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress, arguing that their consent to the search of their home was tainted by their son's unlawful arrest. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the trial court's judgment in both cases.
On appeal from a motion to suppress, the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to upholding the trial court's judgment. The credibility of witnesses and the weight accorded their testimony rest with the trier of fact. Thus, the trial court's findings on disputed facts and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Sanders v. State.2 So viewed, the evidence shows that an agent with the Cherokee County Multi-Agency Narcotics Squad had the Blacks' residence under surveillance for suspected drug activity based on an anonymous tip and information from a confidential informant. After several hours, a truck with three males, including Black's 24-year-old son Rodney, left the residence. The agent followed in his unmarked vehicle and requested assistance from nearby patrol cars. A few minutes later, the truck pulled into a gas station, and all three males exited. The agent followed, and shortly thereafter a couple of patrol cars also pulled into the station. Upon noticing the patrol cars, Rodney immediately walked away from the truck and quickly into the gas station's store. He remained inside the store for less than a minute, exited through the store's opposite entrance, and began walking quickly toward some nearby woods.
At that point, the agent requested that one of the uniformed officers attempt to question Rodney as to what he was doing. An officer attempted to do so but was ignored, and after several repeated attempts to ask him questions, Rodney became belligerent, told the officer that he had no right to speak to him, and acted as if he was about to flee. The officer then grabbed Rodney's arm, causing him to become even more belligerent, and resulting in his arrest for obstruction. He was searched incident to the arrest and found to be in possession of methamphetamine.
After he was arrested, Rodney was read Miranda warnings and agreed to speak with the officers. He stated that he had drug paraphernalia in his room back at home and agreed to accompany the agents and allow them to search his room. As the agents and Rodney were about to leave the gas station, Pamela Black arrived and attempted to speak with her son. The agents informed her that Rodney had consented to a search of his room and asked her if she would accompany them back to the residence, which she did. There, a search of Rodney's room produced more methamphetamine. The agents also asked Pamela if she would consent to a search of her and her husband's room; however, she replied that they would have to get her husband's consent and that he was not currently at home.
After a few minutes, Pamela's husband, Eddie Black, arrived back at the residence. The agents informed him of the situation and asked if he would consent to a search of his bedroom. Eddie agreed and signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights, as well as a written waiver of his constitutional right to a search warrant. Prior to unlocking his bedroom, Eddie asked the agents if he was going to be arrested. The agents responded that it depended on what the search uncovered but that they could make no promises. Subsequently, Eddie unlocked his bedroom, and as a result of the search, the agents found a small amount of methamphetamine for which Eddie was arrested. Immediately thereafter, Pamela was read her Miranda rights and asked to empty her pockets. She complied, but in doing so, attempted to toss away a small bag containing methamphetamine and thus was arrested.
Both Eddie and Pamela were indicted for possession of methamphetamine. Both also filed motions to suppress what they claimed to be unlawfully obtained evidence. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions and later, following a bench trial, convicted both Eddie and Pamela of possession of methamphetamine. These appeals followed.
1. Eddie and Pamela Black, in their respective appeals (Case Nos. A06A1181 and A06A1182), contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress, arguing that Eddie's consent to the search of their bedroom was tainted by the unlawful arrest of their son. Specifically, Eddie and Pamela contend that Eddie's consent to the search was the product of several illegalities, beginning with the unlawful detention of their son and culminating in the agents' unlawful entry into their home. We agree.
Addressing the threshold question of standing, we find that Eddie and Pamela have standing in this matter. A defendant has standing to suppress evidence obtained through an illegal search or seizure only when his or her own rights are violated, because these rights are personal and cannot be asserted vicariously. Rakas v. Illinois.3 See also Lewis v. State.4
Here, Eddie and Pamela contend that the police illegally searched their bedroom based on an invalid consent obtained when the police were illegally in their home. Clearly, they have standing to assert those rights, which are based on their expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the illegality of the presence of the police in their home was based on the police's illegal arrest of their son does not diminish their privacy interests in the police's search of their bedroom and its contents. We therefore find that they have standing to challenge the manner in which that illegality occurred. See, e.g., State v. Corley.5
Turning to the primary issue of whether the search of the Blacks' bedroom was valid, we note that "the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person's home, whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects." (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Randolph.6 However, a warrantless entry into and search of a residence may be authorized by the voluntary consent of the individual whose property is searched or by the consent of a third party who possesses common authority over the premises to be searched. Id. In this matter, the State contends that the narcotics agents obtained valid consent to enter the Blacks' home from Eddie and Pamela's son Rodney subsequent to his arrest. Whether Rodney's consent was obtained validly, however, is contingent upon whether his initial detention and arrest were lawful. See VonLinsowe v. State.7 Our inquiry thus must now focus on the circumstances surrounding Rodney's detention and arrest.
Harris, supra, 261 Ga. App. at 121-122.
The State, citing the U.S. Supreme Court's Illinois v. Wardlow11 decision, asserts that the officer gained a reasonable articulable suspicion justifying a Terry stop based upon the facts that Rodney left a residence under surveillance for alleged drug activity, swiftly walked away from the officer attempting to follow him, and insisted that the police had no right to question him. The State further argues that Rodney's resistance to this brief detention justified his arrest for obstruction and the subsequent search which uncovered methamphetamine. The State, however, misses the point. The encounter with Rodney was at all material points a first-tier encounter, and the police clearly indicated that by their actions. Thus, whether or not the circumstances would have justified a second-tier detention is irrelevant and misleading.
Here, the police did not activate their blue lights when they pulled into the gas station, did not tell Rodney to stop, nor take any action indicating that he was being detained. To the contrary, the police simply approached him behind the gas station and asked if they could "talk to him for a second," none of which indicated Rodney was not free to...
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