Lansdowne v. State

• Decision Date: 29 February 1980
• Docket Number: No. 62,62
• Citation: 287 Md. 232,412 A.2d 88
• Parties: Calvin LANSDOWNE v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 232

287 Md. 232

412 A.2d 88

Calvin LANSDOWNE v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 62.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 29, 1980.

Martha Weisheit, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Bonnie A. Travieso, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, ORTH, ^* COLE and DAVIDSON, JJ.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

This case presents two questions. The first question is whether, under Maryland Rules 757(b) and 757(d), a trial judge, in a criminal case, must, if requested by the accused, include an explanation of the term "reasonable doubt" in instructions to the jury. The second question is whether a trial judge who has explained the term "reasonable doubt" in preliminary remarks to the jury made at the beginning of a trial, commits reversible error by refusing the accused's request to explain that term again after the close of the evidence.

Maryland Rule 757(b) provides in pertinent part:

"The court may, and at the request of any party shall, give those advisory instructions to the jury as correctly state the applicable law. . . . The court need not grant any requested instruction if the matter is fairly covered by the instructions actually given." (Emphasis added.)

Maryland Rule 757(d) provides in pertinent part:

"The court may give its instructions at any time after the close of the evidence."

The appellant, Calvin Lansdowne (accused), was charged under indictment # 20393 with statutory daytime housebreaking and receiving stolen goods under $100, and under indictment # 20394 with statutory daytime housebreaking, receiving stolen goods under $100, and receiving stolen goods over $100. At the beginning of a jury trial held in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, before opening statements and before any evidence was presented, the trial judge made extensive preliminary remarks to the jury, including, in pertinent part, the following:

"As you know, this is a criminal case. In such cases the law presumes every man innocent of crime, and this presumption starts with the accusation and continues to the rendition of your verdict. Because of this presumption, the law casts the burden of proof upon the State of Maryland to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact material to the guilt of the Defendant.

"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt means such proof as produces an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge, and unless the jury are thus convinced, they must acquit. However, this does not mean the State is required to prove its case to an absolute or mathematical certainty, for there are few things in life susceptible of such proof.

"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is simply such proof as convinces you of the truth of a fact to the extent that you would be willing to act upon such conviction without hesitation in an important matter in your own private business affairs."

After the trial judge's preliminary remarks were concluded, the State presented circumstantial evidence to show that the alleged crimes had been committed, and that the accused was the person who had committed them. The accused did not himself testify and did not present any other evidence. Approximately six hours later, after the close of the evidence, the trial judge instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:

"Please keep in mind the preliminary instructions that I gave you earlier today. I am not going to repeat them.

"It is the burden of the State, as I told you earlier, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the offenses which have been charged."

Thereafter, the following colloquy took place at the bench:

"MR. BERNSTEIN (Defense Counsel): (I) would ask the Court to specifically give an instruction with respect to the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as the Court did, I realize, at the beginning of the trial, but I would ask the Court to give it now as a part of these instructions to the jury at this time.

"MR. SAVAGE (State's Attorney): I think the Court has covered it initially in its preliminary instructions. I think the Court has in its preliminary instructions indicated that the burden of proving each one of the elements of the various counts in the indictment I think the Court has gone over it sufficiently to this point, but I will again leave that to the discretion of the Court.

"THE COURT: All right, I am going to advise the jury that it has been brought to my attention that I have not specifically refreshed their recollection about my earlier instruction on the burden of proof and that I will call their attention to what I told them this morning."

The trial judge then addressed the following remarks to the jury:

"THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, it has been properly called to my attention that in reviewing what I had given you by way of previous instructions that I had not called your attention specifically to what I told you this morning about the burden of proof, that it is on the State, and that you recall that I told you that they must establish beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the offense and that I described that burden of proof and how you can conclude whether or not you have evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and I do ask you to recall what I told you this morning and keep that in mind. That is the burden that must be met." (Emphasis added.)

