Blackmon v. LP Pigeon Forge, E2010-01359-COA-R3-CV-FILED
| Decision Date | 25 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. E2010-01359-COA-R3-CV-FILED,E2010-01359-COA-R3-CV-FILED |
| Parties | DENNIS W. BLACKMON, ET AL. v. LP PIGEON FORGE, LLC, ET AL. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sevier County
No. 2009-0258-III Rex Henry Ogle, Judge
This is a nursing home negligence case involving an arbitration agreement. The son of the decedent signed documents admitting his mother to the defendant nursing home. The admission documents included an arbitration agreement. After his mother's death, the son filed a lawsuit on behalf of her estate against the defendant nursing home and others connected to its administration. The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the agreement signed by the son. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the son was not the decedent's agent and did not have authority to sign on her behalf. The defendants appeal. We affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court
Affirmed; Case Remanded
Rebecca Adelman and Peter B. Winterburn, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellants, LP Pigeon Forge, LLC; Signature Consulting Services, LLC; Signature Clinical Consulting Services, LLC; Signature Healthcare, LLC; Jonathan Jack Bowers; Integritas Health Care, LLC; Integritas LTC Practitioners of Tennessee, LLC; Integritas Professional Development Services, LLC; Integritas of Tennessee, LLC; and Kathleen A. Arnold.
Kenneth L. Connor and Camille Godwin, Leesburg, Virginia, and Marty McDonald, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Dennis W. Blackmon, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lois L. Pierce.
Before the decedent, Lois Pierce ("Mother"), was hospitalized on April 7, 2008, the 78-year-old widow had lived alone in her home in Sevierville, Tennessee, for over a decade. During that time, she handled all of her own affairs. She prepared her own meals, transported herself wherever she wanted to go, kept her own checkbook, and handled all of her finances without any assistance.
Mother made the decision to admit herself to Fort Sanders Sevier Medical Center for the care of small sores in her perineal area and adjacent buttock. During her three-day hospitalization, the record reveals that she intelligently interacted with family members and hospital staff. She continued to make her own decisions throughout this hospital stay and, according to the hospital records, was alert and oriented when she left the hospital for the Pigeon Forge Care and Rehabilitation Center ("Facility") on April 10, 2008. Facility is operated by LP Pigeon Forge, LLC (the licensed operator of Facility); Signature Consulting Services, LLC; Signature Clinical Consulting Services, LLC; Signature Healthcare, LLC; Jonathan Jack Bowers; Integritas Health Care, LLC; Integritas LTC Practitioners of Tennessee, LLC; Integritas Professional Development Services, LLC; Integritas of Tennessee, LLC; and Kathleen A. Arnold (collectively "Defendants").
Mother's stay at Facility was expected to be of short duration. It lasted for approximately 20 days. According to the complaint filed in this action by Dennis W. Blackmon ("Son"), acting individually and as the personal representative of Mother's estate, issues arose regarding Mother's declining condition and alleged lack of adequate care. It is alleged that when Mother was removed from Facility and taken to the emergency room, she was found to be suffering from massive infected Stage IV pressure sores. On May 7, 2008, she died when her organs failed as a result of the infections.
In response to the complaint, Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. They relied upon an arbitration agreement signed by Son when Mother was admitted to Facility.
Although Mother was fully capable of making her own decisions on admission to Facility, Defendants did not afford her the opportunity. Son, a local minister, maintains that upon his initial arrival at Facility, he was told that before he could locate and visit his mother, he needed to first speak with Donna Buck, the Social Services Director. According to Son, despite the fact that he made no representation to Ms. Buck about any authority to act on behalf of his mother, she took him to her office to sign documents which she represented were necessary for Medicare to start paying Facility rather than the hospital. Ms. Buck thenproceeded to flip through the pages of the admission documents, placing an "x" beside the blanks she wanted him to sign. Anxious to get to his mother's room and relying on the representations of Ms. Buck, Son felt no need to read the materials and signed where Ms. Buck indicated. Son testified that no further explanation was offered to him, and he did not feel he needed to ask questions in light of the representations made and his understanding that Ms. Buck was a "social worker."
Son testified that he was not provided with copies of any of the documents he signed. His meeting with Ms. Buck lasted about thirty minutes. Unbeknownst to him at the time, among the documents he signed was an agreement waiving Mother's right to a jury trial and agreeing to arbitration in the event of any dispute arising out of her care and treatment in Facility.
Defendants argue that Ms. Buck did not meet with Son to sign the admission documents at issue in this matter. They contend that Son instead met with Todd Heptinstall, Marketing and Admissions Director for Facility. According to the testimony of Mr. Heptinstall, Son, hours prior to his mother's admission, called him about taking care of Mother's admitting paperwork. Mr. Heptinstall stated that Son held himself out as Mother's oldest son. On the strength of that representation, Mr. Heptinstall asked Son to come to Facility and took him through the admission packet (which included the arbitration agreement) and had him sign the various documents. Mr. Heptinstall testified that Son informed him that he was "the executor of [Mother's] affairs"; he admitted, however, that he did not ask for any evidence of Son's authority to act on Mother's behalf. Mr. Heptinstall did claim that he was with Mother three times on the day of her admission and on each occasion, she was "comatose" and unable to interact and communicate.
Mr. Heptinstall testified that he did not explain any of the documents to Son because no questions were asked of him. He claimed that he did read the bolded portion of the arbitration agreement to Son. Interestingly, the examination of Mr. Heptinstall further revealed that his signatures on the documents were not likely made at the same time as those of Son, and that the dates adjacent to the signatures on many of the documents were likely added by a different person on a date after the documents were allegedly signed. Mr. Heptinstall acknowledged that no copies of the admission documents were given to Son or Mother.
Ms. Buck testified that she did not present Son with the admissions paperwork at issue or the arbitration agreement, but did talk with him about other paperwork, including a "Physician Order for Scope of Treatment ("POST") form. On that form, although testifying that she had no recollection of Son, Ms. Buck described him as "son/POA." During her testimony, she related that She testified further as follows:
Ms. Buck admitted that she never discussed admissions issues with Mother. In a social services history, she acknowledged that she had observed Mother, who was alert and could tell person, place, and time, and could communicate her needs.
Son testified that he never met Mr. Heptinstall at any time. He was adamant that Mr. Heptinstall did not go through the admissions documents with him. Son notes that the only male employee he ever met at Facility was defendant Jon Bower, the administrator, during a meeting at Facility to discuss concerns about Mother's care.
According to Son, he never considered a 1991 durable power of attorney that his mother had executed sixteen years earlier in California, as the purposes for that document had long since been accomplished. Defendants, however, having discovered the existence of the power of attorney, argue that Son was Mother's duly authorized attorney-in-fact, eventhough Facility, at the time of Mother's admission, was unaware of the existence of the power of attorney and the original of the document has never been located.
The arbitration agreement included in the admissions paperwork reads as follows:
RESIDENT AND FACILITY ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
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PLEASE READ CAREFULLY
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