Bladen v. Philadelphia

• Decision Date: 04 March 1869
• Citation: 60 Pa. 464
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: Bladen <I>versus</I> Philadelphia.

Page 464

60 Pa. 464

Bladen versus Philadelphia.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

February 4, 1869.

March 4, 1869.

February 4th 1869.

Before THOMPSON, C. J., AGNEW, SHARSWOOD and WILLIAMS, J. READ, J., at Nisi Prius.

Error to the District Court of Philadelphia: No. 442, to January Term 1868 D. W. Sellers, for plaintiff in error.

J. Lynd, for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered, March 4th 1869, by SHARSWOOD, J.

The control of the city councils over all the departments of the municipal government of Philadelphia, in the matter of the disbursements of money, as well for work done and materials furnished, as for the salaries and wages of officers and employees, was finally settled by the judgments of this court in The City v. Flanigen, 11 Wright 21, and The City v. Johnson, Id. 382. Both those decisions were contrary to and in reversal of my own ruling in the court below; but I am bound in candor to say, that subsequent reflection has satisfied me that I was in error, and the Supreme Court were right. But if I were otherwise, I would be none the less obliged to conform my present judgment to the principles authoritatively established in those cases.

To distinguish this case from them would be to make a distinction where there is no difference. It is said as to The City v. Flanigen, that the receiver of taxes was an officer wholly municipal; but this a mistake, as he was then charged with the collection of state as well as city taxes. As to The City v. Johnson, it is argued, that the specific salary of the teacher suing was not limited, but the provision of the ordinance was, that a certain amount only should be appropriated for the salaries of teachers, with a direction that the controllers should scale the salaries accordingly — a circumstance which, if it has any weight at all, makes this case stronger than that; for here there was a specific appropriation of a certain sum for the payment of the plaintiff in error. His learned and acute counsel, who could not fail to discover a distinction if any existed, after this faint effort in his printed argument in that direction, fairly abandoned it, and took the only ground which was left to him, that in those cases too much importance had been given to mere directory provisions for the payment of money by the city treasurer. It would not perhaps be easy to lay down any general rule as to when the provisions of a statute are merely directory, and when mandatory or imperative. Where the words are affirmative, and relate to the manner in which power or jurisdiction vested in...