Blackburn v. Tombling
| Decision Date | 02 October 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 19493,19493 |
| Parties | Harrison BLACKBURN, individually and d/b/a Erhard Hotel, Plaintiff in Error, v. Myree D. TOMBLING, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
McComb, Zarlengo & Mott, Denver, for plaintiff in error.
Wood, Ris & Hames, Denver, for defendant in error.
We will refer to the parties as follows: Plaintiff in error as Blackburn or defendant, and defendant in error as Tombling or plaintiff.
Blackburn seeks reversal of a judgment entered against him for $5,000 awarded to plaintiff for personal injuries allegedly sustained by her when she fell from a step on the hotel premises operated by Blackburn. In her complaint plaintiff alleged that on the date of the occurrence she was on said premises as a business invitee and that the injuries which she received were proximately caused by the careless and negligent manner in which the defendant managed and operated the premises. The property in question is known as the Erhard Hotel, of which defendant was lessee and manager.
In his answer defendant admitted the operation and management of the hotel but denied the remaining allegations of the complaint. He raised as affirmative defenses that the accident was proximately caused by the sole negligence of the plaintiff; by the contributory negligence of the plaintiff; that plaintiff assumed the risk of any alleged dangerous condition; or that the accident was unavoidable.
On the day of the accident of which Tombling complains she was in the act of leaving the hotel premises, operated by Blackburn, through the front entrance thereto. On entering or leaving the hotel one was required to pass through a double set of doors separated by a vestibule. The doors nearest the street opened upon the sidewalk. When this outer door was opened it extended about twenty inches beyond the outer side of a step down to sidewalk level. As plaintiff left the hotel she fell and suffered the injuries complained of.
Counsel for Blackburn present their argument for reversal under five captions. We deem it necessary to consider only two points upon which we ground a reversal of the judgment.
First: 'The court erred in permitting a so-called expert witness to testify that defendant's doorway constituted a dangerous condition.'
Counsel for Tombling called as a witness one John K. Monroe, an architect who had practiced his profession in the Denver area for many years. Monroe had designed hotels, but had never constructed either hotels or apartment buildings. He testified that he had viewed the entrance to the Erhard Hotel, at plaintiff's request, from the outside but never from the inside. He admitted on cross-examination that he did not know what a person could see going out through the entrance; that he made no measurements; and that the only inspection he made was in the daytime. Finally, he stated that the doors, to which we have referred, swung out over the step some 20 to 24 inches although he did not make any measurements to that effect. The witness was then asked whether he had an opinion as to whether the hotel's outer doors as they relate to the steps involved created a dangerous condition, to which the witness replied that he did. He was then asked to give his opinion. Defendant objected to this question for the reason that the situation at hand was not such as required or permitted an expert opinion; that to allow the witness to express such an opinion would be to allow him to usurp the province of the jury and to actually decide the ultimate issue of the case, namely, whether or not a dangerous situation did exist. Despite said objection the court permitted the witness to answer--that in his opinion the condition was dangerous.
The admission of this evidence was error. Generally, 'Expert opinion evidence is admissible where the subject matter is such that a jury cannot be expected to draw correct inferences from the facts.' 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 520, p. 217. There...
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...expulsion, and pelvic inflammatory disease. Evidence of prior dissimilar events is inadmissible to prove liability. Blackburn v. Tombling, 148 Colo. 161, 365 P.2d 243 (1961); Millenson v. Department of Highways, 41 Colo.App. 460, 590 P.2d 979 (1978). Unless the prior tortious conduct is sim......
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Dolan v. Mitchell
...only when the subject matter of the controversy renders it necessary or proper to resort to opinion evidence. Blackburn v. Tombling, 148 Colo. 161, 365 P.2d 243 (1961); Accord, McNelley v. Smith, Supra. Here Professor Crawford was prepared to testify regarding the absence of metal smearing ......
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Blackburn v. Tombling, 20725
...the trial which conceivably might have influenced the jury in determining the question of liability against Blackburn. Blackburn v. Tombling, 148 Colo. 161, 365 P.2d 243. The judgment which was at that time entered against Blackburn on a jury verdict awarding Tombling $5000.00 damages was r......