Black v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 30 June 1945
• Parties: BLACK et al. v. WILSON et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

188 S.W.2d 609

182 Tenn. 623

BLACK et al. v. WILSON et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 30, 1945

Appeal from Chancery Court, Hardeman County; Wayne A. Cox Chancellor.

Action by F. A. Black and others, Road Commissioners of Hardeman county, against Wesley Wilson and others challenging the constitutionality of Private Acts 1945, c. 539, under which the defendants claimed to have succeeded to these offices. From a decree sustaining a demurrer and dismissing the bill the complainants appeal.

Affirmed and bill dismissed.

W. P. Moss, of Jackson, for complainant.

E. J Harris, of Bolivar, for defendant.

CHAMBLISS Justice.

This suit was brought by seven of eight road commissioners of Hardeman County, elected in August, 1944, for two years, challenging the constitutionality of Chapter 539, Private Acts of 1945, under which the defendants claim to have succeeded to these offices. On the hearing the case was submitted on a single issue, whether the Act of 1945 was effective to abolish the offices held by complainants below, as an incident of substantial and fundamental changes in the county road law, or was merely a colorable enactment having for its purpose the removal of complainants from office and the substitution of others. The chancellor sustained a demurrer and dismissed the bill. This appeal is from his decree.

As we have before remarked, 'Each case of the general character now before us stands or falls on its own facts.' Holland v. Parker, 159 Tenn. 306, 307, 17 S.W.2d 926, quoted in Kyle v. Marcom, 181 Tenn. 57, 178 S.W.2d 618. It, therefore, becomes necessary to scrutinize the enactment as applied to its statutory background.

Since the year 1927 the control of the highways in Hardeman County had been in the hands of commissioners varying in number, chosen sometimes by the county court and sometimes by popular vote, and with their duties differing in some details, all according to the provisions of the several acts and amendments thereto adopted by the legislature from time to time. The last amendatory act before passage of the measure now under consideration was that of 1941, which fixed the number of road commissioners at eight, one for each of the several road districts of like number created by the act.

Here we quote from the opinion filed by the Chancellor this clear and concise statement of his views:

'Among the changes which the 1945 Act makes in what the Court conceives to be the pre-existing law are, (1) it gives the Commission the right to employ a secretary and an attorney; (2) it gives the Commission, rather than the County Court, the right to fill vacancies in the Commission; (3) the Commission is given control of all road funds; (4) the Commission is given the exclusive right to purchase materials, machinery, etc., and required to advertise for bids on all purchases in excess of $300.00; (5) it fixes the compensation of the Commissioners; (6) it reduces the number of districts and the number of Commissioners from eight to three; and (7) it creates the office of Road Supervisor, provides for his employment and outlines his duties and responsibilities.

'Some of these changes, taken singly, are certainly minor and insignificant, and rise no higher than the status of 'colorable.' However, taken as a whole, the Court is reluctant to say that the change is only 'colorable.' Reduction of the number of districts and the number of Commissioners, coupled with the creation of the office of road supervisor and the centralization of authority incident to these and other changes made by the Act, indicate a revision of the law designed to bring about a more cohesive and unified organization for the maintenance of the road system of Hardeman County. Recognizing the duty of courts to resolve doubts in favor of the constitutionality of legislative acts, the Court is of the opinion that the 1945 Act substantially changes the road law of Hardeman County. It follows that the demurrer of the defendants will be sustained and the complainants' bill dismissed at their cost.'

The able solicitor for complainants rightly concludes that the chancellor's decision was influenced mainly by the new provision creating the office of Road Supervisor to which office the active direction of the entire road work of the county was delegated, thus centralizing and consolidating the management of all roads and bridges in and under a single operative head.

This view of the chancellor finds support in the opinion of Mr. Justice Cook in Butler v. McMahan, 166 Tenn. 511, 64 S.W.2d 1, Traywick v. Gilkey,

167 Tenn. 465, 467, 71 S.W.2d 676, 677) 'a change from a commission to a managerial form of government.' We held that such a change was not 'merely colorable,' but substantial.

In Butler v. McMahan, supra, 166 Tenn., page 513, 64 S.W.2d 1, 2, it was said that 'the caption expresses the purpose to set up a new and complete system * * * under the control and direction of a county road superintendent, instead of three commissioners of highways.' It is true that in that case no commission was provided for, while here we have a commission of three by whom the supervisor is chosen, under whose general supervision he works and to whom he is accountable. However, this is consistent with the now well established and widely adopted managerial form of government, provided by our legislature for a number of counties and municipalities in this state. It is common to create, or retain, general governing councils or boards, or commissions, with the duty of choosing managers or superintendents and supervising generally the performance of their duties. But changes to this form of administration of the business of these governmental agencies are generally regarded as substantial, if not radical. There is an important principle of administrative operative control involved.

The caption of the Act of 1945, now before us, reads: 'An Act to provide a system for the supervision and management of the construction and maintenance of County Roads, Bridges and Highways in Hardeman County, and to repeal Chapter 544 Private Acts of 1939, and Chapter 313, Private Acts of 1941, creating...