Blagman v. White

Decision Date14 September 2000
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 99-537-AM.,Civ.A. 99-537-AM.
Citation112 F.Supp.2d 534
PartiesLatif BLAGMAN, Plaintiff, v. James R. WHITE, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

Latif Blagman, Victoria, VA, plaintiff pro se.

Pamela Anne Sargent, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, VA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELLIS, District Judge.

A Virginia inmate brings this § 1983 action alleging that defendants, administrators of a "boot camp" program at Stafford Detention Center (SDC) abridged his First Amendment right to the free exercise of his Muslim religion and violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause by treating Muslims less favorably than Christians. The inmate also asserts a claim that defendants attempted to discourage and intimidate Muslims from submitting grievances. For the reasons that follow, summary judgment must be entered for defendants.

I.

Plaintiff, a Virginia inmate, is a practicing Muslim who was a participant in the SDC "boot camp" program from September 28, 1998 to February 12, 1999.1 Named as defendants are James R. White, SDC Superintendent, and Ms. B. Evanchyk, SDC Assistant Superintendent.

SDC is a special residential detention facility for nonviolent male offenders. The program, modeled on military "boot camps," lasts only twenty weeks and is highly structured and restrictive.2 Only inmates who meet certain criteria may participate.3 And importantly, inmates who participate in the program earn the benefit of a potentially substantial sentence reduction.4 Program participants, known as "detainees," are expected to work daily and to complete educational and treatment programs. Additionally, lifestyle is highly regimented; no special dietary provisions are made for any detainee, and none are permitted to own religious paraphernalia other than a Bible, a Talmud, or a Koran.

A fundamental part of the SDC program is an intensive daily schedule. Pursuant to this schedule, a typical day for a detainee at SDC includes twenty-nine separate events, such as rising at 5:30 AM, physical training, reveille and flag raising, three meals, three sessions of programs, treatment, or education, and flag lowering. Detainees have only fifty minutes of personal time between 9:00 PM and 9:50 PM, followed by a ten minute hygiene inspection. Taps and lights out occur at 10:00 PM.

In response to Blagman's complaint, defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Blagman has replied by filing his own Motion for Summary Judgment.5 Somewhat inconsistently, he also contends that summary judgment is untimely because discovery has not yet occurred. Although he alludes generally to potential witnesses and documents, he has neither described in detail the discovery he believes is necessary, nor indicated by affidavit that without specific discovery he is unable to present essential facts in opposition to defendants' motion. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(f). Because Blagman has failed to specify the discovery needed and because the current record adequately sets forth the requisite facts and legal arguments, this matter is now ripe for summary adjudication.

II.

The principles governing disposition of summary judgment motions are well-established. On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The facts themselves, and the inferences to be drawn from those facts, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir.1985), overr'd on other grounds, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989); see also United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) (per curiam). Summary judgment is appropriate when a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The opposing party must do more than "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Moreover, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment...." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Only factual disputes that "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude ... summary judgment." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. And finally, where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, as here, "[R]ule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. It is through the lens of these principles that Blagman's claims must be examined.

III.
A. Equal Protection Claim

Blagman has claimed that Muslim inmates were treated differently from Christian inmates in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, he claims that Christian inmates were favored through (i) the use of better venues for religious services, (ii) the availability of a greater selection of religious books in the SDC library, and (iii) official observances of Christmas and Thanksgiving, without similar observances of Ramadan, a Muslim holiday.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must show at the outset that: (i) he was treated differently from others (ii) who were similarly situated and (iii) that such unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination. See McGlothlin v. Murray, 993 F.Supp. 389, 406 (W.D.Va.1997).

In assessing whether there exists any constitutionally relevant disparate treatment, it is important to keep in mind that the Equal Protection Clause does not command identical treatment; the constitution does not require that prison officials provide identical facilities, personnel, or opportunities for all religious sects. Instead, the Supreme Court has made clear that it is constitutionally sufficient in the prison context for prison officials to provide inmates belonging to various religions a "reasonable opportunity," consistent with valid penological concerns, to practice their religion, and that this opportunity must be "comparable" to the opportunities afforded inmates belonging to mainstream religions. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972).

In the event a threshold showing of constitutionally significant disparate treatment is made, the next step in the analysis is to determine whether any such disparity is warranted in the circumstances. See McGlothlin, 993 F.Supp. at 406. Ordinarily, where a disparity in treatment impinges upon a fundamental right, the inquiry "sharpens to determine whether the classification or disparity is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest." Id. (citing O'Bar v. Pinion, 953 F.2d 74, 81-82 (4th Cir.1991)). In the prison administration context, however, prison regulations need only survive a reasonableness inquiry, not strict scrutiny.6 Put another way, it is settled that the constitution allows reasonable restrictions on prison inmates' religious practices where the restrictions are supported by valid penological concerns. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987).

These settled principles, applied here, compel the conclusion that Blagman's equal protection claims fail. To begin with, Blagman and defendants agree that Christian and Muslim inmates were afforded essentially equal opportunities for religious services in separate locations at the same times and that both groups of inmates were subject to the same daily boot camp regimen and schedule. While Blagman has argued that the space offered Muslim inmates was inferior to that offered Christian inmates, the record reflects that defendants addressed this situation as a result of Blagman's complaints. Specifically, in response to Blagman's complaints, Muslim inmates were authorized to hold their religious services in quieter and less crowded spaces.7 Blagman raises no claim that these spaces are inadequate or inferior to those used by other religions. Moreover, it is undisputed that an exception to the SDC schedule was made permitting weekly Islamic study sessions for two hours on Friday afternoons with an Imam, a congregation leader, and that Blagman attended these sessions. In these circumstances, Blagman's equal protection claim must fail, for this record reflects that defendants afforded Blagman reasonable opportunities for pursuing his faith which were comparable to those afforded to Christian inmates. See Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079.

A further factual issue that is more apparent than real is whether Christian inmates have access to wider varieties of literature in the SDC library. There is essentially no record on this issue apart from the allegation; Blagman has not identified or specified the literature alleged to constitute this imbalance, nor have defendants responded to this claim. There is therefore no triable issue of fact with regard to library literature. Moreover, the law does not require prisons to ensure that their libraries adhere to numerical parity in books congenial to various...

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