Blackman v. Iles, A--75

• Decision Date: 20 February 1950
• Docket Number: No. A--75,A--75
• Citation: 71 A.2d 633,4 N.J. 82
• Parties: BLACKMAN v. ILES et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 82

4 N.J. 82

71 A.2d 633

BLACKMAN v. ILES et al.

No. A--75.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Jan. 23, 1950.

Decided Feb. 20, 1950.

Harry R. Coulomb, Atlantic City, argued the cause for appellant (Coulomb, McAlister & Hunter, Atlantic City, attorneys).

Harry Miller, Atlantic City, argued the cause for respondents Alfred John Iles, Charles Cunliffe and Joseph E. Jadoun (Albert N. Shahadi, Atlantic City, for respondents Alfred John Iles and Joseph E. Jadoun. Bertram M. Saxe, Atlantic City, for respondent Charles Cunliffe).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

WACHENFELD, J.

Josephine Blackman filed her complaint in a civil action in the court below alleging the defendants Iles, Cunliffe and Jadoun carnally knew and debauched her daughter, a child fourteen years of age, at diverse times and places and she was advised that by reason thereof she had separate causes of action against them for damages 'for loss of services, shame, humiliation and nervous shock occasioned by and as a result of the said defendants and each of them, having carnally known and debauched Lois J. Schaufler, the daughter and servant of said plaintiff * * *'

She further asserts doubt has arisen by reason of a statute of the State of New Jersey, i.e., R.S. 2:39A--1 to 2:39A--9, N.J.S.A., as to whether this enactment prohibits her from bringing such action in the courts of this State and that she cannot safely institute these causes without rendering herself liable to criminal prosecution under the terms thereof in the event the statute is ultimately construed to prohibit the institution of said claims. She therefore petitions the court to interpret the statute and to construe it as not forbidding her to file her complaint and issue process to recover damages for the loss of services of her daughter and servant.

The Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, although made a party to the action and served with process, filed no answer. The other defendants by their answers deny they are guilty of the charges alleged against them, challenge the right of the plaintiff to invoke the aid of the Declaratory Judgments Act and assert the 'Heart Balm Act' is applicable and constitutional, having been so declared by the courts of this State. The plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied and the trial court dismissed the complaint, holding the action was barred by the provisions of the 'Heart Balm Act.' The appeal to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court was certified here on our own motion.

The inquiry is, first, whether the complaint is sufficient to sustain a declaratory judgment under R.S. 2:26--66 et seq. N.J.S.A., and, secondly, whether the so-called 'Heart Balm Act,' R.S. 2:39A--1 to 9, N.J.S.A., forbids the plaintiff from having and maintaining the action against the several defendants for the loss of services of her infant daughter as a result of the debauchment by said defendants. The constitutionality of the act is also questioned but this issue will not be encountered unless the second inquiry is resolved against the plaintiff.

The defendants' answers challenged the complaint as insufficient to sustain a declaratory judgment. The issue thus raised must be decided here for the first time since the complaint was dismissed below on other grounds and the question of its sufficiency establishing a justiciable demand for judgment under the Declaratory Judgments Act was not passed upon.

The complaint is not predicated upon a moot or academic proposition but specifically sets forth the cause of action existing against the defendants for the loss of services of the plaintiff's minor daughter and alleges the hazards she may encounter by instituting such an action, which might subject her and her attorneys to indictment and the severe penalties provided in R.S. 2:39A--7, N.J.S.A.: 'Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, which shall be punishable by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for a term of not less than one year nor more than five years or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.'

Each of the defendants by his answer denies guilt and the issue so framed admittedly presents a jury question which cannot be and is not intended to be adjudicated in this action; it can only be determined if and when the plaintiff institutes her contemplated action against the defendants to recover damages.

R.S. 2:26--69, N.J.S.A., provides as follows: 'A person interested * * * or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute * * * may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the * * * statute * * * and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.'

This act is to be liberally construed and administered to carry out its purposes and intent. New Jersey Bankers Ass'n v. Van Riper, 1 N.J. 193, 62 A.2d 677 (Sup.Ct.1948).

The complaint specifically sets forth and clearly states the offenses charged against the defendants on which the plaintiff's cause of action is based and alleges the possibility that the action may be prohibited by R.S. 2:39A--1 to 9, N.J.S.A. If the statute is applicable, the plaintiff would be placed in great jeopardy and subject to indictment and other legal embarrassments.

Under these circumstances, the plaintiff has a clear and unmistakable right to invoke the provisions of the Declaratory Judgments Act in order that her 'rights, status or other legal relations' as affected by the statute may be determined. She is not obliged to assume the risk of prosecution, fine and imprisonment in endeavoring to secure an adjudication of her rights.

The 'Heart Balm Act' originated in 1935 and was designated as Chapter 279, entitled 'An Act declaring and carrying into effect the public policy of the State of New Jersey with respect to causes of action for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction, and breach of contract to marry, actions thereon, contracts with respect thereto and acts and proceedings in connection therewith.' The first section of the act as presently of record reads:

'R.S. 2:39A--1 (N.J.S.A.).

'The rights of action formerly existing to recover sums of money as damage for the alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction or breach of contract to marry are abolished from the after June twenty-seventh, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-five.'

This section centers its prohibition on and forbids actions to recover sums of money for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction or breach of contract to marry and, in determining its scope and effect, consideration must be given to the causes of action then existing. Under our law, a person seduced, except on promise of marriage, never had an action to recover money damages and no action could be maintained for the debauching of a daughter or servant unless there was proof of services previously rendered and thereby lost. The law permitted no recovery unless these elements were established by the aggrieved parent. Coon v. Moffitt, 3 N.J.L. 169 (*583), 4 Am.Dec. 392 (Sup.Ct.1809).

It is a recognized rule of statutory construction that the intention of the Legislature is to be derived from the entire document. The meaning of the general words will be restricted whenever this is necessary to carry out the legislative intention and the reason and spirit of the statute will control in its interpretation. Lynch v. City of Long Branch, 111 N.J.L. 148, 167 A. 664 (Sup.Ct.1933); May v. Board of Com'rs of Town of Nutley, 111 N.J.L. 166 168 A. 140 (Sup.Ct.1933).

The injury in construing statutes is to determine the purpose and intent of the Legislature. If the statute alters or amends the previous law or creates or abolishes types of actions, it is important, in discovering the intention of the Legislature, to ascertain the old law, the mischief and the proposed remedy. Holt v. Akarman, 84 N.J.L. 371, 86 A. 408 (E. & A.1913); Pine v. Okzewski, 112 N.J.L. 429, 170 A. 825 (E. & A.1934). A statute may take away a common law right but there is always a presumption that the Legislature had no such intention. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d Ed.1943), Vol. 3, Sec. 6201. If a change in the common law is to be effectuated, the legislative intent to do so must be clearly and plainly expressed. Carlo v. Okonite-Callender Cable Co., 3 N.J. 253, 69 A.2d 734 (Sup.Ct.1949).

The statutory language abolishing the several actions, construed in the light of these principles, relates to the institution of marriage. The suits against these defendants are common law...