Blackard v. Kolb

• Decision Date: 17 November 1947
• Docket Number: No. 4-8327.,4-8327.
• Citation: 205 S.W.2d 857
• Parties: BLACKARD v. KOLB.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

205 S.W.2d 857

BLACKARD v. KOLB.

No. 4-8327.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

November 17, 1947.

Rehearing Denied December 15, 1947.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Johnson County; Audrey Strait, Judge.

Election contest between Ethel Blackard and Virgil Kolb. From a judgment holding that he was not a qualified elector on November 5, 1946, within the purview of the poll tax law, Ethel Blackard appeals.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

J. H. Brock, Linus A. Williams, and Wiley W. Bean, all of Clarksville, for appellant.

J. D. Bartlett, W. J. Morrow, and Geo. Patterson, all of Clarksville, and J. M. Smallwood, of Russellville, for appellee.

McFADDIN, Justice.

This is an election contest; and the controlling question on this appeal is whether the appellant Blackard was a qualified elector of Johnson County, Arkansas on November 5, 1946, within the purview of our poll tax law. We hold that he was; and Act 155 of 1943 is our authority for such holding.

The facts regarding Blackard's status are these: Prior to his entry into the armed forces of the United States he was a resident of Johnson County. He received his honorable discharge from the Army on November 14, 1945, and immediately returned to Johnson County, and has resided there ever since. In February, 1946 he purchased a poll tax receipt under the provisions of Act 155 of 1943. This was evidently a 1944 poll tax receipt, and its regularity is not questioned on this appeal. A 1944 poll tax receipt was required for voting at any election held between October 1, 1945 and October 1, 1946.

In order to vote at any election held from October 1, 1946, to October 1, 1947, Blackard was required by law to have a 1945 poll tax receipt. On September 14, 1946, Blackard delinquently assessed his 1945 poll tax before the assessor, and went immediately to the tax collector's office, where he paid $1 and received his 1945 poll tax receipt bearing this notation:

"If paid on or before October 1, 1946 will entitle the taxpayer, if otherwise qualified, to vote at any election held in this State prior to October 1, 1947."

It is admitted that the assessor did not certify the delinquent assessment to the county clerk, and that the county clerk did not certify the supplemental assessment to the collector, as required by Act 37 of 1941. Because of this latter omission, it is claimed by appellee that Blackard was not a qualified elector on November 5, 1946. Appellee cites, in support of his contention, Section 4695, Pope's Digest, and a number of our cases, of which the following are a few: Cain v. Carllee, 168 Ark. 64, 269 S.W. 57; Taaffe v. Sanderson, 173 Ark. 970, 294 S.W. 74; Collins v. Jones, 186 Ark. 442, 54 S.W.2d 400; Martin v. Gray, 193 Ark. 32, 97 S.W.2d 439; Trussell v. Fish, 202 Ark. 956, 154 S.W. 2d 587; Wilson v. Luck, 203 Ark. 377, 156 S.W.2d 795; Stephens v. O'Neel, 210 Ark. 570, 196 S.W.2d 917, 918. In the last-cited case we said:

"We have many times held that to be a qualified elector one must both assess and pay his poll tax in the manner provided by law."

But, irrespective of the foregoing authorities, Blackard's 1945 poll tax receipt was valid under Act 155 of 1943, hereinafter referred to as "Act 155". It is captioned: "An Act to Allow Men and Women in the Armed Services of the United States to Vote, If Otherwise Qualified, Without Assessing for Poll Tax If They Are Discharged or Returned From Service After the Time for Assessing Has Expired." Section 1 says:

"Any man or woman who has been discharged or has returned from service in any branch of the armed service of the United States shall be entitled to secure a poll tax at any time before the date of any election held before the next succeeding time for assessing shall close by presenting to the Sheriff and Collector or Collector as the case may be his affidavit showing such service in the armed forces, his discharge from such service and the date of his return to his voting precinct."

We have italicized the words "before the next succeeding time for assessing shall close," because they are the words that caused the circuit court to make the ruling which we now reverse.

Viewing this statute in the light of the law existing prior to its passage, and giving the statute the effect which it seeks to accomplish, we think that the italicized words refer to the time for regularly assessing in the next poll tax year; and do not limit the right of the veteran to pay for and obtain a poll tax receipt — without assessment — for the year in which the regularly assessing period had expired prior to the time of the veteran's discharge. We emphasize that the act means time for regularly assessing, and does not mean time for delinquently assessing; for, otherwise, the Act would not facilitate in any way the veteran's opportunity to become a qualified elector. He is not required to assess delinquently. He is relieved from assessing.

With the italicized words construed as just stated, it is clear that Section 1 of Act 155 means: that, if a veteran returns from the service too late to assess regularly for a poll tax, then such veteran, by making proof (to the collector) of his veteran status, date of return and precinct, may — at any time before any election — pay the collector $1.00 and receive a valid poll tax without being obliged to assess delinquently.

Applying this statute — as so construed —to the case at bar, we have this situation: Blackard returned from the service on November 14, 1945. He had ample time (i. e., from the first Monday in January, 1946 to the third Monday in August, 1946 — as fixed by Section 13683, Pope's Digest) in which to assess regularly his 1946 poll tax which, if thereafter paid...