Blackwell v. Barton

• Decision Date: 23 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 91-4679,91-4679
• Citation: 34 F.3d 298
• Parties: Mindy Michelle BLACKWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Benny BARTON, sued individually and in his official capacity, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 298

34 F.3d 298

Mindy Michelle BLACKWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Benny BARTON, sued individually and in his official

capacity, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 91-4679.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 23, 1994.

Anthony G. Brocato, Jr., James Standiter Ludlum, Jr., Ludlum & Ludlum, Austin, TX, for appellant.

Curtis Bradley Stuckey, Stuckey & Garrigan, Nocogdoches, TX, for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before GARWOOD, DAVIS and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant Mindy Michelle Blackwell (Blackwell) sued defendant-appellant Benny Barton (Barton) asserting constitutional and state law violations arising from an allegedly illegal arrest and subsequent detention. Barton appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment in which he claimed that he was shielded from personal liability on the constitutional claims by the defense of qualified immunity. We reverse the denial of his motion for summary judgment and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Facts and Proceedings Below

On December 3, 1990, Barton, a peace officer investigating "hot checks" for the Nacogdoches County, Texas, District Attorney's Office, sought to arrest a Melinda K. Allen (Allen) on an outstanding warrant. Barton knew that Allen worked in health spas and went by the name "Mindy." He went to the Ultra Fit Health Club in Nacogdoches, Texas, where, unbeknownst to him, plaintiff Blackwell taught aerobics. Barton asked a receptionist if he could speak to "Mindy." The receptionist replied that "Mindy" was teaching a class but would be out soon. Barton waited.

After she finished working, Blackwell approached Barton and identified herself as "Mindy." According to Barton, her appearance was substantially similar to the physical description of Allen that he had received from his dispatcher. ¹ Barton requested that she accompany him, which she did. Outside the spa, he informed her that she had $1,000 in outstanding checks. Blackwell protested. According to her, she told Barton, "I had not signed any hot checks." She gave him her driver's license, which he put in his pocket, apparently without looking at it. Barton asked her to follow him in her car to the county law enforcement center. She did so.

When Barton and Blackwell arrived at the law enforcement center, two jailers greeted them who knew Blackwell. The name Melinda Allen was mentioned, and Blackwell then informed Barton that her name was not Melinda. When he had confirmed this information, he escorted Blackwell to her car. While Barton does not contend that he did not arrest or detain Blackwell, he asserts without contradiction that she was never handcuffed, finger-printed, photographed, booked, or placed in a holding cell. Barton estimated, and Blackwell does not dispute, that twenty-five minutes elapsed from the time he met Blackwell at the health spa to the time she was allowed to leave the police station; no more than ten minutes of that time was spent at the law enforcement center (Blackwell says she was there "a few minutes").

Blackwell sued Barton, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging that he unlawfully arrested and detained her in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. In addition, she asserted pendent state law claims for false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. ² Blackwell sought compensatory damages of $60,000, as well as punitive damages and attorneys' fees.

Barton filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by his affidavit describing the events in question, asserting that Blackwell had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that he was shielded from personal liability on the constitutional claims by the defense of qualified immunity. Blackwell filed a motion for partial summary judgment limited to the issue of Barton's liability for arresting her without probable cause. Blackwell's motion was supported by her affidavit, which does not materially contradict Barton's, and an affidavit of an individual who said he knew both Blackwell and Allen and that they do not look alike, having different color hair and eyes and different skin tone and facial features. Analyzing the motions under Fourteenth Amendment due process cases, the district court denied both motions, concluding that the evidence created a question of fact for the jury. The court reasoned that a reasonable jury could find either that Barton acted in reckless disregard of the possibility that he was arresting the wrong person or that his conduct did not rise to the level of negligence necessary for personal liability. Finally, the court held that Blackwell failed to plead facts sufficient to support a section 1983 action against Barton in his official capacity and dismissed that portion of her complaint.

Barton timely appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, as the district court's denial of Barton's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, to the extent it turns on a question of law, is deemed a final judgment for purposes of appeal. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 498 n. 3 (5th Cir.1991).

Discussion

I. Standard of Review

We review the district court's denial of summary judgment for Barton de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 819 (5th Cir.1993). Thus, summary judgment for Barton is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and if Barton is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Brewer, 3 F.3d at 819. As Barton asserted his entitlement to qualified immunity in a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the burden was on Blackwell to come forward with summary judgment evidence sufficient to sustain a determination that Barton's actions violated clearly established federal law. Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 304, 306 (5th Cir.1992). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Blackwell, the nonmovant.

The first inquiry in the examination of a defendant's claim of qualified immunity is whether the plaintiff alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991). The second inquiry is to determine whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. State officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violate a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of their conduct. Pfannstiel v. Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir.1990).

II. Constitutional Violation

The standard in this Circuit for addressing section 1983 claims arising from allegedly unlawful arrests based on mistaken identity is not readily ascertainable from our prior decisions, for in similar contexts we have turned to both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fourth Amendment establishes the right to be secure against unreasonable seizures and provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause. Blackwell asserts violations of both Amendments in her complaint.

In addressing the propriety of Barton's actions, the district court relied on Fourteenth Amendment due process cases, discussing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986), and Herrera v. Millsap, 862 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir.1989). In Daniels, faced with a claim by an inmate in a city jail who slipped on a pillow negligently left on a stairway by a prison deputy, the Supreme Court concluded "that the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property." 474 U.S. at 328, 106 S.Ct. at 663 (original emphasis).

In Herrera v. Millsap, this Court applied the holding of Daniels to a case of mistaken arrest. 862 F.2d at 1160. A police officer investigating a theft was told that "Gerald Herrera" was the perpetrator of the crime. In police records and in the case submitted to a grand jury, however, the name of the perpetrator was mistakenly given as that of "Gerardo Herrera," the plaintiff. The grand jury indicted Gerardo Herrera, and an arrest warrant issued under that name. Gerardo Herrera was arrested pursuant to the warrant and incarcerated several days before the mistake was discovered. In considering Gerardo Herrera's claim for false arrest and incarceration, this Court concluded that the evidence showed, at most, negligence, and we affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Id. The Herrera Court did not apply Fourth Amendment analysis; in that case, however, unlike the present appeal, the wrongdoing was not of the arresting officers but a result of misinformation given to the grand jury.

The Fourth Amendment controlled this Court's decision in Brown v. Byer, 870 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.1989), decided approximately three months after Herrera. In Brown, a deputy constable received arrest warrants for a "Tamie Brown." The officer decided to write upon the warrants the name of "Tammy Brown," the plaintiff. The officer deliberately altered the driver's license number, address, appearance, and date of birth to match information applicable to Tammy Brown. The altered warrants were then entered into the computer system in the area where the plaintiff lived, leading to her arrest several months later when she was stopped for a traffic offense. We determined that the jury was justified in finding the officer who had altered the warrant knew the plaintiff was not the person named in warrant and affirmed judgment for the plaintiff against that officer. 870 F.2d at 979.

On the basis of Daniels and Herrera, the district court determined that the evidence created a fact question for the jury: whether Barton's...