Blackburn v. Blackburn

• Citation: 270 S.W.3d 42
• Decision Date: 13 November 2008
• Docket Number: No. E2006-00753-SC-R11-CV.,E2006-00753-SC-R11-CV.
• Parties: Edwinna Ruth BLACKBURN v. Heath Bradley BLACKBURN.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee

270 S.W.3d 42

Edwinna Ruth BLACKBURN v. Heath Bradley BLACKBURN.¹

No. E2006-00753-SC-R11-CV.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Knoxville.

September 3, 2008 Session.

November 13, 2008.

John W. Cleveland, Sweetwater, Tennessee, for the appellant, Edwinna Ruth Blackburn.

Keith H. Grant, Dunlap, Tennessee, for the appellee, Heath Bradley Blackburn.

OPINION

CORNELIA A. CLARK, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J., and WILLIAM M. BARKER, GARY R. WADE, and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ., joined.

We granted Wife's application for permission to appeal in this divorce case to address whether the trial court properly entered the parties' divorce decree nunc pro tunc to June 6, 2005, the date upon which the parties announced in open court that they had reached a divorce settlement. We hold that the record does not support a finding that the trial court granted the parties a divorce that day. As a result, the divorce proceeding between Wife and Husband was still pending on October 30, 2005, the day of Husband's death, and as such, the divorce proceeding abated on that day. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Factual and Procedural History

On February 25, 2005, Edwinna Ruth Blackburn ("Wife") filed a claim for divorce against Heath Bradley Blackburn ("Husband"). In her complaint, Wife alleged that there were irreconcilable differences² between the parties and that a divorce should be granted on this ground. In the alternative, Wife alleged that Husband was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct,³ such that she was entitled to an absolute divorce.

Sometime thereafter, Wife filed an application for an order of protection against Husband. A hearing on this matter was set for June 6, 2005. During this hearing, at which no court reporter was present, the parties' attorneys announced in open court that they had reached a full divorce settlement. There is no transcript of this announcement and the court's file does not reflect what action, if any, the trial court took following the parties' announcement of settlement. At a subsequent hearing, the parties' attorneys agreed that, with exception of the disposition of a Ford Ranger, the parties announced the details of the divorce settlement to the trial court during the June 6, 2005 hearing.

Following the hearing, Wife's attorney drafted a proposed judgment of divorce, which reads in pertinent part:

[U]pon the Complaint for Divorce filed by [Wife], the testimony of the parties as heard in open Court, the statements of counsel, and the entire record as a whole, from all of which it duly appears to the Court that the parties have stipulated grounds for divorce . . ., such that the parties should be declared divorced and returned to the status of single persons; . . . [and] that [Wife] shall be restored to her maiden name, "Edwinna Ruth Swafford[.]"⁴

Wife's attorney mailed the proposed judgment to Husband's attorney on June 13, 2005. In the cover letter attached to the proposed judgment, Wife's attorney requested that Husband's attorney sign the proposed judgment, "if the same meets with your approval," and then forward the proposed judgment to the trial court for its approval. The proposed judgment was received by Husband's attorney but was never approved and signed by him and was never sent to the trial court for approval.⁵

On October 30, 2005, Husband died in an automobile accident. On November 9, 2005, Husband's attorney filed a Motion for Entry of Divorce Decree Nunc Pro Tunc, requesting that the trial court enter the final divorce decree nunc pro tunc to June 6, 2005, the day the parties announced in open court that they had reached a divorce settlement.

On January 13, 2006, Wife filed a Suggestion of Death and a Motion to Dismiss. In support of her motion to dismiss, Wife argued that no entry of judgment had been signed by the trial court, and as such, the parties' divorce action abated at the time of Husband's death.

On February 10, 2006, the trial court held a hearing to address the parties' respective motions. During this hearing, Husband's attorney put on proof that Wife believed she was divorced as of June 6, 2005. Husband's attorney proffered witnesses who testified that, subsequent to the June 2005 proceeding, Wife: (1) was "adamant" that she be known by her maiden name, "Swafford," instead of her married name, "Blackburn"; (2) had "celebrated" the fact that she was divorced by going out to eat and shopping with a friend; and (3) had been seen with other men.