At a further bench conference, the following discussion took place:

"MR. BERNSTEIN: I want to ask, Your Honor, that you give more than that. I mean, tell them what that that was six hours ago.

"THE COURT: Well, counsel, you are both going to tell them what it is now. You are going to quote me, and I am going to let it go at that.

"MR. BERNSTEIN: Okay, I would like to note an exception."

The accused was found guilty of statutory daytime housebreaking and receiving stolen goods under $100, and was sentenced to consecutive terms of four years and one year respectively. He appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. In an unreported opinion, Lansdowne v. State, No. 627, September Term, 1978, filed 8 May 1979, that Court determined that a trial judge, even when requested by the accused, was not required to give an explanation of the term "reasonable doubt." It held that whether to give that explanation was a matter within the trial judge's discretion and that in the instant case the trial judge had not abused his discretion. Consequently, it affirmed the convictions. The appellant sought and was granted a writ of certiorari by this Court. We shall reverse.

The initial question to be considered is whether a trial judge is required to give a requested instruction which correctly states the applicable law, and which has not been fairly covered in instructions actually given. Maryland Constitution, Art. IV, § 18 authorized this Court to prescribe rules governing pleadings and other proceedings in equity. Chapter 684 of the 1927 Laws of Maryland, effective 1 June 1927, authorized this Court to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure governing actions at law. Chapter 719 of the 1939 Laws of Maryland, effective 1 June 1939, authorized this Court to prescribe such rules governing all civil actions, whether at law or in equity. That Act specifically provided that any such rules should not "apply to practice and procedure in criminal cases." Under these circumstances, this Court consistently held that in a criminal trial, whether to give a requested instruction, which correctly stated the applicable law and which had not actually been given, was a matter within the trial judge's discretion. Slansky v. State, 192 Md. 94, 107-08, 63 A.2d 599, 604-05 (1949); Esterline v. State, 105 Md. 629, 636, 66 A. 269, 272 (1907); Broll v. State, 45 Md. 356, 360 (1876).

Maryland Constitution, Art. IV, § 18A, ¹ ratified 7 November 1944, authorized this Court to prescribe rules of practice and procedure governing criminal cases. State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 69, 51 A.2d 647, 650 (1947). Part IV of the General Rules of Practice and Procedure, § I, Criminal Rules of Practice and Procedure, became effective 1 January 1950. See Fifth Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Maryland Rule 6, the predecessor of Md.Rule 757(b), ² provided in pertinent part:

"The Court may and at the request of any party shall grant such advisory instructions to the jury as may correctly state the applicable law." ³ (Emphasis added.)

Thereafter, this Court and the Court of Special Appeals, in a series of cases, consistently held that the word "shall," expressly employed in Rule 757(b), made that rule mandatory. E. g., Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 477, 365 A.2d 545, 551, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918, 97 S.Ct. 2183, 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1976); Christensen v. State, 274 Md. 133, 136-41, 333 A.2d 45, 47-49 (1975); Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 385, 183 A.2d 359, 366 (1962); Hardison v. State, 226 Md. 53, 60-62, 172 A.2d 407, 411 (1961); Brown v. State, 222 Md. 290, 296-97, 159 A.2d 844, 847 (1960); Bruce v. State, 218 Md. 87, 97, 145 A.2d 428, 433 (1958). See In re James S., 286 Md. 702, 703, 410 A.2d 586, 586 (1980); State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 334, 403 A.2d 356, 368 (1979). These cases establish that under Md. Rule 757(b) a trial judge is required to give a requested instruction which correctly states the applicable law and which has not been fairly covered in instructions actually given, and that the failure to give such an instruction constitutes error.

Here, the accused requested an instruction explaining "reasonable doubt." In order to decide whether the trial judge was required to give such an instruction, we must determine whether it was applicable, correct, and not fairly covered by instructions actually given.

The reasonable doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal...