Blackwell v. Franchi
| Decision Date | 20 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | COA: 328929,SC: 159491 |
| Citation | 940 N.W.2d 58 (Mem) |
| Parties | Susan BLACKWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dean FRANCHI and Debra Franchi, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 14, 2019 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
I concur in the majority’s decision to deny leave because I am not persuaded the Court of Appeals’ opinion merits further review.
The plaintiff was a guest at a holiday party hosted by the defendants in their home when she entered an unlit room and was injured from falling down an eight-inch step. We asked the Court of Appeals to consider whether the defendants had a duty to warn the plaintiff about the step. Blackwell v. Franchi , 502 Mich. 918, 914 N.W.2d 900 (2018). The majority concluded there was a general duty to warn the plaintiff of a dangerous condition on their property and that whether the defendants breached that duty by failing to warn about an eight-inch step down in a dark room was a question for the jury to decide. Blackwell v. Franchi (On Remand) , 327 Mich. App. 354, 357, 933 N.W.2d 762 (2019).
Our common law and the Restatement of Torts support the panel’s unremarkable holding as to duty. As property owners, the defendants’ duty to licensees is well settled: they have a duty to warn of conditions on their property that involve an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees when they should expect that their licensees will not discover or realize the danger. Preston v. Sleziak , 383 Mich. 442, 453, 175 N.W.2d 759 (1970), citing Restatement Torts, 2d, § 342, overruled in part on other grounds by Stitt v. Holland Abundant Life Fellowship , 462 Mich. 591, 614 N.W.2d 88 (2000).
Moning defined "general standard of care" as "reasonable conduct ‘in light of the apparent risk,’ " differentiating it from duty, which it defined as a "legal obligation." Moning , 400 Mich. at 438, 254 N.W.2d 759. Modern negligence doctrine (including our own) more commonly uses the term "duty" to refer to the general standard of care. See, e.g., Riddle v. McLouth Steel Products Corp. , 440 Mich. 85, 96, 485 N.W.2d 676 (1992) (). And Moning ’s reference to the "specific standard of care," or whether the defendants’ specific conduct met the "general standard of care," is more commonly referred to as "breach." Moning , 400 Mich. at 438, 443, 254 N.W.2d 759.1
The Court of Appeals majority held that the defendants had a general duty to warn and that the specific standard of care (or whether the defendants’ actions fell below the general standard of care) should be determined by a jury. Blackwell (On Remand) , 327 Mich. App. at 358, 933 N.W.2d 762, citing Case v. Consumers Power Co. , 463 Mich. 1, 7, 615 N.W.2d 17 (2000). In other words, the defendants owed a duty to warn the plaintiff about a dangerous condition on the property that they could expect she would not discover. Whether the defendants’ failure to warn of this particular condition was a breach of that duty, the panel also held, was a question of fact. This was not clear error.
Whether the specific hazard here—an eight-inch step into a dark room—qualifies as the kind of danger that should come with a warning is question about which reasonable people could disagree. The dissent thinks this Court should decide that it is not a danger that needs to come with a warning as a matter of law, citing Garret v. W. S. Butterfield Theatres , 261 Mich. 262, 246 N.W. 57 (1933) and Bertrand v. Alan Ford, Inc. , 449 Mich. 606, 537 N.W.2d 185 (1995), for support. In other words, the dissent believes a court should decide this particular question of breach as a matter of law. But neither case the dissent cites supports its view that the fact-bound question here can be decided as a matter of law.
Garret was an ordinary negligence case, and it was not decided on a motion for summary disposition—instead, it was reversed after a jury verdict.
Garret , 261 Mich. at 264, 246 N.W. 57. And the hazards have very little in common—in Garret , the step was four and a half inches (not eight) and the room the plaintiff stepped into was brightly lit. Id. at 263, 246 N.W. 57.2
Bertrand consolidated two cases after separate trial courts granted summary disposition for defendants finding no genuine issues of material fact after plaintiffs alleged injuries caused by falling down steps. Bertrand , 449 Mich. at 609, 537 N.W.2d 185. In one, a plaintiff fell down the second of two six- or seven-inch outdoor steps around noon, which she alleged was only dangerous because she " ‘just did not see it.’ " Id. at 619, 537 N.W.2d 185. The plaintiff thus did not present any facts supporting that the step posed an unreasonable risk of harm, and this Court held that her claim was therefore properly dismissed by a judge because no jury could have found otherwise. In the other, this Court held there was a genuine issue of material fact because the step—which was clearly marked with yellow paint across its entire top corner—may have created an unreasonable risk of harm because of its placement near a vending machine and because of the way a nearby door hinged. Id. at 624, 537 N.W.2d 185. In other words, we decided that the question of whether the failure to warn of this particular step’s danger was a question for the fact-finder. Id. at 624-625, 537 N.W.2d 185.
The unique facts in each of those cases (the premises cases and the ordinary negligence cases) and their holdings support the Court of Appeals’ holding here. The plaintiff was injured when she entered a dark room and fell because she was surprised by an eight-inch step down. The plaintiff thus pled facts showing a more unique danger than an ordinary step encountered not in the dark. Whether the defendants should have warned her about it—whether they breached their duty—is a question for the fact-finder.
The Court of Appeals applied settled law to facts to determine that while there is a duty to warn a licensee of unreasonable dangers that are not discoverable upon casual inspection, there is a question of fact whether the defendants’ failure to warn the plaintiff about this particular hazard breached that duty. There is nothing incorrect or remarkable about that holding.
Viviano, J., joins the statement of McCormack, C.J.
Plaintiff attended an informal Christmas party hosted by defendants at their home. When plaintiff arrived, she was directed by one of the defendants to place her purse in a small room adjoining the garage, commonly known as a "mudroom." Notwithstanding that the room was dark, and that there was a light switch immediately adjacent to the entranceway, plaintiff proceeded into the room without turning on the light or otherwise seeking to ascertain whether it was safe to enter. Plaintiff lost her balance and fell when she set foot into the room, which was about eight inches lower than the adjoining hallway.
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