Blackman v. Blackman, WD

• Decision Date: 14 February 1989
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: 767 S.W.2d 54
• Parties: Sandra K. BLACKMAN, Appellant-Cross-Respondent, v. Raymond Edward BLACKMAN, Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 40754.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 54

767 S.W.2d 54

Sandra K. BLACKMAN, Appellant-Cross-Respondent, v. Raymond Edward BLACKMAN, Respondent-Cross-Appellant.

No. WD 40754.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Western District.

Feb. 14, 1989.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied March 28, 1989.

James F. Ralls, Jr. of Quitmeier & Ralls, P.C., Kansas City, for appellant-cross-respondent.

John W. Dennis, Jr. of Paden, Welch, Martin & Albano, P.C., Independence, for respondent-cross-appellant.

Before MANFORD, P.J., and TURNAGE and LOWENSTEIN, JJ.

MANFORD, Presiding Judge.

This case arose when Sandra Blackman caused a garnishment in aid of execution to be issued on the wages of Raymond Blackman for unpaid child support. Raymond filed a Motion to Quash the Garnishment which the trial court sustained. Raymond's Motions for Order of Satisfaction of Judgment and Costs, and for Reimbursement of Child Support Paid After Emancipation were overruled by the trial court. This appeal by Sandra and cross-appeal by Raymond followed. The appeals have been consolidated.

The marriage of Sandra and Raymond was dissolved by the Circuit Court of Jackson County on January 7, 1974. Sandra was awarded custody of the two children, Bryan David and Jennifer Lyn, and the sum of $27.00 per week per child for child support. After Raymond became delinquent in his child support payments, Sandra filed a Motion to Modify and Application for Show Cause Order for contempt on the arrearage.

Prior to the hearing on Sandra's motion and application, the parties, through their attorneys, entered into a written stipulation. The stipulation, in pertinent part, states:

3. The parties agree that there has been a change of circumstances between the parties so substantial as to make the terms of the Court's Order unreasonable, and that it would be in the best interest of the minor children that the Order of the Court be modified as to child support.

4. The parties further agree that due to the minor children's increased needs and due to the increased earnings of the Respondent, that the child support Order should be increased from the present amount to the sum of Three Hundred Twenty Dollars ($320.00) per month for the support of BRYAN DAVID BLACKMAN and JENNIFER LYN BLACKMAN, with said payments to be made through the Court Administrator of the Jackson County Circuit Court as Trustee.

5. That the agreed monthly child support of Three Hundred Twenty Dollars ($320.00) shall be due and payable on the 15th day of each month, beginning January 15, 1982.

6. Respondent agrees that he shall provide major medical insurance benefits and life insurance benefits on both minor children until said minor children are twenty-one (21) or sooner emancipate from the home, and agrees to make all policy and claim numbers available to the Petitioner for the benefit of the children.

7. That the parties hereby agree that there is a disputed amount of back child support owed by the Respondent to the Petitioner for the support of said minor children.

8. The Respondent agrees to pay the Petitioner as partial payment of the disputed back child support the sum of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) on February 22, 1982.

9. The parties agree that Petitioner will withhold execution on any of the remaining back child support which is allegedly owed by the Respondent to the Petitioner so long as Respondent is current on his child support payments on December 31, 1982, and on December 31 of each succeeding year.

10. The parties further agree that nothing in this agreement is to be interpreted as a total waiver by the Petitioner of any disputed back child support owed to her by the Respondent.

11. Respondent agrees to pay to Petitioner the sum of Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00) toward her attorney fees regarding this action, and agrees to pay said attorney fees on or before June 1, 1982.

The stipulation was filed with the trial court.

On February 22, 1982, the trial court entered an order modifying the divorce decree. In its order, the court indicated that it had reviewed the written stipulation. The order modified the divorce decree to increase child support payments to the total sum of $320.00 and also stated:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED By this Court that Respondent immediately pay to Petitioner the sum of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) as partial payment of the disputed back child support owed by the Respondent to the Petitioner and Petitioner shall herewith withhold execution on any of the remaining back child support which is owed by the Respondent to the Petitioner so long as Respondent is current on his child support payments on December 31, 1982, and on December 31 of each succeeding year thereafter.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED by this Court that Respondent pay to Petitioner the sum of Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00) as attorney fees in this action. Said sum of Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00) shall be paid by Respondent to the Petitioner on or before July 1, 1982.

