Blackwell v. State
| Decision Date | 09 November 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 45,45 |
| Citation | 365 A.2d 545,278 Md. 466 |
| Parties | Anthony Lee BLACKWELL, Sr. v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
George E. Burns, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, and Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore (Arnold M. Zerwitz and Elsbeth L. Bothe, Asst. Public Defenders, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.
Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., and Deborah K. Handel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore , for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and ORTH, JJ.
Whether Maryland's death penalty statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution is the principal issue presented in this case.
Anthony Lee Blackwell, Sr., was charged in the Criminal Court of Baltimore in separate indictments with having, on July 17, 1975, 'feloniously, wilfully and of deliberately premeditated malice aforethought' murdered six persons, and with having, on the same date, committed arson by burning a designated dwelling house. The State sought the imposition of the death penalty, as authorized by chapter 252 of the Laws of Maryland of 1975, now codified as Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Pepl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 413. That statute provides, in subsection (a) that every person convicted of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to life imprisonment 'unless otherwise provided' in subsection (b). Subsection (b) mandates the imposition of the death penalty for first degree murder if (1) the accused actually committed an act which proximately caused the victim's death, (2) the accused was 18 years of age or older at the time the crime was committed, and (3) the murder was committed 'under one or more of the following circumstances':
'(i) The defendant committed the murder at a time when he was confined or under sentence of confinement to any correctional institution in this State;
(ii) The defendant committed the murder in furtherance of an attempt to escape from or evade the lawful custody, arrest, or detention of or by a law-enforcement officer, correctional officer, or guard (iii) The victim was a hostage taken or attempted to be taken in the course of a kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap;
(iv) The victim was a child abducted in violation of § 2 of this article;
(v) The defendant committed the murder pursuant to an agreement or contract to commit the murder for pecuniary gain;
(vi) At the time of the murder, the defendant was under a sentence of life imprisonment;
(vii) The defendant committed more than one offense of murder in the first degree arising out of the same or separate incidents;
(viii) The defendant committed the murder while committing or attempting to commit robbery.' (Emphasis added.)
The murder indictments returned against Blackwell contained averments, required by § 616(b) of Art. 27 in instances where the death penalty is sought, that each offense came within the provisions of § 413(b). Specifically, it was charged in each murder indictment that Blackwell was 'the person who actually committed an act which proximately cause(d) the victim's death, that at the time of the commission of the act, . . . (he) was eighteen years of age, or older, and that at the time of the murder, the defendant committed more than one offense of murder in the first degree arising out of the same incident.'
At Blackwell's trial before a jury, evidence was adduced showing that on the evening of July 16, 1975, he visited the Baltimore City residence of a former girl friend, Jonline Gwynn. Sometime during that evening, Jonline took some money from Blackwell and refused to return it. As a result, Blackwell left Jonline's residence in anger and sought police assistance to recover his money.
At 3 A.M. on July 17, Blackwell returned to Jonline's residence with a police officer and awoke the household. Jonline denied that she had taken any of Blackwell's money the officer told Blackwell to leave the house, which he did, saying 'I'll be back to burn the bitch down.'
Blackwell thereafter obtained a plastic jug full of gasoline and returned to Jonline's residence at 4:20 A.M. He filled three glass bottles with gasoline and into each he stuffed a makeshift wick. He lit the wick of one of the bottles and threw the bottle through the front window of the house; the house caught on fire. Blackwell then lit the wicks of the other two bottles and also threw them into the dwelling. Thirteen people were sleeping in the house at the time of the fire; seven escaped while the remaining six died in the burning house from breathing smoke, soot and carbon monoxide.
Blackwell was apprehended by police a few blocks from the scene of the fire. In a written statement given to the police that same morning, Blackwell admitted that he had set the fire by throwing three 'gas bombs' into the dwelling.
Six character witnesses testified on Blackwell's behalf. Each testified that Blackwell was generally regarded as a peaceful, quiet young man with a spotless record as a worker and job corps participant.
Blackwell testified on his own behalf. He said that in starting the fire he intended only to force Jonline out of the home. He admitted knowing that a number of people were in the dwelling when he threw the three 'molotov cocktails' through the window, but he denied any intent to harm them.
The jury found Blackwell guilty of six first degree murders and of arson. He was sentenced to death by the court, and to thirty years' imprisonment, to run consecutively, on the arson count.
On appeal, Blackwell challenges the constitutionality of § 413 and of the death penalty imposed upon him under its provisions. He also contends (1) that the court erred in its instructions to the jury, (2) that the court committed reversible error in sustaining an objection to the opening argument of his defense counsel, and (3) that certain of the prosecutor's comments during the State's closing argument were so prejudicial as to deny him a fair trial.
Constitutionality of the Maryland death penalty.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in six cases decided in July of 1976, considered whether the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of murder constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution.
The Court upheld the death penalty statutes of Georgia, Gregg v. Georgia, -- U.S. --, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859; Texas, Jurek v. Texas, -- U.S. --, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929; and Florida, Proffitt v. Florida, -- U.S. --, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 19 L.Ed.2d 913. In each of these states, the capital sentencing statutes called for a bifurcated trial procedure, guilt and punishment being separately determined, and for expedited appellate review. Imposition of the death penalty was limited to cases in which certain aggravating circumstances were shown and, most significantly, the sentencing authority was required to consider the existence of mitigating circumstances. Such a requirement, it was held, 'guides and focuses the . . . (sentencing authority's) objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individual offense and the individual offender before it can impose a sentence of death.' Jurek v. Texas, -- U.S. at --, 96 S.Ct. at 2057, 49 L.Ed.2d at 939.
The Court struck down as unconstitutional the death penalty statutes of North Carolina, Woodson v. North Carolina, -- U.S. --, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944; Louisiana, Roberts v. Louisiana, -- U.S. --, 96 S.Ct. at 2957, 49 L.Ed.2d at 939. Oklahoma, Green v. Oklahoma, mem., -- U.S. --, 96 S.Ct. 3216, 49 L.Ed.2d 1214. What was primarily lacking in the statutes of each of these states was '. . . the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment, . . . (which) requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.' Woodson v. North Carolina, --, U.S. at --, 96 S Ct. at 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d at 961. Since none of the capital sentencing statutes in these states required particularized consideration of such mitigating circumstances and otherwise failed to provide any 'objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death,' Woodson v. North Carolina, -- U.S. at --, 96 S.Ct. at 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d at 960, the statutes were found violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution.
As heretofore indicated, the Maryland death penalty statute limits the imposition of the death sentence to eight narrowly drawn categories of first degree murder in cases where the accused actually committed an act which proximately caused the victim's death and where he was at least 18 years of age when the crime was committed. The statute does not provide any other standards whereby the sentencing authority can consider the individual circumstances or characteristics of either the offense or the offender; indeed, all those convicted under the statute are treated alike, without regard to the circumstances. The statute does not provide for a bifurcated trial whereby aggravating and mitigating circumstances can be specially presented, nor does it provide for any special or expedited appellate procedure to review the imposition of the death sentence. 1
The Attorney General suggests that the 'key factor' in a constitutional capital sentencing system is a provision giving the sentencing authority the duty and opportunity objectively to consider aggravating as well as mitigating circumstances 'which lead to consideration of both the individual offense as well as the individual offender.' He notes, with commendable candor, that while § 413 permits the sentencing authority to focus on the...
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