Blackburn v. Astrue
| Decision Date | 03 January 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 10 C 5198,10 C 5198 |
| Parties | JAMIE MARIE BLACKBURN, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jamie Marie Blackburn filed this action seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act ("SSA"). 42 U.S.C. §§ 416, 423(d), 1381a. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
To recover Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") or Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the SSA,1 a claimant must establish that heor she is disabled within the meaning of the SSA. York v. Massanari, 155 F. Supp. 2d 973, 977 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Keener v. Astrue, 2008 WL 687132, at *1 (S.D. Ill. 2008). A person is disabled if he or she is unable to perform "any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). In determining whether a claimant suffers from a disability, the ALJ conducts a standard five-step inquiry:
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520, 416.909, 416.920; see Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 162 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985). "The burden of proof is on the claimant through step four; only at step five does the burden shift to the Commissioner." Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.
Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI on March 16, 2006, alleging she became disabled on August 26, 2005, due to right knee injury and depression. (R. at 11, 22-24, 38, 49, 61, 73-77, 337-39.) The application was denied initially and on reconsideration, after which Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing. (Id. at 11, 22-24, 31, 34-38, 45-49, 325-36.)
On September 30, 2008, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (R. at 11, 344-77.) The ALJ also heard testimony from Edward A. Pagella, a vocational expert ("VE"). (Id.)
The ALJ denied Plaintiff's request for benefits on November 5, 2008. (R. at 11-19.) Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found, at step one, that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 26, 2005, her alleged onset date. (Id. at 13.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's degenerative joint disease and affective disorder are severe impairments. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of any of the listings enumerated in the regulations. (Id. at 14.)
The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC")2 and determined that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform a full range of sedentary work but can only perform occasional postural maneuvers. (R. at 14.) Based on Plaintiff'sRFC and the VE's testimony, the ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff could not perform any past relevant work. (Id. at 18.) At step five, based on Plaintiff's RFC, her vocational factors and the VE's testimony, the ALJ determined that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the regional economy that Plaintiff can perform, including work as a hand sorter, bench assembler, or hand packer. (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not suffering from a disability as defined by the SSA. (Id. at 18-19.)
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on September 24, 2009. (R. at 4A-4C). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ's decision, which stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2009).
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is authorized by § 405(g) of the SSA. In reviewing this decision, the Court may not engage in its own analysis of whether the plaintiff is severely impaired as defined by the Social Security Regulations. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). Nor may it "reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the record, decide questions of credibility, or, in general, substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner." Id. The Court's task is "limited to determining whether the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence." Id. (citing § 405(g)). Evidence is considered substantial "if a reasonable person would accept it as adequate to support a conclusion." Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2004). "Substantial evidence must be morethan a scintilla but may be less than a preponderance." Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). "In addition to relying on substantial evidence, the ALJ must also explain his analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review." Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005).
Although this Court accords great deference to the ALJ's determination, it "must do more than merely rubber stamp the ALJ's decision." Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The Court must critically review the ALJ's decision to ensure that the ALJ has built an "accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion." Young, 362 F.3d at 1002. Where the Commissioner's decision "lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review, the case must be remanded." Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Id. 2002).
In April 2003, Plaintiff climbed on a stool in her kitchen to change the time on a clock. (R. at 179.) The stool gave way, and Plaintiff crashed to the floor. (Id.) The fall seriously injured her right knee, tearing her anterior cruciate ligament (ACL), as well as her lateral meniscus and her medial meniscus, which are pieces of cartilage that spread the load of the body's weight and reduce the amount of friction generated when the joint is moved. (Id.)
About two months later, Steven A. Marciniak, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, performed an operation on Plaintiff's right knee. (R. at 199-201.) Dr. Marciniak removed some of the cartilage from Plaintiff's lateral meniscus and medial meniscus in a procedure known as a meniscectomy; he also used an arthroscopic shaver to de-bride the "stump" of her ACL that remained attached to her femur. (Id.)
This was not the first time Plaintiff had suffered an injury to her right knee, or the first time it had been operated on. About fifteen years earlier, when she was in high school, a fellow student shoved a desk into her knee, apparently as a prank. (R. at 357.) The impact tore some cartilage in her knee, and she had to have surgery to repair the damage. (Id.)
Plaintiff's right knee continued to cause her problems even following Dr. Mar-ciniak's surgery. While Dr. Marciniak noted that she walked with a normal, reciprocal gait, he also observed that Plaintiff "seems like she is having significant discomfort." (R. at 177.) Indeed, Plaintiff complained that physical therapy was not helping her recovery, describing a persistent, aching pain in her knee. (Id.) Dr. Marciniak suggested that she wear a brace, but it did not help; Plaintiff's knee buckled even when she was wearing the brace, and she continued to experience significant pain. (Id. at 175-76.)
By December 2003, Dr. Marciniak concluded that Plaintiff would need another surgery to reconstruct her ACL. (R. at 175.) More than a year passed before that surgery was scheduled, however, because Plaintiff's husband passed away unexpectedly and she did not have insurance to cover the surgery. (Id. at 174-75.) Theoperation finally took place in February 2005. Dr. Marciniak used tissue from a cadaver to reconstruct Plaintiff's ACL in a procedure known as an allograft. (Id. at 196-98.) Two months later, Plaintiff said she was feeling "great" and that "this is the best her knee has felt in two years." (Id. at 173.) She was doing so well by June, in fact, that Dr. Marciniak told her that she could "do anything except jumping, sprinting, and cutting" and that he would remove all work restrictions by August. (Id.)
But a few weeks later, Plaintiff injured her knee again. (R. at 172.) While swimming in a wave pool, she was "hit from behind" by one of the artificially generated waves. (Id.) Dr. Marciniak suspected that she may have torn the graft that he used to reconstruct her ACL. (Id.) Indeed, an MRI confirmed an "ACL graft failure" and also showed a tear in Plaintiff's posterior cruciate ligament. (Id.) Dr. Marciniak recommended another surgery to reconstruct Plaintiff's ACL. (Id.) He also prescribed Mobic and Vicodin for her pain. (Id.)
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