Several years later, on December 23, 1987, Sandra filed a request for garnishment in aid of execution against the wages of Raymond for past due child support. Raymond filed a Motion to Quash Execution by Garnishment and Motions for Order of Satisfaction of Judgment and Costs, and for Reimbursement of Child Support Paid After Emancipation.

A hearing on the garnishment action and pending motions was held on May 16, 1988. Raymond testified that he was employed by the Brock Hotel Corporation in Dallas, Texas. A portion of his income was withheld pursuant to the garnishment served on the corporation's registered agent in St. Louis, Missouri. Raymond believed that the amount of the child support arrearage was between $8,000 and $9,000 in January of 1982. Pursuant to the written stipulation and order, Raymond paid Sandra $4,000 on the arrearage.

The parties stipulated at the hearing that their two children were emancipated. Bryan David was emancipated on August 20, 1985 when he entered military service. Jennifer Lyn was emancipated on February 16, 1986 when she was married. Sandra did not notify Raymond of the emancipations of the children and, consequently, Raymond paid approximately $4,800 in child support to Sandra after the children were emancipated. When Raymond learned of the emancipations, he stopped making payments and took action to terminate the trust with the Court Administrator's Office of the Circuit Court.

Raymond testified that in the summer of 1987, he had conversations with Sandra and asked her to sign satisfaction of judgment papers. He stated that Sandra said she was going to make an appointment with his attorney and sign the papers. Sandra had a few questions to ask, but Raymond did not know what the questions were. Sandra did not sign a satisfaction of judgment. Raymond stated that Sandra never told him "point blank, or words to that effect" that he owed her child support arrearages. She did, however, seek legal advice and file the garnishment action.

Raymond had no documentation to show which payments he made. He had partially paid Sandra the $800 attorney fees previously ordered by the court. The parties stipulated that Raymond made all the child support payments ordered in the modified decree from January 15, 1982 to the time of the emancipation of the children on a current basis.

Terry Blackman, Raymond's wife at the time of the hearing, testified that she spoke with Sandra regarding the satisfaction of judgment papers. Terry said Sandra told her she would sign the papers and had made an appointment to see Raymond's attorney, but Sandra also told Terry she had some concerns and wanted to ask some questions before signing.

Sandra testified at the hearing, identifying an exhibit listing child support payments made by Raymond and those he missed. The exhibit, which was admitted into evidence and filed on appeal, shows total principal and interest due in the amount of $18,815.89 as of the hearing date. Sandra stated that Raymond never satisfied the arrearage that existed at the time of the stipulation, although he did make the partial payment of $4,000. The exhibit credited Raymond for payments made after the emancipation of the children.

Sandra recalled a conversation with Raymond who indicated there would be no further child support payments. Sandra wanted to discuss the past due child support in the amount of approximately $14,000, but Raymond told her she was overreacting. She also recalled conversations with Terry Blackman in which Sandra indicated that she never agreed that the arrearage should be forgiven, she just didn't have the money to pursue it.

At the close of the evidence, the trial court sustained Raymond's Motion to Quash Execution by Garnishment. All funds held pursuant to that execution were ordered released to Raymond. The trial court overruled Raymond's Motion for Order of Satisfaction of Judgment and Costs, and for Reimbursement of Child Support Paid After Emancipation. Neither party requested findings of fact or conclusions of law, and none were made. The appeal and cross-appeal followed.

Sandra appeals from the trial court's order sustaining the Motion to Quash Execution by Garnishment. The scope of review in this court-tried action is subject to the provisions of Rule 73.01 and the construction of that rule in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976); the decree or judgment will be sustained by an appellate court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law.

At the heart of the dispute on appeal is the stipulation entered into by the parties. There is no question that an order for child support encompassed in a decree of dissolution and owed by one spouse to another becomes a judgment debt. Penney v. White, 594 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Mo.App.1980). Sandra is not legally prevented from executing on a valid judgment debt for past due...