Blackshear v. Clark
| Decision Date | 17 August 1978 |
| Citation | 391 A.2d 747 |
| Parties | Charles BLACKSHEAR, M.D., Defendant below, Appellant, v. Elena M. CLARK and William P. Clark, Jr., her husband, Plaintiffs below, Appellees, and Thomas R. Brooks, M.D., Defendant below, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.
F. Alton Tybout, of Tybout & Redfearn, P. A., Wilmington, for defendant-appellant.
Gerald Z. Berkowitz, of Knecht, Greenstein & Berkowitz, Wilmington, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before DUFFY and McNEILLY, JJ., and HARTNETT, Vice Chancellor.
This appeal brings up for review an order of the Superior Court in a medical malpractice action denying a motion by defendant, Dr. Charles Blackshear, for summary judgment.
Essentially, the issue involves a construction of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act, 10 Del.C. S 6301, etc. All of the pertinent facts and much if not all of the decisional law are found in Judge Taylor's full opinion, Del.Super., 377 A.2d 365 (1977), to which reference is made.
Briefly, Elena M. Clark (plaintiff) contends that Dr. Blackshear, a senior resident employed by the Wilmington Medical Center, was negligent in performing surgery upon her. Plaintiff settled her claim against the Center. Thereafter, this action was filed against Dr. Blackshear and against Dr. Thomas R. Brooks, a staff surgeon supervisor of surgery. The terms of a release executed by plaintiff as part of the settlement with the Center are the focal point of the present controversy. Specifically, the issue is whether the claim against Dr. Blackshear as an employee of the Center was preserved, or whether it has been discharged by the release.
The Superior Court concluded that the release does not bar plaintiff's claim and that it does not interfere with indemnity rights. Restatement of Agency, 2d 359B.
In this appeal, defendant makes two contentions. The first is that when the liability of a master (Wilmington Medical Center) is derived solely from the negligence of its servant (Dr. Blackshear), the Center and the Doctor are not "joint tort-feasors" and a release of the Center also released the Doctor. The second contention is that, in any event, the release is sufficiently broad in its terms to release Dr. Blackshear.
10 Del.C. § 6301 provides:
"For the purposes of this chapter, 'joint tort-feasors' means 2 or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them."
In our opinion, the language of this statute clearly covers both the Doctor and the Center in this case; Dr. Blackshear would be liable as the tort-feasor and the Center would be liable as the employer. Thus, these "2 . . . persons . . . (are) severally liable in tort for the same injury." The Basis Of liability is not relevant, nor is the relationship among those liable for the tort. In short, it makes no difference whether the Center's liability is based upon the doctrine of Respondeat superior or any other legal concept. The point is that both it and the Doctor are (at least) "severally" liable for the same injury to plaintiff. Therefore, the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act applies. We so hold. *
10 Del.C. § 6304, which relates to the release of one joint tort-feasor, provides in part:
"(a) A release by the injured person of one joint...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Tebo v. Havlik
...theory of liability is not a prerequisite to contribution. Clark v. Brooks, 377 A.2d 365 (Del.Super.1977), aff'd sub nom. Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747 (Del.1978); Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 386 Mass. 95, 434 N.E.2d 1008 (1982); White v. McKenzie Electric Cooperative, Inc., 225 F.Supp. 94......
-
Woodrum v. Johnson
...liable for the same injury to the plaintiff. Therefore, the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act applies. Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747, 748 (Del. 1978).25 Similar reasoning was employed in applying a statute containing the "liable in tort" definition in Wrenn v. Maria Parham Hos......
-
Yates v. New South Pizza, Ltd.
...Van Cleave's injury, the Uniform Act applies."). Accord Harris v. Aluminum Co. of America, 550 F.Supp. 1024 (W.D.Va.1982); Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747 (Del.1978) (interpreting the 1939 version of the Act); Smith v. Raparot, 101 R.I. 565, 225 A.2d 666 (1967) (interpreting the 1939 vers......
-
In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig.
...(“The most startling change made by [DUCATA] was to provide a remedy of contribution among tortfeasors.”), aff'd sub nom. Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747 (Del.1978) ; Lutz v. Boltz, 100 A.2d 647, 647 (Del.Super.1953) (“Prior to 1949, no right of contribution existed between joint tortfeas......