Wife testified, however, that she did not believe that she was divorced after the June 2005 hearing. Wife explained that she called her attorney several times after the June 2005 hearing to check on the status of her divorce proceeding. Wife denied any romantic involvement with men, other than Husband, after the June 2005 proceeding and explained that she sometimes signs her maiden name because "everyone around here knows me as Swafford" and that she signed her maiden name "even while we was [sic] married."

After all proof had been presented, the trial court asked the parties' attorneys, both of whom were present at the June 6, 2005 hearing, whether the court had "approve[d] the announcement that was made to the Court?" Wife's attorney stated that the trial court had approved the announcement and then asked that she "prepare the documents." Husband's attorney stated that the trial court "did approve the divorce and the agreement as stated." The trial court then asked whether it indicated "to the parties at that time, as [it] routinely do[es], that the divorce is granted and approve the agreement?"⁶ Wife's attorney responded that the court did not specifically state that the parties were divorced. Husband's attorney responded that he did not know if the trial court stated that "the divorce is granted" but did believe that the court stated that it "approve[d] the divorce."

At the conclusion of the February 2006 hearing, the trial court made the following statements and findings from the bench:

The Court has carefully considered the testimony of the witnesses and has paid particular attention to the witnesses as they testified, including [Wife], be she identified as Edwinna Blackburn or Edwinna Swafford. The Court has also considered the various exhibits that have been introduced, the trial brief that was filed by [Husband's attorney] on behalf of the decedent, [Husband], . . . and the opinions that were submitted to me by [Wife's trial attorney] on behalf of [Wife].

And I think what we have got here is a situation where, if I rule for [Wife] in this case, I have, in effect, taken the position that [Wife] . . . can be who she wants when she wants when it's advantageous for her.

. . .

It's the Court's right and the Court's duty to make any record for any proceedings or record of that proceeding speak the truth and it's the Court's obligation to discharge that duty. And the most important thing, if the Court discharges that duty, is to make sure that that document or that record, in fact, speaks the truth. And that's what we are after here in a court of law. We put people under oath, we conduct extensive proceedings, and we do that to try to find what the truth is.

And the truth in this case, this Court finds, the truth in this case was that these parties were before me on June 6th, said they wanted a divorce, I granted them a divorce, I granted them a divorce at that time, and intended that the parties be divorced at that time. The decree was then prepared and, for whatever reason, . . . that decree was never presented to the Court.

So in order for this Court to make these proceedings truthfully reveal what occurred and to make these proceedings accurate, it's incumbent upon this Court to discharge its duty, enter the decree nunc pro tunc, and I elect to exercise my discretion and I elect to discharge my duty and I elect to enter the decree nunc pro tunc. These parties were divorced on June the 6th, my order is that they were divorced on June the 6th, and the decree will then be entered nunc pro tunc as of June the 6th.

The trial court subsequently entered an order, stating that the judgment "previously submitted shall be entered nunc pro tunc to June 6th, 2005, and that the parties were divorced as of that date."

Wife appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. We granted Wife's application for permission to appeal and now address whether the trial court erred in entering a divorce decree nunc pro tunc.

Standard of Review

When dealing with a trial court's findings of fact, we review the record de novo with a presumption of correctness, and we must honor those findings unless there is evidence which preponderates to the contrary. Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn.1993). The trial court's conclusions of law, however, are accorded no presumption of correctness. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741, 744-45 (Tenn.2002).

Analysis

It is a well-settled principle of law that a pending divorce action, being purely personal in nature, abates upon the death of one of the parties. Swan v. Harrison, 42 Tenn. (2 Cold.) 534, 536-40 (1865); see Owens v. Sims, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 544, 549 (1866) (stating that wife could not appear and defend action for divorce after death of husband); Steele v. Steele, 757 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1988) (stating "if an action for a divorce is commenced, and one of the parties dies thereafter, but before the entry of the final decree, the action abates"). If, however, the court has entered a final divorce decree, the subsequent death of a spouse does not affect the decree. See, e.g., Vessels v. Vessels, 530 S.W.2d 71, 71 (Tenn. 1975). Accordingly, at issue in this appeal is whether the trial court granted the parties a divorce on June 6, 2005, and/or whether a...