Blackmon v. Eaton Elec.
| Decision Date | 17 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. W2012-02039-COA-R3-CV,W2012-02039-COA-R3-CV |
| Parties | RUBY BLACKMON v. EATON ELECTRICAL, ET AL. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County
Arnold G. Goldin, Chancellor
Appellant's claim for unemployment benefits was denied based upon a finding of work-related misconduct. Appellant sought review in the chancery court, which upheld the decision of the Commissioner's Designee. On appeal to this Court, Appellant claims that the chancery court erred in denying her request for a continuance and in affirming the decision of the Commissioner's Designee without considering the evidence which purportedly would have been introduced had a continuance been allowed. We affirm the decision of the chancery court.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
J. Jeffrey Lee, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ruby Blackmon
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, William E. Young, Solicitor General, Derek C. Jumper, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development
OPINIONRuby Blackmon ("Appellant") was discharged from her employment at the Eaton Corporation ("Eaton") in Memphis, Tennessee, on September 29, 2010, and she filed a claim for unemployment compensation on October 15, 2010. In response to a request for separation information, Eaton explained that Ms. Blackmon was terminated for violating a known company policy, specifically, for "address[ing] a group of employees and call[ing] them '[a racial slur].'" Eaton stated that an investigation had been conducted in which Ms. Blackmon admitted the conduct.
In November 2010, the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Employment Security (the "Agency") rendered its "Agency Decision" in which it denied Ms. Blackmon's claim for unemployment benefits, finding that Ms. Blackmon had violated company policy, that Ms. Blackmon was aware of such policy, and that her actions constituted "work-related misconduct" under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-7-303 making her ineligible for unemployment benefits. The Agency's Decision was upheld by the Appeals Tribunal, and the Commissioner's Designee later affirmed the decision of the Appeals Tribunal.1
On April 10, 2011, Ms. Blackmon filed a "Petition for Judicial Rehearing" in the Shelby County Chancery Court, denying the use of a racial slur, and claiming that she was terminated in retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment by a manager. On August 9, 2012, the chancery court entered a "Memorandum and Order" affirming the decision of the Commissioner's Designee. The court concluded that the decision of the Commissioner's Designee was supported by substantial and material evidence and that there existed a reasonable basis in law to support his decision that Ms. Blackmon was terminated for work-related misconduct. Ms. Blackmon timely appealed to this Court.
Ms. Blackmon presents the following issues, slightly restated, for our review:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner additional time to locate and secure crucial witnesses and counsel; and2. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the Respondents/Appellees had met their burden in the absence of any countervailing proof.
Additionally, the Agency presents the following issue:
3. Whether there is substantial and material evidence in the administrative record, and a reasonable basis in law, to support the Commissioner designee's decision that Petitioner is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303(a)(2)(A) for work-related misconduct.
For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the chancery court.
On appeal, Ms. Blackmon first argues that the chancery court "abused its discretion when it denied [her] request for a continuance[.]" Ms. Blackmon claims that she "wished to present the testimony of several co-workers[] who were not present on the date of trial[,]" and that she "was not able to secure counsel and did not understand the necessity of preparing a record of the hearing for appeal."2 She further claims that a continuance was appropriate because "she appeared completely unprepared for a hearing" and because the Agency would not have been prejudiced by a continuance.
"The granting or denial of a motion for a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the court." Blake v. Plus Mark, Inc., 952 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Tenn. 1977) (citing Moorehead v. State, 409 S.W.2d 357, 358 (Tenn. 1966)). "The ruling on the motion will not be disturbed unless the record clearly shows abuse of discretion and prejudice to the party seeking a continuance." Id. (citing State v. Strouth, 620 S.W.2d 467, 472 (Tenn. 1988)); see also Comm'r of Dep't of Transp. v. Hall, 635 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tenn. 1982) () (citing Brady v. State, 584 S.W.2d 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979)). Under the abuse of discretion standard, we must consider "(1) whether the decision has a sufficient evidentiary foundation; (2) whether the trial court correctly identified and properly applied the appropriate legal principles; and (3) whether the decision is within the range of acceptable alternatives." State ex rel. Moore v. Moore, No.W2007-01519-COA-R3-JV, 2008 WL 2687672, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2008) (citing State ex rel. Vaughn v. Kaatrude, 21 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)). We are required to uphold the trial court's ruling "as long as reasonable minds could disagree about its correctness," and "we are not permitted to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court." Caldwell v. Hill, 250 S.W.3d 865, 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). In considering a motion for a continuance, trial courts should consider "(1) the amount of time the proceedings have been pending, (2) the reasons for the continuance, (3) the diligence of the parties seeking the continuance, and (4) the prejudice to the requesting party if the continuance is not granted." Burks v. Spurlin, No. M2006-00122-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 1341769, at *2 (citing Nagarajan v. Terry, 151 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)).
As stated above, Ms. Blackmon claims that the trial court erred in denying her "request for a continuance[;]" however, the record lacks any evidence that Ms. Blackmon, in fact, made such a request before the trial court.3 "The failure to request a continuance constitutes waiver." State v. Vaughn, No. M2006-01659-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 110094, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 9, 2008). In any event, insofar as Ms. Blackmon sought a continuance to present additional evidence, the trial court was limited to considering the evidence contained in the administrative record. Gore v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water, No. M2009-01237-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4801703, at *5 n.3 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S. Dec. 14, 2009) perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 18, 2010) (citing Armstrong v. Magill, No. W2003-00207-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1462631, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)). Accordingly, Ms. Blackmon is not entitled to relief on this issue.
As her second issue on appeal, Ms. Blackmon seems to argue that the trial court erred in upholding the decision of the Commissioner's Designee without a full presentation of evidence by Ms. Blackmon-i.e. including the evidence she would have attempted to submit had a continuance been allowed.4 Based upon our above-conclusion regarding Ms. Blackmon's waiver of the continuance issue, and the trial court's inability to consider evidence outside of the administrative record, we likewise find that Ms. Blackmon is notentitled to relief on this issue.
On appeal, the Agency contends that the trial court properly affirmed the decision of the Commissioner's Designee-that Ms. Blackmon's had engaged in work-related misconduct which disqualified her from receiving unemployment compensation benefits-because it was based upon substantial and material evidence and because it had a reasonable basis in the law.
In an appeal from an agency decision regarding unemployment compensation benefits, both the trial court and this Court apply the standard of review set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-7-304(i)(2):
"When the evidentiary basis of a decision involving an unemployment compensation claim is attacked, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-304(i)(2)(D) and (E) direct the courts to review the entire record, including any proof that fairly detracts from the agency's decision, to determine whether it is arbitrary, capricious, characterized by an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial and material evidence." Armstrong v. Neel, 725 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (footnote omitted). The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner's Designee as to the weigh of the evidence on questions of fact, and the decision of the...
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