Blacknall v. Heckler, 82-4546

Citation721 F.2d 1179
Decision Date17 October 1983
Docket NumberNo. 82-4546,82-4546
Parties, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 15,094 Jack BLACKNALL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, * Secretary of Health & Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Douglas E. Jaffe, Sacramento, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.

Dennis J. Mulshine, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.

Before WALLACE, PREGERSON, and NORRIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) denied Blacknall's request for disability insurance benefits. Blacknall alleged that he was unable to work because of a lower back disc injury and psychiatric impairments. After a modification, the district court adopted the Magistrate's Proposed Findings and Recommendations on review of the Secretary's ruling, granting summary judgment for the Secretary. We affirm.

In reviewing a denial of a disability claim, we must affirm if the Secretary's findings are supported by substantial evidence and the Secretary applied the proper legal standards. Thompson v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 936 (9th Cir.1982); Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653 (9th Cir.1978).

First, Blacknall argues that the Secretary misapplied the law by relying on the medical-vocational grid in making the disability determination because Blacknall had nonexertional, as well as exertional, limitations. Therefore, he claims it was error for the Secretary to have found that Blacknall had a residual functional capacity for light work, because his non-exertional limitations greatly diminished the range of light work he could do. We disagree.

The Medical-Vocational Guidelines explicitly provide that:

[W]here an individual has ... [a] ... combination of impairments resulting in both strength limitations and nonexertional limitations, the rules in this subpart are considered in determining first whether a finding of disabled may be possible based on the strength limitations alone and, if not, the rule(s) reflecting the individual's maximum residual strength capabilities, age, education, and work experience provide a framework for consideration of how much the individual's work capability is further diminished in terms of any types of jobs that would be contraindicated by the nonexertional limitations.

20 C.F.R. Appendix 2, Sec. 200.00(e)(2). The section also requires that full consideration be given to all relevant facts of the case. See also 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1520 (outlining factors involved in evaluation of disability generally).

The Secretary's determination that Blacknall was not disabled on the basis of exertional limitations alone is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is legally not improper. The ALJ considered medical reports from orthopedists indicating that the exertional limitations from Blacknall's degenerative disc disease did not preclude work not involving heavy lifting. That substantial evidence also supports the holding as to Blacknall's residual functional capacity and his ability to do light work...

To continue reading

Request your trial
75 cases
  • Flaten v. Secretary of Health & Human Services
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • January 17, 1995
    ...404.1564, 404.1569 and 404, subpt. P, app. 2, tbl. 1, rule 201.19. Use of the guidelines was appropriate here. See Blacknall v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 1179, 1180-81 (9th Cir.1983). Therefore, we find that substantial evidence supports the Secretary's conclusion that Flaten, though physically imp......
  • Weather v. Astrue
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of New York
    • December 27, 2012
    ...expert.” Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 410 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 605 (2d Cir.1986) ; Blacknall v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir.1983) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, the ‘mere existence of a nonexertional impairment does not automatica......
  • Weather v. Astrue, 6:11–CV–00890 (LEK/VEB).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of New York
    • December 27, 2012
    ...expert.” Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 410 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 605 (2d Cir.1986); Blacknall v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir.1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, the ‘mere existence of a nonexertional impairment does not automaticall......
  • Durakovic v. Colvin, 3:12-CV-6 (FJS)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of New York
    • March 31, 2014
    ..."'significantly limit the range of work permitted by his exertional limitations.'" Id. at 605 (quoting Blacknall v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). Accordingly, the ALJ must determine on a case-by-case basis the application of the grid guidelines and the necessit......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Bohr's Social Security Issues Annotated - Volume II
    • May 4, 2015
    ...Jan. 31, 2012), 7th-12, 7th-13 Blacha v. Sec. of HHS , 927 F.2d 228, 231 (6th Cir. 1990), §§ 205.8, 205.9, 1205 Blacknall v. Heckler , 721 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1983), 2d-10 Black v. Apfel , 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998), 8th-10, §§ 202.7, 203.1, 203.17, 204.2, 204.9, 205.2, 205.9, ......
  • Table of cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Social Security Issues Annotated. Vol. II - 2014 Contents
    • August 3, 2014
    ...Jan. 31, 2012), 7th-12, 7th-13 Blacha v. Sec. of HHS , 927 F.2d 228, 231 (6th Cir. 1990), §§ 205.8, 205.9, 1205 Blacknall v. Heckler , 721 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1983), 2d-10 Black v. Apfel , 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998), 8th-10, §§ 202.7, 203.1, 203.17, 204.2, 204.9, 205.2, 205.9, ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT